a- 


PRESENT  PROBLEMS 
IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 


Books  By  David  Jayne  Hill 

A  History  of  Diplomacy  in  the  In- 
ternational Development  of  Europe. 

Vol.  I. — The  Struggle  for  Universal  Empire. 
With  5  Colored  Maps,  Chronological  Tables, 
List  of  Treaties  and  Index.  Pp.  XXII- 
481. 

Vol.  II.— The  Establishment  of  Territorial 
Sovereignty.  With  4  Colored  Maps, 
Tables,  etc.  Pp.  XXIV-688. 

Vol.  III. — The  Diplomacy  of  the  Age  of 
Absolutism.  With  5  Colored  Maps,  Tables, 
etc.  Pp.  XXVI-706. 

World    Organization,    as    Affected    by    the 
Nature  of  the  Modern  State.    Pp.  IX-2I4. 
Translated  also  into  French  and  German. 

The  People's  Government. 

Pp.  X-288. 

Americanism — What    It    Is. 

Pp.  XV-283. 

Translated  also  into  French. 

The  Rebuilding  of  Europe. 

Pp.   XII-28p. 

Translated  also  into  French. 

Impressions  of  the  Kaiser. 

Pp.  XII-266. 

Present  Problems  in  Foreign  Policy. 


PRESENT  PROBLEMS 
IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

BY 

DAVID  JAYNE  HILL 

\v 

AUTHOR  OT  "THE  PEOPLE'S  GOVERNMENT," 
"AMERICAN  ISM — WHAT  IT  is,"  BTC.J 


D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK  AND  LONDON 

MCMXIX 


COPYRIGHT,  1919,  BY 
D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY 

Copyright,  1919,  by 
THE  NOBTH  AMEBICAN  REVIEW  PUBLISHIKO  Co. 


PBINTED  IN  THE   UNITED  STATES  OF 


"Europe  has  a  set  of  primary  interests  which 
to  us  have  no,  or  a  'very  remote,  relation.  Hence 
she  must  be  engaged  in  frequent  controversies,  the 
causes  of  which  are  essentially  foreign  to  our 
concerns.  Hence  therefore  it  must  be  unwise  in 
us  to  implicate  ourselves,  by  artificial  ties,  m 
the  ordinary  vicissitudes  of  her  politics,  or  the 
ordinary  combinations  and  collisions  of  her  friend- 
ships or  enmities.  It  is  our  true  policy  to  steer 
clear  of  permanent  alliances  with  any  portion  of 
the  foreign  world — so  far,  1  mean,  as  we  are  now 
at  liberty  to  do  it;  for  let  me  not  be  understood 
as  capable  of  patronizing  infidelity  to  existmg 
engagements" 

GEORGE  WASHINGTON. 


/\ » . 

Go 


PREFACE 

THE  Great  War  has  been  on  the  part  of  the 
Entente  Allies  avowedly  a  battle  against  autoc- 
racy. The  occasion  for  it  was  that  autocracy, 
having  no  basis  in  principles  of  justice,  ruled 
by  the  exercise  of  arbitrary  force  regardless  of 
the  restraints  of  law. 

The  conflict  ended  in  the  triumph  of  democ- 
racy. The  autocratic  empires  were  left  in  ruins. 
The  task  of  democracy  is  to  reorganize  the  eman- 
cipated populations  and  to  create  responsible 
governments  which  can  maintain  legal  relations- 
with  one  another. 

This  can  be  done  only  by  the  firm  establishment 
of  law,  both  national  and  international;  for  de- 
mocracy without  respect  for  law  is  anarchy. 
Having  no  unity  of  interest  or  constancy  of 
purpose,  a  lawless  democracy  implies  a  perpetual 
conflict  without  definite  aims,  in  which  all  the 
participants  waste  their  energies  in  mutual  re- 
sistance. 

If,  therefore,  democracy  is  to  survive  and  or- 
ganize its  victory,  it  must  do  so  in  a  spirit  of 
loyalty  to  principles  of  justice.  The  will  of 

vii 


PREFACE 

the  victor  must  be  guided  by  the  spirit  of  obe- 
dience to  law.  Its  first  necessity,  however,  is  to 
prove  that  law  cannot  be  violated  with  impunity. 

The  fundamental  problem  that  confronts  us  at 
the  termination  of  the  Great  War  is,  therefore,  the 
restoration  of  the  rule  of  law.  I  say  the  restora- 
tion, and  not  the  inauguration,  of  the  rule  of  law, 
because  the  idea  of  law  is  not  a  new  idea,  and  a 
nominal  respect  for  law  is  not  a  new  state  of 
mind.  The  defect  in  pre-war  international  or- 
ganization was  not  that  International  Law  did  not 
exist  or  that  it  was  not  in  theory  authoritative, 
but  that  there  was  no  fixed  determination  on  the 
part  of  any  nation  to  enforce  it  except  in  its  own 
interest. 

The  lesson  of  the  war  is  that  the  enforcement 
of  International  Law  is  a  universal  and  not  mere- 
ly a  national  interest;  and  that,  in  reality,  there 
is  no  human  interest  that  is  comparable  with  it 
in  importance  except  the  enforcement  of  just  laws 
within  the  nations  themselves. 

The  difference  between  the  ante-war  period  and 
that  upon  which  we  have  entered  lies  chiefly  in 
this :  that  before  the  war  nations  were  to  a  great 
extent  ruled  by  autocratic  masters  who  had  no 
regard  for  law  but  were  guided  by  their  own 
ambitions  and  the  ambitions  of  those  who  sup- 
ported them ;  whereas  the  dissolution  of  these  im- 
perial Powers  has  left  their  populations  free  to 

viii 


PREFACE 

reestablish  themselves  upon  lines  of  organized 
liberty  under  law. 

The  task  of  accomplishing  this  is  a  stupendous 
one.  Without  mutual  aid,  and  especially  without 
the  utter  extermination  of  the  spirit  of  military 
autocracy,  it  is  impossible.  The  first  step  in 
the  accomplishment  of  that  task  is  peace, — a  peace 
in  which  it  is  made  clear  to  all  the  world  that 
the  spirit  which  caused  the  war  is  completely  sub- 
dued and  rendered  powerless  for  further  disturb- 
ance. Such  a  peace  must  be  a  peace  of  victory,  in 
which  it  is  made  evident  that  law  has  been  vin- 
dicated, and  that  violations  of  it  can  be  and  are 
effectively  punished.  To  speak  of  peace  in  any 
other  sense  than  this  before  such  a  peace  is  im- 
posed is  to  substitute  dreams  for  realities.  Herein 
lies  the  test  of  what  the  future  of  the  world  will 
be. 

When  that  condition  of  peace  is  fulfilled,  when 
it  is  plainly  established  that  the  violation  of 
International  Law  can  really  be  punished,  there 
will  be  a  ground  for  faith  that  it  can  in  the 
future  be  maintained.  With  the  certainty  of 
justice  will  come  the  organization  of  peace,  and 
it  can  be  attained  in  no  other  way. 

The  object  of  this  little  book  is  to  maintain  the 
thesis  that  without  the  rule  of  law  there  is  no  hope 
of  permanent  peace;  and  that  International  Law, 
being  the  affair  of  all  nations,  requires  for  its 

ix 


PREFACE 

enforcement  that  all  nations,  and  not  a  single 
group  organized  in  their  own  interest,  shall  freely 
have  a  part  in  the  formulation  and  protection 
of  it. 

The  proper  task  of  the  Entente  of  Free  Nations 
formed  in  the  prosecution  of  the  Great  War  is 
not,  therefore,  to  create  a  mere  organ  of  power 
but  an  institution  of  justice.  Such  an  institution 
cannot  be  established  by  a  League  of  Nations, 
unless  as  an  organization  it  makes  law  and  not 
power  the  chief  object  of  its  existence.  If  it 
dedicates  its  energies  frankly  to  the  perfection  of 
International  Law,  it  may  indeed  rise  to  the  height 
of  world  leadership;  but,  because  all  sovereign 
States  are  equal  before  the  law,  it  cannot  long 
subsist  merely  as  a  "League,"  which  is  essentially 
a  group  of  Powers  within  the  general  Society  of 
States.  What  is  required  is  the  union,  not  the 
division,  of  that  society.  Working  as  an  Entente 
of  Free  Nations  toward  the  ultimate  establish- 
ment of  that  society  on  the  basis  of  a  common 
law,  the  victors  in  the  war  have  had  their  oppor- 
tunity to  prove  that  violations  of  law,  even  of 
great  magnitude,  can  be  punished,  and  that  the 
time  has  come,  in  the  light  of  that  result,  for 
the  whole  Society  of  States  to  unite  in  the  perfec- 
tion and  the  protection  of  the  Law  of  Nations. 

This  is  not  the  course  that  has  been  pursued  in 
the  Peace  Conference  at  Paris.  "The  Constitution 


PREFACE 

of  a  League  of  Nations"  elaborated  there  has 
been  formed  under  the  stress  of  an  unfinished  war, 
in  the  face  of  an  unrepentant  foe,  in  the  midst 
of  conflicting  national  interests,  and  under  in- 
timidation by  the  presence  of  a  wholly  new  enemy 
tending  to  destroy  all  responsible  government.  It 
is  the  work  not  of  jurists  building  on  solid  founda- 
tions already  laid,  but  of  politicians  holding  a 
brief  for  particular  interests  or  a  personal  theory. 

These  conditions  have  prevented  the  dispassion- 
ate consideration  of  the  fundamental  problem  of 
permanent  international  organization  on  the  basis 
of  International  Law,  for  which  no  provision  is 
made.  The  "League  of  Nations,"  although  con- 
templating the  preservation  of  peace  by  the  crea- 
tion of  a  defensive  alliance  and  an  imperial  syn- 
dicate for  the  regulation  of  the  world  under  the 
control  of  a  small  group  of  Great  Powers,  is  no- 
where pledged  to  the  maintenance  of  International 
Law  or  to  the  recognition  of  the  inherent  rights 
of  States.  It  provides  for  war,  and  lays  down 
conditions  on  which  it  will  be  resorted  to;  but  it 
does  not  provide  for  justice  through  the  perfec- 
tion and  enforcement  of  law  based  upon  agreement. 

What  was  needed  to  give  effect  to  the  work  of 
the  Hague  Conferences  was  its  further  extension 
and  a  provision  for  applying  and  enforcing  its 
results.  The  proposed  League  of  Nations  wholly 
disregards  historic  continuity,  makes  no  reference 

• 

XI 


PREFACE 

to  past  achievements  or  provision  for  completing 
them,  and  simply  takes  us  back  to  the  conception 
of  the  preponderance  of  power. 

That  which  especially  justifies  these  reflections 
is  that  the  League  of  Nations,  as  it  has  been 
framed,  does  not  correspond  to  our  American 
traditions  and  ideals.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  in 
some  respects  an  abandonment  of  them.  How  far 
this  is  true  the  reader  may  judge  for  himself.  The 
aim  of  the  writer  has  been,  without  prejudice,  but 
with  perfect  freedom,  to  discuss  the  problems 
which  the  "League"  raises  as  well  as  those  which 
it  attempts  to  solve.  And  this,  it  is  believed,  can 
be  done  the  more  freely  because  the  idea  of  a 
"League,"  although  with  some  evident  misappre- 
hensions, has  been  received  in  Europe  as  an  Amer- 
ican idea. 

The  author  is  indebted  to  "The  North  Ameri- 
can Review"  for  permission  to  use  some  of  the 
papers  which  first  appeared  in  that  periodical. 

The  fourth  and  fifth  chapters  are  in  substance 
two  lectures  delivered  before  the  George  Wash- 
ington University. 

DAVID  JAYNE  HILL. 


CONTENTS 

MMM 

PREFACE vii 

I.    THE  ENTENTE  OF  FREE  NATIONS 1 

II.    GERMANY'S  POSE  FOR  PEACE 38 

^III.    INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  POLICY 69 

IV.    THE  CORPORATE  CHARACTER  OF  THE-  LEAGUE  OF 

NATIONS 104 

V.    THE  TREATY- MAKING  POWER  UNDER  THE  CONSTI- 
TUTION OF  THE  UNITED  STATES •  140 

VI.    THE  OBSTRUCTION  OF  PEACE 180 

VII.    THE  DEBACLE  OF  DOGMATISM 225 

VIII.    THE  PRESIDENT'S  CHALLENGE  TO  THE  SENATE      .  263 

DOCUMENTS 

I.     PRESIDENT  WILSON'S  "POINTS" 303 

II.    THE  COVENANT  AS  ORIGINALLY  AGREED  UPON  AT  . 

PARIS 309 

III.  THE  SENATE  "ROUND  ROBIN" 325 

IV.  AMENDMENTS  PROPOSED 327 

V.    THE  COVENANT  AS  REVISED 334 

INDEX  355 


I 

THE  ENTENTE  OF  FREE  NATIONS 

IN  every  period  of  warfare  since  modern 
nations  came  into  existence,  there  have  been 
serious  reflections  upon  the  cost  and  the  hor- 
rors of  war  which  have  culminated  in  schemes 
for  preventing  it  altogether.  Some  of  these 
have  been  merely  abstract  theories  regard- 
ing the  manner  in  which  international  con- 
flicts could  be  obviated  or  rendered  impos- 
sible ;  while  others  have  been  of  a  more  prag- 
matic character,  aiming  to  create  in  the  realm 
of  actuality  a  situation  which  would  safe- 
guard the  interests  of  peace  and  possibly  of 
justice. 

The  Thirty  Years'  War,  which  was  ended 
by  the  Peace  of  Westphalia,  in  1648,  sug- 
gested to  Emeric  Cruce  his  "Nouveau 
Cynee,"  written  during  its  progress  in  1623, 
in  which  the  Republic  of  Venice  was  pro- 
posed as  a  place  where  a  permanent  corps 

1 


IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

should  reside  and  by  their 
votes  settle  all  international  disputes.  In 
1625  Hugo  Grotius,  perceiving  that  such 
settlements  could  not  be  made  except  upon 
some  basis  of  previously  accepted  rules  and 
principles,  gave  to  the  world  his  great  work, 
"De  Jure  Belli  ac  Pacis,"  the  first  complete 
treatise  on  the  Law  of  Nations;  and  to  this 
he  added  the  proposal  of  "some  kind  of  a 
body  in  whose  assemblies  the  quarrels  of  each 
one  might  be  terminated  by  the  judgment  of 
others-  not  interested,"  and  that  "means  be 
sought  to  constrain  the  parties  to  agree  to 
reasonable  conditions." 

In  like  manner,  in  1634,  a  notable  device 
for  maintaining  peace,  called  the  "Great  De- 
sign," was  invented  by  the  Duke  of  Sully 
and  attributed  to  Henry  IV  of  France  as 
the  plan  of  that  monarch  for  ending  the  long 
struggle  between  the  House  of  Hapsburg 
and  the  rest  of  Europe ;  but  it  is  now  estab- 
lished that  it  was  the  scheme  of  Sully  him- 
self, who  as  a  fallen  minister  hoped  by  this 
means  to  procure  his  own  recall  to  the  ad- 
ministration of  the  affairs  of  his  country.  All 


THE  ENTENTE  OF  FREE  NATIONS 

Europe,  according  to  this  plan,  was  to  be  or- 
ganized into  fifteen  States,  which  should  to- 
gether constitute  one  Christian  Republic, 
in  which  wars  were  to  be  prevented  by  a  Gen- 
eral Council,  composed  of  forty  delegates, 
meeting  annually  in  the  most  central  cities 
of  the  different  countries  in  rotation. 

During  the  Congress  of  Utrecht,  in  1713, 
the  Abbe  de  St.  Pierre  elaborated  his 
"Project  of  Perpetual  Peace,"  to  which 
more  particular  reference  will  be  made  in 
discussing  the  provisions  of  the  League  of 
Nations  proposed  at  Paris,  of  which  it  is 
an  almost  perfect  prototype.  The  Napo- 
leonic Wars  also  brought  forth  plans  for  in- 
ternational peace,  the  most  conspicuous  ef- 
fort being  that  of  Immanuel  Kant,  in  1796, 
in  his  essay  on  "Eternal  Peace,"  in  which  the 
solution  offered  by  this  Prussian  philosopher 
was  that  all  States  should  become  republi- 
can in  form;  a  condition,  as  he  thought, 
which  would  enable  them  by  some  kind  of 
general  federation  to  unite  their  forces  for 
the  preservation  of  peace. 

It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that,  as  a 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

result  of  the  defeat  of  the  aggressors  in  the 
Great  War  now,  as  we  hope,  happily  termi- 
nated by  the  united  efforts  of  a  group  of 
advanced  and  liberal  nations,  these  plans, 
or  modifications  of  them,  should  again  re- 
ceive attention,  and  that  a  general  desire 
should  be  created  for  "some  kind  of  body," 
as  Grotius  expressed  the  aspiration,  which 
could  prevent  the  repetition  of  the  experi- 
ence through  which  the  world  has  passed. 

What  was  impossible  before  the  Great 
War,  it  is  believed  by  many,  could  be  easily 
accomplished  now;  and  that,  therefore,  even 
before  a  peace  is  finally  concluded,  and  as 
an  essential  part  of  it  and  a  condition  of  its 
perpetuity,  a  "League  of  Nations"  should  be 
formed. 

There  are,  it  is  true,  wide  differences  of 
opinion  regarding  the  objects,  the  methods, 
the  organization,  and  the  obligations  of  such 
a  league,  varying  from  the  creation  of  a 
World  State  by  the  federation  of  the  ex- 
isting nations  into  one  vast  political  organ- 
ism including  all,  both  small  and  great,  to 
a  limited  compact  confined  to  a  few  Powers 


THE  ENTENTE  OF  FREE  NATIONS 

with  no  function  beyond  the  peaceable  ad- 
judication of  differences  by  an  international 
tribunal  without  power  to  enforce  its  judg- 
ments. 

The  occasion  is,  no  doubt,  opportune  for 
a  thorough  discussion  of  these  widely  differ- 
ing plans,  and  it  is  timely  for  their  advocates 
to  express  their  views  and  support  their  con- 
ceptions by  argument;  but  it  is  by  no  means 
to  be  taken  for  granted  that  any  one  of 
these  projects,  however  honestly  and  earn- 
estly its  supporters  may  believe  it  should 
be  at  once  adopted,  is  either  practicable  or 
desirable.  The  stress  of  insistence  should 
not  be  placed  upon  the  means  of  forcing  the 
acceptance  of  a  particular  plan,  however 
meritorious  it  may  be  in  itself,  but  upon  the 
intelligent  comparison  of  different  plans 
and  a  patient  examination  of  their  probable 
effects. 

That  which  needs,  first  of  all,  to  be  em- 
phasized is,  that  no  one  Power  can  expect, 
or  should  desire,  to  impose  upon  others  a  sys- 
tem which  they  do  not  all  heartily  approve; 
and,  in  the  next  place,  that  if  any  plan  is  to 

5 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

be  permanent  and  effective,  it  must  have  the 
support  not  only  of  the  leading  governments 
but  of  the  great  masses  of  the  people  whom 
those  governments  represent.  It  is,  there- 
fore, greatly  to  be  desired  that  the  public 
should  be  fully  informed  before  any  decisive 
step  is  taken,  that  nothing  should  be  urged 
until  it  is  well  understood,  and  that  no 
theorist,  however  competent  and  trusted, 
should  be  regarded  as  a  trustee  of  a  whole 
people  in  a  matter  of  such  import  and  conse- 
quence. The  true  principle  that  should  be 
invoked  for  guidance  in  this  matter  was  well 
and  forcibly  enunciated  by  the  President  of 
the  United  States  when,  in  1912,  in  his  first 
electoral  campaign,  he  dwelt  upon  the  value 
of  "common  counsel,"  and,  as  one  of  the 
people,  seeking  leadership,  expressed  his  at- 
titude regarding  public  policies  in  the  words : 
"I  am  one  of  those  who  absolutely  reject  the 
trustee  theory,  the  guardianship  theory.  I 
have  never  found  a  man  who  knew  how  to 
take  care  of  me,  and,  reasoning  from  that 
point  out,  I  conjecture  that  there  isn't  any 
man  who  knows  how  to  take  care  of  all  the 

6 


THE  ENTENTE  OF  FREE  NATIONS 

people  of  the  United  States.  I  suspect  that 
the  people  of  the  United  States  understand 
their  own  interests  better  than  any  group  of 
men  in  the  confines  of  the  country  under- 
stand them." 

It  may,  of  course,  be  thought  that  it  is  not 
the  "interests  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States"  that  should  prevail  in  the  formation 
of  an  organization  so  general  as  a  "League 
of  Nations,"  but  the  interests  of  humanity. 
This  may  be  true,  but  the  "trustee  theory, 
the  guardianship  theory,"  is  perhaps  even 
less  applicable  to  humanity  as  a  whole  than 
it  is  to  a  single  people,  who  in  ordinary  cir- 
cumstances may  at  least  have  an  opportunity 
to  choose,  and  to  some  extent  direct,  their 
trustee  or  guardian. 

It  would,  however,  be  a  fatal  error  to 
overlook  the  fact  that  the  interests  of  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  as  well  as  the 
interests  of  other  portions  of  humanity,  are 
deeply  involved  in  any  plan  to  form  a 
"League  of  Nations."  Great  benefits  might 
accrue,  or  serious  disadvantages  might  re- 
sult from  occupying  a  place  in  it.  It  is  the 

7 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

duty  of  the  people  as  well  as  the  statesmen 
of  the  nations  that  may  enter  into  such  a 
league,  to  consider  for  themselves  the  alleged 
benefits  and  the  possible  disadvantages. 
This  has  been  done  in  Great  Britain,  in 
France,  in  Italy,  and  in  Japan, — to  mention 
only  a  few  of  the  co-belligerents, — and  their 
interests,  which  are  different,  have  been  care- 
fully considered.  The  signs  of  this  are  evi- 
dent to  those  who  are  familiar  with  the  con- 
temporary comments  of  the  European  press 
upon  this  subject,  especially  the  great  Brit- 
ish quarterlies,  which  have  discussed  the 
"League  of  Nations"  with  a  candor,  a  seri- 
ousness, and  an  understanding  that  have  not 
been  equaled  by  American  periodicals  of 
the  same  class,  which  have  inclined  to  take 
the  complimentary  speeches  of  Lloyd 
George,  Lord  Grey,  Mr.  Asquith,  and  Mr. 
Balfour  as  a  complete  and  authoritative  ex- 
pression of  British  opinion,  but  this  is  far 
from  being  the  case. 

No  discussion  of  the  subject  had  been  pub- 
lished in  America  to  compare  in  amplitude 
of  knowledge  and  solidity  of  judgment  with 

8 


THE  ENTENTE  OF  FREE  NATIONS 

the  treatment  of  it  under  the  title  "The 
Greatest  League  of  Nations,"  by  Lord  Syd- 
enham  of  Combe,  in  "The  Nineteenth  Cen- 
tury and  After,"  for  August,  1918,  which 
concludes:  "We  shall  not  win  the  war  by 
planning  Leagues  of  Peace  to  meet  circum- 
stances which  we  cannot  yet  foresee.  Like 
the  paper  constitutions  of  Sieyes  they  may 
prove  impracticable;  but  the  Holy  Alliance 
against  the  forces  of  evil  remains,  and  when 
it  is  crowned  with  victory  it  can  be  turned 
into  a  powerful  agency  for  maintaining  the 
peace  of  the  world.  Then,  in  some  happier 
future,  the  vision  of  Isaiah  may  be  fulfilled, 
and  'Nation  shall  not  lift  up  sword  against 
nation;  neither  shall  they  learn  war  any 
more.' " 

Nor  had  anything  appeared  in  the  Ameri- 
can periodicals  so  searching  and  so  well  in- 
formed as  the  article  by  J.  B.  Firth,  under 
the  title  "The  Government  and  the  League 
of  Nations,"  in  "The  Fortnightly  Review" 
for  September,  1918.  He  points  out  that 
the  British  Government  some  months  before 
appointed  "a  very  well  chosen  Committee," 

9 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

— as  Mr.  Balfour  described  it, — "on  which 
international  law  and  history  were  power- 
fully represented,"  to  examine  and  report  on 
a  "League  of  Nations."  "The  report,"  he 
says,  "has  been  drawn  up,  but  its  contents 
have  not  been  divulged.  Neither  Lord  Cur- 
zon  nor  Mr.  Balfour  alluded  to  it;  they  did 
not  even  say  that  it  had  been  considered  by 
the  War  Cabinet.  By  a  curious  coincidence 
the  same  official  reticence  is  being  observed 
in  France.  There,  too,  an  authoritative 
Commission,  presided  over  by  M.  Bourgeois, 
was  appointed  by  the  Government,  and  is- 
sued its  report  last  January;  but  it  has  not 
been  published  in  France,  and,  according 
to  Lord  Curzon,  no  copy  of  it  had  reached 
the  British  Government  on  June  26th.  Why 
this  secretiveness,  both  in  London  and  Paris? 
If  there  had  been  practical  unanimity  in 
favor  of  the  project  there  could  be  no  reason 
for  reserve." 

There  was,  no  doubt,  however,  an  excel- 
lent reason  for  this  discreet  silence.  It  is  the 
desire  of  the  officials  of  both  England  and 
France  not  to  wound  the  sensibilities  of  the 

10 


THE  ENTENTE  OF  FREE  NATIONS 

Americans,  who  are  credited  with  being  the 
sponsors  of  the  "League  of  Nations."  The 
British  leaders,  always  without  definition, 
but  in  a  fine  spirit  of  courtesy,  took  up  the 
watchword,  a  "League  of  Nations," — for 
it  was  so  far  nothing  more, — and  Lord 
Curzon  was  able  to  say  in  the  House  of 
Lords,  that  opinion  in  England  in  favor  of 
the  League  was  "rather  in  advance  of  the 
opinion  of  any  of  our  Allies  save  the  United 
States";  and  he  added,  that  "if  the  British 
Government  went  ahead  too  quickly,  or  too 
abruptly,  there  was  danger  of  a  rebuff."  As 
a  confirmation  of  this  danger,  Mr.  Firth  re- 
marks, that,  "although  the  report  of  the 
French  Commission  has  not  been  published, 
it  is  an  open  secret  that  its  judgment  was 
adverse  to  any  proposal  for  establishing  an 
international  force  which  shall  be  always 
ready  to  enforce  the  decisions  of  the  League 
upon  a  recalcitrant  member." 

In  an  admirable  historic  summary,  Mr. 
Firth  illustrates  with  instances  the  tedious 
wrangling  in  the  so-called  Concert  of  Europe 
over  the  simplest  and  most  necessary  forms 

11 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

of  cooperative  action,  and  asks:  "How  can 
these  idealists  talk  airily  about  the  estab- 
lishment of  an  international  army  or  the  dis- 
patch of  an  international  expedition  to  deal 
with  an  aggressor  against  the  'League  of 
Nations,'  when  they  see  how  long  it  has 
taken  Japan  and  the  United  States  to  come 
to  an  understanding  on  the  subject  of  joint 
action  in  Siberia?  Every  hour  was  of  price- 
less value  ....  Yet  days  and  weeks  were 
suffered  to  slip  by  for  political  reasons  which 
are  perfectly  well  known  and  thoroughly 
understood.  Will  it  be  any  different  when 
there  is  a  'League  of  Nations'  ?" 

A  passage  as  instructive  to  Americans  as 
it  is  characteristic  of  English  thought  is 
found  in  the  "English  Review"  for  October, 
1918,  in  which  its  editor,  Austin  Harrison, 
illustrates  what  he  conceives  to  be  a  general 
principle  by  what  he  regards  as  a  conspicu- 
ous example.  "There  is  and  can  be  no  such 
thing,"  he  says,  "as  democratic  government, 
as  loosely  understood;  for  every  democracy 
is  controlled  by  an  oligarchy,  whether  of  in- 
tellect, of  interest,  or  of  mere  popularity, 


THE  ENTENTE  OF  FREE  NATIONS 

and  the  purer  the  democracy  the  greater 
would  seem  to  be  the  authority  of  its  oli- 
garchy, as  we  have  all  seen  in  the  astonish- 
ing singleness,  discipline,  and  elasticity  of 
the  heterogeneous  masses  of  America  at  war 
under  what  is  nothing  less  than  the  sov- 
ereign will  of  the  President.  It  is  this 
acceptance  of  oligarchical  authority  in 
America  that  differentiates  the  democracy 
of  the  New  World  from  that  of  the  Old,  as 
particularly  exemplified  in  Britain.  Take 
the  case  of  conscription,  which  in  America 
became  law  overnight,  though  three  thou- 
sand miles  of  sea  divided  America  from  the 
theater  of  the  war,  and  in  no  case  was  any 
motive  put  forward  for  war  but  that  of  prin- 
ciple. Here  it  took  us  two  years,  because 
our  democracy  does  not  accept  its  oligarchy, 
does  not  recognize  acquiescence,  is  intellect- 
ually and  traditionally  antagonized  by  the 
very  idea  of  authority,  whether  of  govern- 
ment or  opportunity." 

It  is  true  that  the  people  of  the  United 
States  have  been  singularly  united  and  sin- 
gularly obedient  to  leadership,  but  the  com- 

13 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ment  fails  to  find  a  true  interpretation  of  the 
fact.  This  nation  has  never  bowed  to  "the 
sovereign  will  of  the  President."  It  has  re- 
spected the  voice  of  individual  conscience. 
It  beheld  in  the  conduct  of  Germany  an  in- 
expressible wrong  of  gigantic  proportions. 
It  shuddered,  but  it  did  not  hesitate  to  judge 
or  condemn.  Millions,  tens  of  millions,  of 
men  in  America  wanted  to  fight  Germany 
when  the  will  of  the  President  was  not  yet 
for  war,  and  chafed  under  the  neutrality  of 
their  Government.  Thousands  of  our  young 
men  went  to  Canada  and  to  France,  in  order 
to  help  in  defeating  Germany  before  any 
"sovereign  will"  had  expressed  itself  in  the 
United  States.  There  is  the  explanation  of 
conscription.  It  was,  indeed,  based  on  a 
"principle" ;  but  the  principle  was  not  a  gov- 
ernmental enunciation,  it  was  a  deep-seated 
and  almost  universal  declaration  of  the 
national  mind. 

It  took  England,  Mr.  Harrison  says,  "two 
years  to  adopt  conscription,  because  English 
democracy  does  not  accept  its  oligarchy." 
In  the  result  the  advantage  is  with  England. 

14 


THE  ENTENTE  OF  FREE  NATIONS 

It  took  us  much  more  than  two  years  to  pre- 
pare for  war,  because  our  oligarchy  did  not 
appeal  to  its  democracy. 

The  error  of  this  brilliant  writer  regarding 
our  "oligarchy"  and  its  influence  has  led  him 
more  seriously  astray  on  some  other  points. 
Without  our  intervention,  he  thinks,  the 
Great  War  would  have  had  to  be  settled  on 
the  principle  of  "the  balance  of  power," — a 
peace  without  a  victory;  and  from  this  he 
argues  that  "the  message  of  America  is 
democracy,  her  mission  is  union."  America 
is  thus  held  responsible  for  proposing  a 
"League  of  Nations."  We  have  been  fight- 
ing, he  thinks,  "not  Germany;  not,  in  the  his- 
torical sense,  the  Germans ;  but  the  German 
idea  of  mastery,  the  German  feudal  system, 
the  Kultur  of  imperial  and  dynastic  ambi- 
tion. America  is  thus  fighting  against  the 
attitude  of  the  balance  of  power." 

This  is  a  total  misapprehension,  which 
proves  how  inadequately  British  perception 
has  comprehended  our  real  motives  as  a  peo- 
ple, and  how  insufficiently  we  have  thus  far 
expressed  them.  It  assumes  that  we  have 

15 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

been  fighting  for  "fourteen  points"  of  Euro- 
pean and  world  reconstruction ;  and  that  the 
success  of  those,  including  a  "League  of 
Nations,"  was  what  we  have  had  in  mind. 
There  is  probably  not  one  soldier  or  even  one 
officer  in  the  American  Army,  either  in  the 
field  or  at  home,  who  ever  thought  for  a  mo- 
ment that  he,  or  his  country,  was  carrying 
on  this  war  "against  the  attitude  of  the  bal- 
ance of  power,"  or  to  establish  a  "League  of 
Nations."  Not  one  in  a  hundred  thousand 
ever  dreamed  that  the  war  had  anything  to 
do  with  "the  balance  of  power";  and  few 
would  have  known  what  it  meant  if  it  were 
suggested  to  them.  They  were  fighting  the 
Germans,  because  the  Germans  were  brutal- 
izing mankind,  violating  International  Law, 
and  destroying  people's  homes.  And  there 
is  not  a  man  of  them  who  would  not  fight 
again  for  the  same  reason.  )  1 1  ^  «7^^iifc 
We  do  not  wish  to  be  misunderstood  in 
Europe  by  the  representation  that  we  went 
into  this  war  with  the  purpose,  or  for  the 
end,  of  creating  a  "League  of  Nations."  We 
have  not,  as  a  people,  studied  the  project. 

16 


THE  ENTENTE  OF  FREE  NATIONS 

We  do  not  all  even  know  what  it  is.  There 
are  many  full-fledged  and  very  ingenious 
schemes  for  a  "League  of  Nations"  which 
palpably  contradict  one  another.  Of  one 
thing  some  of  us  are  sure,  we  do  not  wish, 
or  intend,  to  be  bound  in  the  dark,  or  to  be 
controlled  by  abstract  terms  that  would 
make  us  shrink  from  keeping  our  obligations 
in  a  concrete  way;  and  we  know  that  noth- 
ing is  more  illusive  than  the  requirements 
of  a  treaty,  unless  it  is  very  precise  and  treats 
of  matters  clearly  and  definitely  known. 
We,  as  a  people,  went  into  this  war  to  pre- 
vent Germany  from  throttling  the  world, 
our  own  country  included,  as  she  had  done 
to  Belgium,  and  Serbia,  and  whoever  else 
opposed  or  did  not  aid  her.  It  was  not  to 
secure  for  her  a  place  of  equality  in  a  so- 
ciety whose  laws  and  whose  material  inter- 
ests she  had  deliberately  planned  to  destroy, 
that  two  million  peaceful  American  citizens 
put  on  their  uniforms  and  went  to  Europe 
over  seas  in  whose  waters  torpedoes  lurked 
and  mines  floated.  It  was  to  render  this 
savagery  impossible. 

17 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

We  have  not,  however,  to  read  far  before 
we  discover  that  it  is  not  a  league  in  the  sense 
of  a  mere  legal  compact,  with  minutely  spe- 
cified obligations,  that  Mr.  Austin  Harrison 
has  in  mind.  "The  real  problem  in  a  League 
of  Nations  is,  to  my  mind,"  he  says,  "not  the 
sanction — that  the  soldiers  will  see  to  on 
their  return — not  the  machinery,  not  the  tri- 
bunal, not  the  immediate  dispensation  of 
justice,  but  the  creation  of  a  regularized  co- 
operation capable  of  the  necessary  flexibil- 
ity and  progressiveness,  which  alone  can  give 
it  the  life  of  durability."  In  brief,  it  is  not 
a  treaty  signed  by  diplomatists,  but  a  union 
of  consciences  in  a  common  cause  of  jus- 
tice that  is  to  save  the  world.  Of  this  no 
American  soldier,  I  think,  would  need  to  be 
convinced.  It  was  a  consciousness  of  this  in 
his  own  understanding  that  made  him  ac- 
cept gladly  his  marching  orders. 

In  another  article  in  the  same  Review, 
Austin  Harrison,  to  illustrate  his  meaning, 
cites  the  words  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States  uttered  on  September  27th, 
1918:  "It  is  the  peculiarity  of  this  great 

18 


THE  ENTENTE  OF  FREE  NATIONS 

war  that,  while  statesmen  have  seemed  to 
cast  about  for  definitions  of  their  purpose 
and  have  sometimes  seemed  to  shift  their 
ground  and  point  of  view,  the  thought  of 
the  mass  of  men,  whom  statesmen  are  sup- 
posed to  instruct  and  lead,  has  grown  more 
and  more  unclouded,  more  and  more  cer- 
tain of  what  it  is  they  are  fighting  for.  Na- 
tional purposes  have  fallen  more  and  more 
into  the  background,  and  the  common  pur- 
pose of  enlightened  mankind  has  taken  their 
place.  The  counsels  of  plain  men  have  be- 
come on  all  hands  more  simple  and  straight- 
forward and  more  unified  than  the  counsels 
of  sophisticated  men  of  affairs,  who  still  re- 
tain the  impression  that  they  are  playing  a 
game  of  power  and  playing  for  high  stakes. 
That  is  why  I  have  said  that  this  is  a  peo- 
ple's war,  not  a  statesman's.  Statesmen 
must  follow  the  clarified  common  thought 
or  be  broken." 

These  are  words  as  true  as  they  were  no- 
bly spoken.     They  have  given  to  the  man 
who  uttered  them  an  unprecedented  pres- 
tige.   In  words  equally  true  and  noble,  Mr. 
19 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Harrison  expresses  the  expectations  which 
they  inspire.  "In  place  of  diplomacy  acting 
in  secrecy  for  purely  selfish  or  national  mo- 
tives, Europe  is  bidden  to  regard  the  oppor- 
tunity of  the  whole,  bidden  to  the  law  of  a 
commonwealth."  This  is  assumed  to  be  the 
message  of  America  that  is  to  save  Europe. 

'Unfortunately,  this  message  is  enveloped 
in  a  nebula  shot  through  with  seeming  con- 
tradictions. "It  is  not,"  Mr.  Harrison  con- 
tinues, "a  question  of  juridical  form  and 
formula.  Its  sanction  must  be  inborn,  in- 
duced— the  evolution  of  harmony.  Peace 
can  never  be  established  on  a  durable  basis 
through  the  organization  of  international 
councils  of  control;  by  police  machinery; 
still  less  by  penal  or  constrictive  impositions. 
That  is  the  old — the  Napoleonic,  the  Ger- 
man— way.  .  .  .  All  must  go  to  the  table  of 
peace  ready  to  give  and  to  give  up ;  to  found 
a  charter  of  international  rights  based  not  on 
force,  but  on  the  sanction  of  free  peoples." 

This  might  well  be  the  message  of  Amer- 
ica; though  perhaps  rather  puzzling  to  the 
members  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace. 
20 


THE  ENTENTE  OF  FREE  NATIONS 

But  what  is  the  authority  for  it?  Who  has 
been  charged  to  deliver  America's  message? 
Who  has  formulated  it?  Who  has  explained 
it? 

In  glowing  words,  Mr.  Harrison  reiter- 
ates the  thought  that  Europe  is  to  be  some- 
how saved  by  America.  "Either  an  attempt 
to  restart  Europe  on  some  accepted  law  or 
morality  of  cooperative  utility  instead  of 
competitive  force  with  the  object  of  remov- 
ing the  causes  of  war,  or  we  shall  achieve 
nothing  permanent,"  he  declares.  And  it  is 
America  that  is  to  give  the  start.  And  he 
tells  us  in  what  manner.  "I  can  only  re- 
peat," he  says,  "what  I  have  urged  again 
and  again,  that  national  conferences  should 
be  convened,  charged  to  offer  their  con- 
certed advice  upon  the  problems  of  the  sub- 
ject peoples;  that  these  conferences  should 
consider  concurrently  a  common  agenda; 
that  the  proceedings  of  all  these  conferences 
should  be  made  public,  and  that  they  should 
be  in  daily  telegraphic  communication  with 
one  another.  Something  of  the  kind  has 
been  done  in  France,  but  here  (in  England) 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

we  have  heard  of  no  such  assembly  of  in- 
tellect. A  Declaration  of  Rights  can  hard- 
ly issue  from  a  bureaucracy;  it  must  come 
from  the  clash  of  the  best  minds  of  democ- 
racy, thinking  aloud.  .  .  .  For  the  problems 
are  not  only  international,  they  are  also  na- 
tional, and  the  danger  to  the  constitution  of 
the  new  fabric  of  laws  will  be  found  in  their 
application.  That  is  why  the  collective  wis- 
dom emanating  from  these  National  Confer- 
ences would  seem  the  indispensable  condi- 
tion of  the  success  of  any  permanent  Inter- 
national Law.  .  .  .  Now  the  antecedent  con- 
dition to  such  a  Law  of  Nations  must  be  a 
Declaration  of  Rights." 
,  What  progress  had  we,  the  American  peo- 
ple, made  in  this  direction  when  the  Peace 
Conference  met  at  Paris?  We  are  assumed 
to  have  felt, — we  are  said  even  to  have  im- 
parted to  Europe, — the  impulse  toward  a 
better  international  adjustment;  but  what 
channel  for  its  expression,  what  mechanism 
for  its  effective  operation,  had  been  deliber- 
ately even  discussed  either  by  or  before  the 
people?  "The  voice  of  the  people  must 


THE  ENTENTE  OF  FREE  NATIONS 

make  itself  felt,  directing  the  voice  of  the 
Conference,"  we  are  told;  "for  only  so  can 
there  be  any  'demonstration'  of  the  new 
thought  essential  to  release,  or  any  manifes- 
tation of  sacrifice."  What  an  opportunity 
then  has  been  missed,  to  say  openly  what 
sacrifices  are  expected  of  us?  What  obliga- 
tions are  to  be  incurred  by  us?  What  legal 
forms  are  to  be  accepted  by  us,  in  the  great 
process  of  creating  an  international  govern- 
ment which,  in  important  matters,  will  su- 
persede our  own?  for  that  is  what  is  implied 
in  a  "League  of  Nations." 

I  shall  not  attempt  to  enter  here  upon  any 
analysis  of  the  various  ingenious  drafts  of  an 
international  constitution,  as  the  fundamen- 
tal law  regulating  the  legislative,  judicial, 
and  executive  powers  of  such  an  internation- 
al government, — a  government  which,  with- 
in its  sphere,  will  control  the  governments 
of  the  nations  that  subscribe  to  it.  One 
thing,  however,  is  plain,  that  to  possess  any 
efficiency  these  powers  must  detract  in  im- 
portant ways  and  in  large  degree  from  the 
powers  of  the  national  governments  and  in- 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

volve  a  considerable  sacrifice  of  their  sov- 
ereignty. It  is  true,  on  the  one  hand,  that 
sovereignty  in  what  are  called  the  "democ- 
racies" has  been  gradually  transferred  from 
a  personal  absolute  monarch  to  the  people, 
or  to  some  portion  of  them;  and  it  is  also 
true,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  conception 
of  sovereignty  in  constitutional  States  has 
been  to  some  degree  modified  by  the  recog- 
nized limitation  of  the  irresponsible  use  of 
force  and  the  addition  of  ethical  elements 
in  its  exercise.  In  brief,  no  people  can  right- 
ly claim  to  possess  rights  in  proportion  to 
their  power,  and  sovereignty  cannot,  in  a 
juristic  sense,  be  longer  regarded  as  strictly 
absolute.  In  every  State  founded  upon  the 
rights  of  persons,  which  is  the  basis  claimed 
by  democracy,  the  rights  of  the  whole  peo- 
ple cannot  exceed  what  is  necessary  to  the 
maintenance  of  the  right  of  each. 

In  proportion  as  they  become  republican, 
as  Kant  contends,  States  may  find  it  easier 
to  combine  in  federations  than  was  the  case 
with  absolute  monarchies;  still,  even  repub- 
lics are  jealous  of  their  sovereign  powers, 

24 


THE  ENTENTE  OF  FREE  NATIONS 

and  they  are  not  disposed  lightly  to  surren- 
der them.  Every  scheme  for  a  League  of 
Nations  requires  this  surrender  in  some  de- 
gree, for  every  such  league  creates  in  some 
form  a  supernational  body  of  control,  to 
which  the  members  agree  to  submit.  Mem- 
bership in  such  a  league,  of  necessity,  im- 
plies the  renunciation  of  any  independent 
foreign  policy. 

In  a  world  composed  of  nations  varying 
in  culture,  character,  education,  and  honor, 
as  well  as  in  numbers,  strength,  and  military 
traditions,  such  a  renunciation  cannot  wisely 
be  made  without  unusual  assurances,  and  it 
cannot  be  universal.  If  made  at  all,  it  must 
be  made  for  the  sake  of  advantages  not  oth- 
erwise attainable,  and  for  an  association  that 
is  beyond  suspicion.  A  league  which  had 
for  its  object  to  enforce  peace,  without  spe- 
cific foreknowledge  of  the  occasions  that 
might  call  for  its  exercise  of  the  war-making 
power,  could  not  be  wisely  created  except 
between  nations  of  the  highest  moral  respon- 
sibility and  mutual  confidence,  and  could 
never  safely  be  allowed  to  include  any  nation 

25 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

that  could  not  be  trusted  to  accept  and  obey 
the  decisions  of  a  tribunal  to  which  it  might 
consent  to  submit  a  difference. 

A  league  professing  to  be  composed  only 
of  "free  nations"  would  rest  upon  a  basis  of 
an  extremely  ambiguous  character.  What 
nations  are  to  be  classed  as  "free"  ?  Certain- 
ly no  nation  that  holds  in  subjection  any 
people  not  permitted  to  enjoy  self-govern- 
ment. And  the  mutability  of  nations  must 
not  be  overlooked.  The  expression  "free  na- 
tions" is  especially  equivocal  in  a  period  of 
revolution  and  transition,  like  the  present. 
Neither  Russia,  nor  Austria- Hungary,  nor 
even  Germany  could  claim  a  place  in  it,  nor 
could  the  fragments  into  which  they  may 
possibly  fall  before  the  movements  of  revolt 
or  secession  are  completed.  And  what  is  to 
be  said  of  the  suppressed  nationalities  which 
are  aspiring  to  independence  but  have  not 
yet  attained  it? 

Is  it  not  a  little  singular  that  the  course  of 
events  and  the  effort  to  control  them  by  gen- 
eral principles  should  have  led  men  to  claim 
that  the  coming  peace  should  include  such 
26 


THE  ENTENTE  OF  FREE  NATIONS 

logical  antinomies  as  a  partial  renunciation 
of  national  sovereignty  and  the  complete  at- 
tainment of  self-determination? 

The  origin  of  the  problem  is  more  evident 
than  its  solution.  On  the  one  hand,  some 
nations  are  regarded  as  too  independent,  too 
powerful,  and  too  aspiring,  to  be  considered 
safe  for  the  rest  of  the  world,  unless  they 
are  willing  to  have  imposed  upon  them  cer- 
tain restraints  wrhich  equality  seems  to  re- 
quire; while,  on  the  other,  some  nations  are 
too  much  oppressed,  too  feeble,  and  too  sub- 
missive, to  assert  the  national  rights  which 
even-handed  justice  would  assign  to  them. 

We  are  here  confronted  with  the  indis- 
putable fact  of  the  natural  inequality  of  na- 
tions, and  this  disparity  extends  to  every  cir- 
cumstance of  national  life,  except  one.  Ju- 
ristically,  all  independent  and  responsible 
States,  whether  large  or,  small,  have  equal 
abstract  rights  to  existence,  self-preserva- 
tion, self-defense,  and  self-determination; 
but  culturally,  economically,  and  potentially 
they  are,  and  must  remain,  unequal.  If  they 
enter  a  "League  of  Nations,"  they  must  en- 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ter  it  upon  terms  which  the  strong  are  dis- 
posed to  grant  to  the  weak  and  which  the 
weak  are  obliged  to  accept  from  the  strong. 
It  is  evident  who  will  make  the  laws.  But 
if  self-determination  is  a  right,  and  its  real- 
ization is  possible  only  through  the  exercise 
of  force,  who  shall  say  that  a  suppressed  na- 
tion may  not  plan  and  achieve  its  own  devel- 
opment, as  the  greater  States  have  done? 
Shall  the  great  empires  impose  upon  the 
world  an  unchangeable  status  of  their  own 
devising;  or  shall  the  Balkan  States,  for  ex- 
ample, agree  upon  their  own  boundaries  and 
affiliations? 

The  problem  of  adjustment  is  further 
complicated  by  the  fact  that  the  modern  na- 
tion is  no  longer  a  merely  juristic  entity, 
having  for  its  only  object  the  maintenance 
of  order  and  justice  among  its  own  inhabi- 
tants. *It  has  become  an  economic  entity,  a 
business  corporation,  looking  for  markets 
for  its  commodities  and  for  raw  material 
from  which  to  manufacture  them.  The 
State  owns  mines,  railways,  steamships, 
colonies,  and  uses  them  as  means  of  increas- 
28 


THE  ENTENTE  OF  FREE  NATIONS 

ing  its  own  power  of  control  over  the  prod- 
ucts and  the  markets  of  the  world.  Will  it 
open  its  house  to  the  passer-by,  invite  him  to 
its  banquet-board,  and  share  with  him  its  ac- 
cumulated treasures? 

This  is  a  question  which  time  will  answer. 
And  a  very  short  time  has  sufficed  for  a  par- 
tial response.  Every  one  of  the  Powers  is 
now  planning  how  it  may  increase  its  trade, 
and  how  it  may  extend  its  control  over 
natural  resources. 

In  so  far  as  the  object  of  a  "League  of 
Nations"  is  to  prevent  this  rivalry  from  be- 
coming dangerously  acute,  its  purpose  is  no 
doubt  commendable;  but  the  danger  it  in- 
volves is,  that,  in  striving  to  enforce  a  legal 
compulsion,  it  may  be  felt  to  be  oppressive, 
— a  new  type  of  multiplex  imperialism  in 
place  of  the  old.  In  one  respect,  at  least, 
this  danger  is  imminent.  If  a  "League  of 
Nations"  proves  to  be  a  device  to  compel  in- 
dependent nations  to  make  economic  sacri- 
fices for  the  benefit  of  others,  and  establishes 
a  central  control  of  resources  which  becomes 
a  dispenser  of  benefits  which  the  beneficiaries 
29 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

have  not  aided  in  creating,  then  the  League 
will  prove  a  bondage  that  will  he  resented, 
and  will  not  be  endured.  It  is  very  appeal- 
ing to  our  better  natures  to  inform  us,  that 
the  future  is  to  be  "a  life  of  service,"  in  which 
we  must  perform  a  generous  part.  If  this  is 
voluntary,  the  call  may  well  be  a  spur  to 
action.  But  if  the  "League  of  Nations" 
aims  to  obtain  these  sacrifices,  not  by  such 
voluntary  action  as  the  associated  nations 
have  freely  offered  to  one  another  during  the 
period  of  war,  by  supplies  of  food,  loans  of 
money,  free  medical  service,  and  gifts  of  a 
magnitude  which  the  world  has  never  before 
known,  but  by  the  enforced  operation  of  a 
legal  contract,  the  call  is  different.  The 
policy  underlying  a  "League"  is  that  the 
world's  supplies,  the  world's  credit,  and  the 
world's  military  strength,  in  the  name  of 
"equal  economic  opportunity,"  together  with 
the  "freedom  of  the  seas,"  whatever  that  may 
mean,  are  to  be  placed  under  the  control  of 
a  central  authority, — an  International  Coun- 
cil whose  decisions  shall  be  paramount  and 
final  in  the  great  questions  of  trade  and  war. 

30 


THE  ENTENTE  OF  FREE  NATIONS 

If  nations  had  not  developed  into  business 
corporations,  and  had  confined  their  activi- 
ties to  the  realm  of  protecting  the  rights  of 
their  individual  citizens,  a  "League  of 
Nations"  might  have  meant  something  quite 
different  from  this.  Laws  of  a  universal 
character  might  have  been  readily  assented 
to  for  the  uniform  protection  of  individual 
persons  which  it  is  now  difficult  for  sovereign 
Powers  to  accept  as  applying  to  themselves. 
This  is  particularly  true  when  international 
restraints  are  directed  against  perfect  free- 
dom in  national  fiscal  policy.  No  nation 
whose  citizens  are  required  by  their  habits 
and  climate  to  maintain  a  high  standard  of 
living,  or  suffer  deterioration  by  lowering  it, 
can  afford  to  bind  itself  to  grant  equal  terms 
to  imports,  especially  manufactured  articles, 
from  all  countries  alike.  They  would  soon 
find  their  working  classes  reduced  to  starva- 
tion wages  accompanied  by  the  total  paraly- 
sis of  many  lines  of  industry  as  a  conse- 
quence of  an  enforced  competition  with  lower 
races,  living  in  climates  and  under  condi- 
tions where  the  customary  standard  of  life 
31 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

can  be  maintained  at  a  trifling  cost,  while  for- 
eign employers  were  reaping  rich  harvests 
of  profit  by  exploiting  practically  subject 
peoples. 

Under  such  a  regime,  the  people  of  the 
United  States  would  suffer  more  than  any 
others,  for  the  reason  that  their  standard  of 
living  is  the  highest  in  the  world.  It  is  on 
this  account  that  by  voluntary  sacrifice  the 
United  States  has  been  able  to  rescue  from 
starvation  and  to  supply  with  needed  com- 
modities the  impoverished  nations  of  the 
world.  This  has  been  one  of  their  chief  con- 
tributions to  the  Great  Understanding,  the 
Entente  of  Free  Nations,  in  saving  from 
ruin  the  countries  overridden  by  centralized 
economic  power.  It  has  been  possible  be- 
cause personal  initiative  and  enterprise,  pro- 
tected and  left  free  to  achieve  its  own  devel- 
opment without  absorption  by  the  State,  had 
accumulated  forces  and  agencies  which,  be- 
ing free,  were  in  reality  the  most  efficient  in 
the  world.  Without  that  freedom  and  with- 
out that  protection,  the  contribution  of 
America  in  the  war  would  have  been  impos- 


THE  ENTENTE  OF  FREE  NATIONS 

sible.  Our  country  would  have  been  in  a 
state  of  colonial  dependence  upon  the  great 
manufacturing  centers  of  the  European 
nations. 

Our  interest  and  our  policy  are,  therefore, 
plain:  first  of  all,  to  hold  fast  to  our  free- 
dom ;  and,  next,  to  prevent  from  falling  into 
desuetude  that  unwritten  charter  of  union 
which  constitutes  the  Entente  of  Free 
Nations,  cherishing  its  unity  of  purpose  as 
the  most  precious  of  human  achievements.  It 
is  a  moral,  not  a  legal  unity,  that  has  given 
us  the  victory.  Uncovenanted  armies  have 
gathered  from  every  quarter  of  the  globe  to 
assert  the  determination  of  the  free  nations 
that  the  rule  of  arbitrary  force  shall  be  ended. 
Our  sons  and  brothers  have  been  among 
them.  Together  they  have  faced  death  and 
have  shed  their  blood,  and  men  of  many 
nations  sleep  in  common  graves.  It  is  the 
most  splendid  assurance  for  the  peace  of  the 
world  and  the  rule  of  justice  that  can  be  im- 
agined. The  sense  of  comradeship  in  a  holy 
cause  cannot  perish.  A  new  Brotherhood  of 
Men  has  come  into  being.  Let  us  not  mar  its 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

simplicity  by  distrust  or  controversy,  or  try 
to  force  upon  any  of  our  co-belligerents  any 
untried  theory  of  legal  union  which  might  be 
honestly  rejected,  or  accepted  with  doubt 
and  reluctance.  The  battle  has  been  fought 
in  the  name  of  freedom.  Let  us  remain  free 
in  the  hour  of  victory. 

But  in  our  freedom  there  are  certain  prin- 
ciples which  must  not  and  will  not  be  for- 
gotten. They  will  control  the  practice  of 
the  Entente  of  Free  Nations,  which  must 
continue  with  its  present  provisions  for  con- 
ference, discussion,  and  united  action.  A 
marked  step  of  advancement  has  been  taken 
in  the  recognition  of  the  principle  that  all  in- 
ternational engagements  and  undertakings 
must  be  justified  by  the  moral  law  and  must 
have  publicity.  A  formal  covenant  in  this 
sense  may  be  found  possible,  and  it  may  take 
a  solemn  legal  form;  but,  whether  this  be 
the  case  or  not,  the  war  has  established  a  few 
precepts  that  will,  undoubtedly,  be  admit- 
ted to  a  permanent  place  in  the  code  of  in- 
ternational right.  No  treaty  between  nations 
should  be  considered  binding  unless  it  is  pub- 
34 


THE  ENTENTE  OF  FREE  NATIONS 

lished  when  it  is  made.  No  negotiations  af- 
fecting the  destinies  of  peoples  should  be 
conducted  without  their  knowledge  of  the 
fact  and  of  the  obligations  to  which  they  are 
to  be  committed.  No  war  should  be  begun 
without  a  public  statement  of  the  reasons 
for  it  and  an  opportunity  for  public  media- 
tion between  the  disputants,  which  should 
never  be  considered  an  offense.  No  territory 
occupied  in  war  should  be  claimed  by  right 
of  conquest  without  a  public  hearing  of  all 
who  are  affected  by  it. 

The  attempt  to  state  these,  or  any,  definite 
principles,  illustrates  how  inadequate  a 
strictly  documentary  form  of  engagement  of 
necessity  must  be.  It  is,  however,  the  spirit, 
not  the  form,  that  mustf  be  depended  upon 
for  the  security  which  a  formal  treaty  of  al- 
liance or  an  understanding  can  afford.  The 
whole  structure  of  international  peace  and 
justice  rests  upon  the  character  of  the 
peoples  who  form  the  Society  of  Nations. 
The  Great  War  has  subjected  the  combat- 
ants to  a  fiery  test.  It  cannot  well  be  doubt- 
ed that  the  Entente  of  Free  Nations  will 
35 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

stand  also  the  test  of  peace.  A  solidarity 
that  has  been  only  strengthened  by  the 
dangers  of  battle  will  certainly  not  be  broken 
in  the  attempt  to  revise  the  Law  of  Nations, 
to  make  it  the  basis  of  clearer  understand- 
ings, and  to  increase  the  confidence  with 
which  the  co -partners  in  victory  will  bring 
before  the  judgment  bar  of  reason  the  dif- 
ferences that  may  tend  to  divide  them.  But 
the  perfection  of  this  understanding  is  a  mat- 
ter of  growth  and  of  gradual  adjustment. 
What  cannot  be  accomplished  by  a  stroke  of 
the  pen  at  a  given  moment  of  time  may 
prove  an  easy  task  if  the  spirit  of  the  En- 
tente, and  especially  the  sense  of  freedom 
which  brought  it  into  being,  can  be  retained 
and  matured.  But  this  can  be  done  only  by 
a  renunciation  of  the  desire  to  force  any 
favorite  plan  to  an  issue  within  the  Entente. 
For  a  considerable  time,  unless  new  dangers 
are  to  be  incurred,  armies  and  navies  will  be 
necessary  to  guard  the  peace  that  is  to  be 
signed  at  Versailles.  It  will  be  wise  to  main- 
tain the  supremacy  of  the  forces  that  will 
have  made  it  possible.  For  this  the  respon- 

36 


THE  ENTENTE  OF  FREE  NATIONS 
i 
sibility  rests  upon  all,  according  to  their 

strength.  And  because  they  are  strong  they 
may,  by  the  constancy,  justice,  and  unself- 
ishness of  their  conduct,  prove  to  all  mankind 
that  really  free  nations  alone  can  preserve 
the  peace  of  the  world- 


II 

GERMANY'S    POSE    FOR    PEACE 

THE  peace  to  which  Germany  was  looking 
forward  when,  in  October,  1918,  the  armis- 
tice was  requested,  was  expected  to  be  ar- 
rived at  by  a  process  of  bilateral  debate  on 
the  meaning  of  the  fourteen  rubrics  of  peace 
proposed  in  January,  1918,  by  the  President 
of  the  United  States.  Those  rubrics,  it  was 
thought,  were  so  broad  in  their  scope  and  so 
indefinite  in  some  of  their  applications,  that 
it  appeared  possible  so  to  interpret  them  as 
to  procure  for  Germany  a  peace  that  would, 
in  effect,  be  a  greater  victory  than  the  Ger- 
man armies  could  ever  hope  to  secure  by  war. 
The  policy  that  was  then  adopted  and  has 
since  been  dominant  in  the  German  mind  is 
an  effort  to  obtain  an  economic  victory  at  the 
cost  of  a  military  surrender, — an  economic 
victory  which  would  completely  justify  an 


GERMANY'S  POSE  FOR  PEACE 

acknowledgment  of  military  defeat  if  it 
could  be  secured  by  the  acceptance  of  the 
German  construction  of  the  fourteen  rubrics 
considered  as  the  terms,  and  the  only  terms, 
of  peace. 

Little  information,  it  is  true,  was  given 
publicity  regarding  the  plans  and  policies  of 
Germany  for  securing  the  most  favorable 
peace.  It  is,  perhaps,  not  without  a  pur- 
pose that  comparative  silence  on  that  sub- 
ject has  been  preserved;  still,  there  has  been 
a  very  distinct  outcropping  of  what  was 
latent  in  the  minds  of  German  diplomatists. 
"All  the  belligerents,"  Count  von  Bern- 
storiF  allowed  himself  to  say,  "have  accepted 
the  President's  fourteen  points,  and  the  only 
question  to  be  discussed  is  their  interpreta- 
tion." The  new  German  Secretary  for  For- 
eign Affairs,  Count  von  Brockdorff-Rant- 
zau,  made  a  similar  statement,  and  the 
"Tageblatt"  of  Berlin  supported  this  view 
with  the  declaration,  "No  peace  must  be 
signed  which  differs  by  the  breadth  of  a  hair 
from  the  principles  of  President  Wilson's 
fourteen  points,  which  Germany  has  ac- 
39 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

cepted,  and  the  Entente  willingly  or  unwill- 
ingly has  signed." 

It  is  needless  here  to  repeat  the  interpre- 
tations of  which  these  rubrics  seem  to  be  sus- 
ceptible. It  is  sufficient  to  note  that  they 
were  held  at  Berlin  to  provide  for  the  fol- 
lowing privileges  which,  after  peace,  Ger- 
many, equally  with  other  nations,  might  be 
permitted  to  enjoy,  under  the  protection  of 
"mutual  guarantees  of  political  indepen- 
dence and  territorial  integrity"  provided  by 
"a  general  association  of  nations": 

1.  Absolute  freedom  of  navigation  upon 
the  seas,  alike  in  peace  and  in  war; 

2.  The  removal  of  all  economic  barriers, 
and  the  establishment  of  an  equality  of  trade 
conditions ; 

3.  Free  and  open-minded  adjustment  of 
all    colonial    claims,    unprejudiced   by   the 
actual  results  of  the  war; 

4.  Entire     national     self-determination, 
which  would  logically  include  perfect  free- 
dom in  choosing  and  maintaining  a  future 
form  of  government;  and 

40 


GERMANY'S  POSE  FOR  PEACE 

5.  Admission  on  equal  terms  into  a  gen- 
eral League  of  Nations. 

A  peace  based  upon  these  conditions,  and 
involving  only  the  surrender  of  what  Ger- 
many had  no  claim  to  before  the  war,  would 
render  her  not  only  a  victor  in  all  the  sub- 
stantial elements  of  victory,  but  would  leave 
her  in  population  the  largest  political  unit 
on  the  Continent  of  Europe,  with  a  clear  ac- 
cession by  union  with  Austria  of  more  than 
eight  million  of  the  Teutonic  race ;  and,  after 
extruding  some  four  million  of  her  present 
subjects  belonging  to  other  races,  would  give 
her  a  net  gain  of  some  four  or  five  million 
souls  and  a  considerable  amount  of  new  ter- 
ritory. When  the  peace  was  signed,  the  zone 
of  occupation  evacuated,  and  the  occupying 
troops  demobilized,  Germany,  whether  a  re- 
public or  a  monarchy,  the  choice  being  freely 
open  to  her,  with  untouched  economic  re- 
sources and  organization,  no  matter  what 
proportionate  disarmament  might  be  im- 
posed, would  be  by  far  the  strongest  military 
state  in  Europe.  She  would  possess  racial 
unity,  territorial  enlargement,  economic  pre- 
41 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

eminence  on  the  Continent,  and  military  se- 
curity. Even  though  she  had  not  been  de- 
feated in  the  field,  such  a  peace  would  be  an 
advantageous  one  for  Germany  to  make,  a 
more  satisfactory  one  indeed  than  she  could 
ever  hope  to  win  by  the  victory  of  her 
armies  on  the  field  of  battle. 

How  then  has  Germany  hoped  to  secure 
such  a  peace? 

The  course  of  procedure  was  clearly  mark- 
ed out  for  her.  Such  a  peace  could  never  be 
made  with  the  Kaiser  as  the  head  of  the 
Empire.  That  had  been  plainly  declared. 
What,  above  everything  else,  was  demanded 
of  Germany  was  that  she  should  repudiate 
her  Hohenzollern  dynasty  and  take  her  place 
among  the  nations  as  a  free,  self-governing 
people;  for  a  "people,"  it  was  assumed,  when 
it  takes  government  into  its  own  hands,  is 
always  just,  honorable,  and  trustworthy; 
while  rulers  alone  are  untrustworthy.  Let 
the  rulers  and  the  military  caste,  therefore, 
be  repudiated,  and  peace  would  be  easily  ob- 
tainable. 

What  nation,  weary  of  a  fruitless  war, 


GERMANY'S  POSE  FOR  PEACE 

seeing  its  army,  after  a  supreme  effort  to 
break  through  the  enemy's  reinforced  lines, 
steadily  and  inevitably  retreating,  its  terri- 
tory about  to  be  invaded,  its  cities  bombard- 
ed and  assaulted  from  the  air, — what  nation, 
I  say,  could  be  expected  to  miss  such  an  op- 
portunity to  make  a  profitable  peace? 

Germany  was  too  prudent  to  lose  such  a 
chance  of  advantage.  The  Kaiser's  own  ap- 
pointed Imperial  Chancellor,  accountable 
only  to  him,  therefore  asked  for  an  arm- 
istice, in  order  that  such  a  peace  might  be 
negotiated. 

"Who  are  you,  who  ask  for  an  armistice, 
with  a  view  to  peace,  and  whom  do  you  rep- 
resent?" was,  in  effect,  demanded  of  the  Im- 
perial Chancellor.  "Do  you  speak  for  the 
German  people?" 

The  Imperial  Chancellor  was  silent.  How 
could  he  speak  for  the  German  people,  with 
whom  he  had  nothing  to  do,  and  to  whom  he 
was  not  responsible?  The  answer  must  be 
better  staged. 

It  is  a  new  officer,  therefore,  the  represen- 
tative of  what  poses  as  a  new  government, 
43 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
who  responds  to  the  question  intended  for 
the  Imperial  Chancellor  and  writes  for  him 
a  certificate  of  character. 

"The  present  German  Government,"  he 
declares,  as  if  speaking  by  some  new  popu- 
lar authority, — "the  present  German  Gov- 
ernment, which  has  undertaken  the  respon- 
sibility for  this  step  toward  peace,  has  been 
formed  by  conferences  and  in  agreement 
with  the  great  majority  of  the  Reichstag. 
The  Chancellor,  supported  in  all  his  actions 
by  the  will  of  this  majority,  speaks  in  the 
name  of  the  German  Government  and  of  the 
German  people." 

Thus,  at  last,  the  long  silent  "German 
people,"  the  presumably  just,  honorable,  and 
trustworthy  German  people,  who  were  as- 
sumed not  to  be  responsible  for  the  war,  but 
rather  the  victims  of  a  false  and  shameless 
autocracy  too  infamous  to  be  dealt  with  had, 
it  was  made  to  appear,  really  spoken.  They 
had  spoken,  however,  only  through  the  voice 
of  a  "great  majority  of  the  Reichstag," — a 
body  which  from  the  beginning  had  with 

44 


GERMANY'S  POSE  FOR  PEACE 

unanimity  supported  the  war  and  all  its* 
atrocious  procedure;  a  body  which  only  for  a 
moment  found  a  voice  with  which  to  speak 
the  mind  of  the  people  and  having  been  for 
that  one  moment  indistinctly  vocal,  has  since 
subsided  into  the  silence  of  the  grave!  If 
the  German  Reichstag  really  represented 
the  German  people,  why  in  this  great  emer- 
gency did  it  not  remain  at  its  post  of  duty? 

Germany,  in  that  fateful  hour,  seemed  to 
prefer  to  have  no  responsible  government. 
Was  it  because  it  is  more  difficult  to  hold 
accountable,  and  on  that  ground  to  condemn 
and  punish,  a  nation  without  a  responsible 
government  than  a  nation  which  can  be  on 
specific  charges  indicted  and  arraigned  for 
its  past  misdeeds? 

Say  what  we  will  of  the  Kaiser's  personal 
regime,  it  was  at  least  one  which,  whether 
trustworthy  or  not,  could  be  held  accountable 
for  its  crimes.  But  the  Kaiser's  Govern- 
ment was  alleged  to  be  no  longer  in  existence. 
In  order  that  it  might  disappear,  he  was 
urged  to  abdicate.  He  professed  to  have 
done  so,  and  went  to  Holland.  Germany 
45 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

appeared  satisfied,  but  the  outside  world  de- 
manded the  evidence  of  his  abdication;  and 
it  was  not  till  three  weeks  after  his  retreat, 
that,  in  order  to  satisfy  foreign  demands,  on 
the  29th  of  November,  a  document  was 
finally  signed  by  the  alleged  ex-Kaiser. 

The  reason  for  his  withdrawal  from  Ger- 
many William  II  himself  frankly  stated. 
"I  go  to  Holland,"  he  is  reported  to  have  de- 
clared, "in  order  to  facilitate  peace";  and  no 
one  has  contradicted  this  statement.  The 
German  people,  it  seems,  when  the  Kaiser's 
armies  were  beaten  in  the  field,  suddenly 
wished  him  gone,  sent  forth,  as  it  were,  like 
the  "scapegoat"  of  ancient  times,  into  the 
wilderness,  not  because  his  people  hated  him 
or  considered  him  an  arch-criminal,  not  be- 
cause they  themselves  wished  to  destroy  him 
— as  they  had,  and  still  have,  an  opportunity 
to  do — but  because  it  appeared  that  he  might 
be  laden  with  their  sins,  and  his  going  with 
this  burden  would  "facilitate  peace"  by  con- 
signing responsibility  to  the  wilderness  of 
oblivion. 

And  why  was  it  supposed  that  his  going 
46 


GERMANY'S  POSE  FOR  PEACE 

would  facilitate  peace?  Was  it  not  because 
an  irresponsible  nation  can  demand  easier 
terms  than  a  responsible  ruler? 

The  just,  honorable,  and  trustworthy 
"people  of  Germany"  seemed  to  be  pleading 
at  the  judgment  bar  of  history,  and  prepar- 
ing to  say  at  the  peace  table:  "We  demand 
peace  because  we  are  an  innocent  and  a  de- 
fenseless people.  First  of  all,  we  are  a 
'people,'  and  how  can  you  punish  a  whole 
people?  Has  it  not  been  said  that  there  is 
something  sacred  and  sacrosanct  in  a 
'people'  ?  You  are  trying  'to  make  the  world 
safe  for  democracy.'  We  are  now  a  democ- 
racy. See,  we  have  dismissed  the  Kaiser! 
We  shall  have  no  more  of  him.  Have  mercy 
upon  us,  Kameraden!  We  accept  all  your 
glorious  democratic  principles.  Now,  un- 
doubtedly, you  are  ready,  since  you  would 
make  the  world  safe  for  democracy,  to  make 
our  democracy  an  asylum  of  safety  for  us !" 

Here  was  a  change  of  plan,  but  was  there 
any  change  of  heart  behind  these  preten- 
sions ?  Have  all  Germans,  or  most  Germans, 
suddenly  become  Social  Democrats,  clamor- 

47 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ing  for  a  Socialist  Republic?  Where  are  all 
those  millions  of  troops?  Where  are  all 
those  hundreds  of  thousands  of  officers,  those 
Prussian  generals  who  are  said  to  have  made 
the  Kaiser  declare  war?  Have  they  gone 
to  Holland?  Only  a  few  of  them.  The  vast 
majority,  armed,  organized,  waiting  for  a 
word  of  command,  were  in  Germany;  and 
they  were  silent,  as  silent  as  the  Reichstag. 
Why  were  they  silent?  They  were  silent 
because  silence  was  the  order  of  the  day,  a 
token  of  irresponsibility  and  acquiescence  in 
a  new  order  of  things.  They  were  waiting  to 
see  if  an  economic  victory  could  be  won.  If 
it  is  won,  they  will  have  their  reward.  If  it 
is  not  won,  they  will,  perhaps,  have  some- 
thing to  say  in  the  future  when  the  peace 
has  been  concluded,  and  is  yet  to  be  executed, 
when  the  Allied  armies  are  demobilized,  and 
when  the  rest  of  Europe  has  gone  to  sleep. 
There  was,  before  the  armistice,  no  serious 
revolution  in  Germany.  There  had  been 
hunger,  there  had  been  weariness,  there  had 
been  joy  at  the  cessation  of  battle,  there  had 
been  a  vision  of  peace,  of  comfort  and  tran- 

48 


GERMANY'S  POSE  FOR  PEACE 

quillity.  There  had  been  also  an  emergence 
of  Bolshevism,  the  weapon  which  Germany 
skillfully  forged  and  thrust  into  the  vitals 
of  Russia;  but  Germany  expects  to  receive 
no  serious  wound  from  this  weapon.  There 
was  no  clear  evidence  of  change  in  Germany, 
no  movement  beyond  street  fights  and  bread 
mobs,  such  as  may  occur  in  any  city  when 
the  conditions  of  life  are  hard  and  when  the 
passions  of  low-browed  men  are  for  a  time 
let  loose.  The  Councils  of  Workmen  and 
Soldiers  solemnly  infested  the  Herrenhaus 
under  the  protection  of  a  machine-gun;  but 
the  generals  knew  that  at  any  moment  in 
Germany  they  could  make  short  work  of  all 
this  assemblage  of  the  rags  and  tatters  of 
Bolshevism.  But  the  time  was  not  oppor- 
tune. The  disease  of  Bolshevism,  in  so  far 
as  it  is  a  social  malady,  may  safely  be  per- 
mitted in  Germany  to  run  its  course.  It 
illustrates  to  the  middle-class  what  the 
dangers  of  democracy  may  be.  It  shows  to 
the  world  how  wide  the  infection  may  be- 
come, if  peace  is  not  quickly  made.  It  pre- 
sents to  the  Allies  the  puzzling  problem  how 
49 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

to  obtain  redress  from  a  people  who  disavow 
accountability  and  are  too  broken  and  dis- 
organized to  enforce  the  duties  of  a  respon- 
sible State. 

How  real  is  a  revolution  when  the  domes- 
tic courts  are  in  session,  when  the  bureau- 
cracy is  administering  affairs,  and  when  life 
and  property  are  not  in  great  immediate 
peril?  The  Germans  are  an  exceptionally 
orderly  people.  Their  demonstrations  are 
customarily  innocuous.  Their  habits  of  life 
are  prudent.  Their  burghers  are  not  stricken 
with  poverty,  and  their  proprietors,  accus- 
tomed to  the  use  of  arms,  are  able  to  guard, 
and  are  determined  to  defend,  their  own  ma- 
terial interests.  When  a  real  revolution  ap- 
pears, if  it  does  appear,  they  will  unite  their 
forces  and  rally  to  their  own  protection. 
What  they  have  wished  to  exhibit  to  their 
conquerors  was  a  starving  population  in- 
capable of  bearing  new  burdens,  an  unsettled 
public  order  that  might  prove  a  contagion 
to  their  neighbors,  an  effort  for  democracy 
that  would  be  taken  as  an  apology  for  the 
past,  and  above  all  a  situation  which  would 

50 


GERMANY'S  POSE  FOR  PEACE 

excite  the  sympathy  of  the  credulous  and  the 
support  of  class  interests  of  a  revolutionary 
temper  in  the  population  of  those  countries 
which  they  would  represent  as  their  oppress- 
ors for  capitalistic  gain. 

You  wish  the  evidence  of  this?  Then 
listen  to  the  speech  of  Hindenburg  to  his 
army,  on  November  13th  at  the  moment 
when  he  had  decided  that  it  was  an  economic 
rather  than  a  military  victory  for  which  Ger- 
many was  to  look.  Does  he  pretend  that  he 
or  they  had  fought  under  merely  autocratic 
orders?  Does  he  confess  that  the  course  of 
Germany  was  wrong?  Does  he  call  for  a 
change  of  heart,  or  merely  for  a  change  of 
policy?  He  says: 

"Germany  up  to  to-day  has  used  her  arms 
with  honour.  In  hard  fighting  the  soldiers 
have  held  the  enemy  away  from  the  German 
frontier  in  order  to  save  the  Fatherland 
from  the  horrors  of  war.  In  view  of  our 
enemies'  increasing  numbers  and  the  collapse 
of  our  allies  and  our  economic  difficulties,  our 
Government  was  resolved  to  accept  the  hard 
terms  of  the  armistice ;  but  we  leave  the  fight, 
51 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

in  which  for  more  than  four  years  we  have 
resisted  a  world  of  enemies,  proudly  and 
with  heads  erect." 

If  we  turn  to  what  calls  itself  a  govern- 
ment of  democracy,  what  do  we  hear  from 
the  alleged  Premier,  Ebert,  when  he  wel- 
comed the  troops  coming  home  to  Berlin? 
Does  he  repudiate  the  purpose  of  the  war? 
Does  he  inform  the  returning  soldiers  that 
they  have  made  useless  sacrifices,  or  have 
been  engaged  in  an  unworthy  cause,  at  the 
command  of  an  autocracy  in  whose  down- 
fall they  should  rejoice?  Tens  of  thousands 
of  men  march  by  still  bearing  their  arms, 
filing  between  other  tens  of  thousands  of 
people  who  are  supposed  to  have  made  a 
revolution,  who  welcome  them  as  joyful  spec- 
tators, the  troops  laden  with  garlands,  as 
they  tramp  on  to  the  loud  blare  of  bands  of 
music  intoning,  "Deutschlaiid,  Deutschlanct 
uber  Alles" 

"Your  deeds  and  sacrifices,"  the  Premier 
declares,  "are  unexampled.  No  enemy  over- 
came you.  Only  when  the  preponderance 
of  our  opponents  in  men  and  material  grew 


GERMANY'S  POSE  FOR  PEACE 

ever  heavier  did  we  abandon  the  struggle. 

"You  endured  indescribable  sufferings, 
accomplished  incomparable  deeds,  and  gave, 
year  after  year,  proofs  of  your  unmistakable 
courage.  You  protected  the  homeland  from 
invasions,  sheltered  your  wives,  children,  and 
parents  from  flames  and  slaughter  and  pre- 
served the  nation's  workshops  and  fields 
from  devastation. 

"With  deepest  emotion  the  homeland 
thanks  you.  You  can  return  with  heads 
erect.  Never  have  men  done  or  suffered 
more  than  you." 

Is  this  a  proclamation  of  democracy?  Is 
the  world  to  be  "made  safe"  by  this  adulation 
of  a  career  of  national  crime  ?  What  can  be 
said  after  this  to  the  heroes  who  are  told  that 
in  serving  the  Kaiser  they  were  nobly  de- 
fending the  Fatherland,  if  for  this  glorious 
service  they  are  asked  to  toil  in  the  fields  and 
the  workshops  to  pay  for  the  damage  they 
have  done  to  Belgium,  to  France,  to  Poland, 
and  to  other  lands  which  they  have,  without 
just  cause,  ruthlessly  invaded  and  cruelly 
devastated  ?  Can  they  be  urged  to  make  rep- 

53 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

aration?  Or  will  they  think  it  unjust  that, 
having  suffered  so  much  in  a  cause  so  noble, 
they  must  be  treated  as  if  they  were  the  per- 
petrators of  outrages  for  which  they,  their 
children,  and  their  children's  children  must 
be  held  accountable? 

Here  is  no  note  of  penitence  or  contrition. 
It  is  the  same  Germany,  speaking  with  the 
voice  of  Hindenburg  and  Ebert,  which  ac- 
cepted the  Kaiser  as  its  glorious  War  Lord, 
that  believed,  or  professed  to  believe,  in  the 
divine  right  of  conquest,  and  threatened  in- 
nocent nations  with  the  extortion  of  enor- 
mous indemnities,  covering  not  only  the  total 
cost  of  their  exploits  but  sufficient  to  enrich 
the  nation  and  render  it  the  most  opulent 
in  the  world. 

The  attitude  of  Germany  in  accepting 
just  conditions  of  peace,  will  be  the  test  of 
the  character  of  the  German  people  with 
whom  in  the  future  other  nations  must  live 
and  deal.  The  first  necessity  to  a  recogni- 
tion of  reformation  is  the  disposition  to  re- 
pay, in  so  far  as  that  is  possible,  at  what- 
ever sacrifice,  the  damage  they  have  inflicted. 


GERMANY'S  POSE  FOR  PEACE 

If  exemption  from  this  obligation  is  claimed 
on  the  ground  of  irresponsibility,  it  will  im- 
ply a  degradation  of  character  as  deep  as 
that  evinced  by  the  predatory  enterprise  in 
which  all  Germany  was  to  profit  by  collect- 
ing the  costs  of  the  war  from  its  innocent 
victims. 

Without  reparation  for  the  injuries  in- 
flicted, there  can  be  no  real  peace.  The  ex- 
ample of  such  an  unpunished  exploit  would 
remain  as  an  encouragement  to  future  crime. 

Will  the  German  people,  whose  sense  of 
justice,  honor,  and  moral  obligation  is  now 
to  be  put  to  a  crucial  test,  voluntarily  ac- 
cept the  burdens  which  a  just  peace  will  im- 
pose upon  them?  If  not,  what  confidence 
can  be  placed  in  the  proposal  to  make  the 
world  safe  for  democracy,  and  what  will  be 
the  world's  judgment  upon  the  ethical  stand- 
ards of  democracy  itself?  We  shall  learn 
from  the  conduct  of  Germany  whether  or 
not  we  are  to  ascribe  all  the  enormities  of 
the  war  to  the  depravity  and  malevolence  of 
her  rulers,  against  whom,  until  the  moment 
of  defeat,  the  people  offered  no  protest;  and 

55 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

whether  or  not  a  people,  left  free  to  express 
its  own  character,  will  accept  the  burdens  of 
an  act  of  justice. 

On  account  of  the  Great  War,  in  which 
their  duty  rendered  it  necessary  that  they 
should  participate,  the  people  of  the  United 
States  of  America  have  not  only  freely  of- 
fered to  the  cause  of  justice  the  lives  of  tens 
of  thousands  of  their  sons,  but  have  paid, 
or  will  have  paid,  probably  over  thirty  billion 
dollars,  which  they  have  not  yet  demanded 
should  be  returned  to  them.  The  whole  ex- 
penditure of  the  war,  by  the  Allies,  con- 
sidered merely  as  a  matter  of  monetary  sac- 
rifice, is  said  to  exceed  two  hundred  billion 
dollars;  and  yet  this  gigantic  sum,  which  it 
will  require  generations  to  make  good,  is 
one  of  the  least  and  one  of  the  most  easily 
repaired  of  the  damages  inflicted  by  this  as- 
sault upon  humanity. 

The  manufacturing  plants  of  Germany 
are  practically  intact,  and  their  escape  from 
devastation  affords  the  Germans  every  ad- 
vantage over  their  neighbors  in  the  resump- 
tion of  their  normal  industries.  The  loss  of 

56 


GERMANY'S  POSE  FOR  PEACE 

man-power  through  death  and  mutilation 
may  amount  approximately  to  three  or  four 
million  men,  but  this  loss  will  probably  be 
made  good  to  the  extent  of  at  least  one-half 
by  the  growth  of  population  during  the 
period  of  nearly  five  years  from  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war  to  the  conclusion  of  peace. 

The  greatest  hardship  for  the  Germans 
will  be  the  deficiency  of  raw  materials  for 
manufacture;  such  as  cotton,  wool,  copper, 
iron,  rubber,  and  many  others.  They  wiE 
doubtless  plead  for  these  as  absolutely  essen- 
tial to  them.  If  they  were  wholly  withheld, 
it  would,  of  course,  be  impossible  for  the 
Germans  to  pay  any  indemnities,  because 
they  can  only  pay  to  the  extent  to  which  they 
are  able  to  earn  the  means  of  payment. 

If,  however,  this  argument  should  prevail, 
its  inevitable  consequence  should  not  be  over- 
looked. If  raw  materials  are  furnished  to 
the  extent  of  Germany's  demand,  German 
manufactures  will  at  once  obtain  an  im- 
mense acceleration,  German  goods  will  flood 
every  market,  and  the  less  favored  countries 
will  be  driven  out  of  the  world's  marts  by 
57 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

an  excess  of  German  production  and  Ger- 
man methods  of  commercial  exploitation.  It 
would  not  require  many  years  for  Germany, 
with  these  advantages,  even  though  promis- 
ing the  payment  of  heavy  money  indemnities, 
to  have  so  taken  possession  of  the  world's 
markets  as  to  make  the  arrangement  a  profit- 
able bargain.  While  the  Belgians  and  the 
French  were  slowly  recovering  their  pro- 
ductive capacity  by  a  restoration  of  their 
ruined  industrial  plants,  Germany  would 
completely  forestall  them  in  securing  for- 
eign trade.  Such  a  programme  would,  in 
effect,  be  the  formation  of  a  partnership  in 
which,  to  secure  a  portion  of  Germany's 
gains  in  the  form  of  an  indemnity,  they 
would  surrender  to  her  the  conduct  of  for- 
eign business,  while  they  themselves  were 
engaged  in  merely  recovering  to  some  extent 
the  productive  efficiency  of  which  Germany's 
invasion  has  deprived  them. 
:  To  appreciate  the  full  significance  of  such 
an  arrangement,  it  is  necessary  to  consider 
that,  while  Germany's  manufacturing  plants 
have  not  been  in  any  way  impaired,  and  are 

58 


GERMANY'S  POSE  FOR  PEACE 

ready  to  begin  operation,  those  of  Belgium 
and  Northwestern  France  have  been  practi- 
cally destroyed.  It  is  reported  that  26,000 
factories  in  the  French  districts  occupied  by 
the  Germans  were  either  wholly  demolished 
or  stripped  of  their  machinery;  which,  with 
the  looms  and  other  portable  means  of  in- 
dustry of  Belgium,  have  been  carried  into 
Germany.  Thousands  of  square  miles  of 
rich  agricultural  land  have  been  so  deeply 
plowed  with  shells  as  to  be  utterly  unfit  for 
cultivation.  JJouses  and  public  edifices  have 
been  left  in  ruins  and  can  be  replaced  only 
by  years  of  labor.  Valuable  mines  have 
been  rendered  useless,  and  it  will  require  both 
time  and  expense  to  restore  them.  It  would 
be  unjust,  even  though  the  money  value  of 
all  these  objects  were  eventually  paid  in 
cash,  to  impose  upon  the  inhabitants  of  these 
devastated  countries  the  concentration  of  all 
their  skill  and  labor  upon  the  work  of  re- 
construction while  those  who  had  destroyed 
them  were  profiting  by  expanding  their  own 
world-wide  trade.  At  the  end  of  the  period 
when  the  restoration  was  complete,  the 

59 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

money  paid  would  have  been  spent  in  the 
work  of  reconstruction,  and  these  unfortu- 
nate countries,  having  in  the  meantime  de- 
voted their  energies  entirely  to  this  task  of 
restoration,  would  be  no  better  off  than  they 
were  when  the  war  began,  while  German  in- 
dustry and  trade  domination  would  in  the 
meantime  have  been  definitely  and  perhaps 
permanently  established. 

The  remedy  which  justice  would  seem  to 
demand  is  evident.  Whatever  of  value  has 
been  carried  into  Germany  should  be  im- 
mediately brought  back  and  replaced.  The 
reconstruction  of  houses,  factories,  and  other 
edifices  should  then  be  speedily  brought  to 
completion  by  German  workmen  at  Ger- 
many's expense,  aided  by  those  natives  who 
for  the  time  being  have  no  other  employment, 
all  their  labor  to  be  paid  for  by  Germany. 
In  so  far  as  the  German  shipyards  can  re- 
place the  tonnage  destroyed,  they  should  be 
at  once  employed  for  the  purpose ;  and  only 
such  ships  should  be  allowed  for  German 
trade  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  distribu- 
tion of  Germany's  just  proportion  of  over- 

60 


GERMANY'S  POSE  FOR  PEACE 

seas  commerce.  The  other  forms  of  indem- 
nity would  not  be  cancelled  by  this  process 
of  restoration;  but  the  liquidation  of  these 
obligations  might  be  ultimately  accomplished 
by  the  saving  of  all  expense  for  military  pur- 
poses beyond  mere  domestic  police  duty  in 
Germany,  by  special  import  licenses  on  Ger- 
man goods,  and  by  the  appropriation  of  a 
percentage  of  the  profits  of  Germany's  coal 
and  potash  mines. 

This  would  be  undoubtedly  a  heavy  bur- 
den for  a  conquered  people  to  bear;  but  it 
is  less  than  it  was  the  German  purpose  to 
impose  upon  the  innocent  victims  of  their 
imperial  schemes  of  conquest. 

Has  the  alleged  German  democracy  any 
intention  gracefully  to  accept  such  obliga- 
tions? 

It  will  be  noted  that  under  the  fourteen 
rubrics  of  peace  proposed  by  the  President 
of  the  United  States,  reparation  and  indem- 
nity are  not  included.  "Belgium,"  the  sev- 
enth rubric  declares,  "the  whole  world  will 
agree,  must  be  evacuated  and  restored;"  but 
the  restoration  here  referred  to,  as  the  fol- 
61 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

lowing  words  imply,  seems  to  relate  to  "the 
sovereignty  which  she  enjoys  in  common  with 
other  free  nations,"  while  no  mention  is 
made  of  the  reparation  of  material  damages. 

Under  the  eighth  rubric  it  is  proposed  that 
"All  French  territory  should  be  freed,  and 
the  invaded  portions  restored";  but  the  im- 
plication here  appears  to  be  the  same  as  that 
under  the  seventh  rubric.  In  both  cases  it 
is  the  restoration  of  territory,  not  reparation 
that  is  specified. 

The  truth  is  that,  in  a  military  sense,  Ger- 
many was  defeated.  Her  generals  have  ad- 
mitted that  it  was  useless  to  continue  the 
fight.  Had  no  basis  of  settlement  been  pro- 
posed, the  alternative  to  the  invasion  of  Ger- 
many by  the  Allies  and  an  allied  victory  pro- 
claimed at  Berlin  would  have  been  an  im- 
mediate unconditional  surrender.  The  terms 
of  the  peace  would  then  have  been  the  con- 
ditions to  be  laid  down  by  the  conquerors. 
Who  then  will  deny  that  there  would  have 
been  a  clearer  case  for  the  conditions  which 
the  Allies  must  in  Justice  impose,  and  less 
opportunity  for  a  plea  that  only  the  four- 
62 


GERMANY'S  POSE  FOR  PEACE 

teen  rubrics  should  be  discussed  and  Ger- 
many's interpretation  of  their  meaning  con- 
sidered, if  the  surrender  were  in  no  way  con- 
nected with  the  alleged  "terms"  which  both 
belligerents  are  assumed  to  have  accepted? 

As  the  case  stands,  Germany  claims  the 
right  to  voice  her  interpretation  of  those 
"terms,"  and  will  insist  that  they  be  re- 
garded in  their  entirety  as  a  body  of  condi- 
tions, each  involving  the  others.  It  will  be 
urged  that  conditions  ought  not  to  be  made 
more  burdensome  for  a  new  popular  regime 
in  Germany  than  were  contemplated  at  the 
time  the  armistice  was  signed  and  the  alleged 
"terms"  accepted,  while  the  Kaiser's  cul- 
pable Government  was  still  in  command. 

All  these  claims  and  pleas  must  prove  un- 
availing, for  the  reason  that  they  are  not 
just.  What  gives  them  plausibility  is  Ger- 
many's assertion  that  she  was  led  to  expect 
an  advantageous  peace  on  certain  conditions, 
and  that  those  conditions  have  now  been  ful- 
filled. One  implied  condition  was,  it  is  held, 
that  a  free  people  could  receive  better  terms 
than  a  guilty  autocracy.  The  specific  terms 
63 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

of  peace  were  contained  in  the  fourteen 
rubrics.  On  these  "terms"  a  nation  that  still 
takes  pride  in  the  cause  for  which  its  armies 
fought,  that  abandoned  the  struggle  only 
because  its  force  was  exhausted,  and  that  has 
made  no  apology  for  a  crime  in  which  it  par- 
ticipated, now  demands  to  be  received  as  an 
equal  partner  in  an  international  order  yet 
to  be  established;  if,  indeed,  any  "general 
association  of  nations"  can  ever  be  formed 
which  will  "guarantee"  the  conditions  which 
these  rubrics  suggest. 

All  this  does  not  destroy,  and  it  should  not 
obscure,  the  demands  of  justice  to  the 
nations  that  have  suffered  invasion  and  dev- 
astation at  the  hands  of  Germany.  The 
whole  scheme  of  the  rubrics  aimed  at  com- 
promise. If  it  has  really  deceived  Germany, 
or  if  its  application  should  leave  any  of  the 
injured  without  redress,  it  was,  indeed,  mor- 
ally and  diplomatically  a  mistake.  The  de- 
mands of  justice,  however,  remain  unshaken. 
There  can  be  no  binding  agreement  to  do 
wrong  or  to  escape  doing  what  is  right.  The 
-alleged  terms  of  peace  may  have  to  be  inter- 


GERMANY'S  POSE  FOR  PEACE 

preted  again  and  again;  but,  wholly  irre- 
spective of  any  interpretation,  complete 
reparation  by  Germany  should  be  made  in 
Belgium  and  France,  not  to  mention  other 
devastated  countries,  or  the  coming  peace 
will  be  as  wicked  as  the  war. 

"No  State,"  says  Maximilian  Harden, 
who  now  assumes  the  role  of  interpreter  of 
the  Germany  of  which  he  has  long  dreamed, 
— "no  State  that  was  snatched  along  into 
this  flood  of  the  Deluge  can  expect  other  in- 
demnity than  those  which  can  be  effected 
by  thrift  and  savings" ;  which,  he  makes  clear, 
must  be  the  effort  of  each  people  for  itself. 
There  are  to  be,  then,  no  indemnities  paid 
by  Germany.  "Taxes  and  customs  duties," 
he  says,  "that  would  yield  even  the  interest 
on  the  tens  of  billions  of  debt,  would  neces- 
sarily paralyze  trade  and  industry  in  com- 
petition with  America,  Australia,  and  the 
Yellow  World;  would  necessarily  grind  to 
bits  the  idea  of  private  property.  .  .  .  What 
then  shall  happen?  Something  that  has 
never  happened  before.  .  .  .  Let  Europe's 
war  debt  become  a  treasure  of  atonement. 
65 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Let  the  war  loan  certificates  of  all  the  Euro- 
pean States  that  have  participated  in  this 
war  .  .  .  serve  as  legal  tender,  guaranteed 
by  all  debtors;  a  form  of  money  which  in 
every  land  that  is  subject  to  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  arbitration  court  must  be  accepted  in 
payment  in  any  transaction  and  by  any  cred- 
itor at  its  full  face  value !" 

Thus  all  the  national  war  debts,  Ger- 
many's included,  it  is  proposed,  should  be 
pooled  in  one  great  "peace  fund"  and  placed 
under  a  central  control  to  prevent  the  out- 
break of  future  war!  "The  court  of  the 
nations,"  so  runs  the  scheme, — "serves  as 
trustee  of  the  treasurer,  and  sets  aside  there- 
from in  equal  parts  out  of  the  certificates  of 
indebtedness  of  all  the  States  what  it  needs 
for  itself  and  its  militia.  It  may  punish  dis- 
obedience of  its  judgments  in  the  case  of  any 
individual  State  by  means  of  a  money  pen- 
alty, declaring  valueless  all  the  circulating 
certificates  of  that  State,  calling  them  in,  or 
destroying  them,  in  the  case  of  any  State 
that  breaks  the  peace  without  previously  be- 
ing itself  bodily  and  vitally  threatened. 
66 


GERMANY'S  POSE  FOR  PEACE 

r- 

"Here,"  this  writer  continues,  "is  where  a 
community  of  European  citizenship  beckons 
us.  Thus  the  Continent  would  be  delivered 
from  its  money  stringency;  .  .  .  thus  it 
would  gently  be  obliged  to  bury  quickly  and 
deeply  the  useless  reminders  of  futile  con- 
flict." 

It  is  time  for  Germany,  if  she  would  ever 
regain  the  respect  of  mankind,  to  dismiss 
such  fantastic  illusions  as  these,  and  to  take 
up  the  burden  of  national  responsibility  in 
a  serious  sense.  Let  her,  first  of  all,  sus- 
tain a  government  that  will  admit  the  re- 
sponsibility of  the  nation  for  the  past,  and 
with  which  it  is  possible  to  deal.  Then  let 
that  government  assume  and  enforce  those 
obligations  which  a  just  peace  will  certainly 
impose  upon  the  German  nation;  not  for- 
getting that  the  greatest  possible  calamity 
to  mankind  would  be  to  write  into  the  Law 
of  Nations,  by  absolving  the  German  people 
from  complicity  in  a  national  crime,  the 
ruinous  principle  that  a  "people"  is  not 
responsible  for  the  government  it  supports, 
and  that  it  may  therefore  exempt  itself  from 
67 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

merited  punishment  by  merely  changing  its 
form  of  government. 

Has  Germany  the  character  to  stand  this 
test?  When  she  has  proved  her  ability  to  do 
so,  then,  and  only  then,  can  there  be  a  pos- 
sibility, when  years  of  fidelity  have  estab- 
lished her  good  faith,  of  admitting  her  to  a 
place  in  a  League  of  Nations.  If  those  who 
are  gathering  to  conclude  peace  cannot  now 
enforce  that  judgment,  then  it  is  more  than 
futile  to  hope  to  enforce  such  a  judgment 
in  the  future;  for  the  contingencies  of  a  fu- 
ture in  which  so  great  a  crime  was  left  un- 
punished would  be  simply  appalling  to  con- 
template. 


in 

INTERNATIONAL    LAW    AND    POLICY 

AT  no  time,  perhaps,  since  history  began 
to  be  recorded  has  there  existed  so  profound 
and  so  universal  a  conviction  of  the  value  and 
necessity  of  law;  and  particularly  of  the  re- 
straint of  law  in  controlling  the  activities  of 
independent  sovereign  States. 

Everywhere  the  necessities,  even  more 
than  the  volitions,  of  men  have  in  some  form, 
established  the  authority  of  the  State;  whose 
laws,  even  though  occasionally  violated,  are 
regarded  as  paramount  over  the  populations 
within  their  jurisdiction.  A  comparative 
study  of  law  discloses  the  fact  that,  with 
slight  and  almost  negligible  divergences,  the 
great  principles  of  jurisprudence  accepted 
in  all  the  most  highly  developed  communities 
are  not  only  similar  but  virtually  identical. 
As  a  result,  that  body  of  customary  law 
common  to  different  nations,  to  which  the 
69 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Roman  jurisconsults  gave  the  name  Jus 
Gentium,  and  which  became  the  basis  of 
what  we  now  call  International  Law,  was 
believed,  until  the  events  of  the  Great  War 
disturbed  the  conviction,  to  have  attained  a 
consistency  of  content  and  a  degree  of  gen- 
eral acceptance  by  responsible  States  which 
placed  beyond  all  serious  question  its  author- 
ity as  law. 

There  is,  as  we  all  know,  some  diversity 
of  view  as  to  what  constitutes  the  law  in  gen- 
eral. If  it  were  otherwise  it  would  be  a  very 
stale  and  unprofitable  profession. 

As  regards  the  Law  of  Nations,  which  has 
temporarily  fallen  into  disrepute  as  even 
more  vague  and  uncertain  than  other 
branches  of  the  law,  notwithstanding  the  as- 
persions cast  upon  it,  there  is  the  highest  au- 
thority, based  on  judicial  decisions,  for  as- 
serting with  Sir  William  Blackstone  that, 
"whenever  any  question  arises  which  is  prop- 
erly the  object  of  its  jurisdiction,"  it  is  in 
England  "adopted  in  its  full  extent  by  the 
Common  Law,  and  is  held  to  be  a  part  of  the 
law  of  the  land";  and  we  may  also  cite  the 

70 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  POLICY 

opinion  of  Alexander  Hamilton,  that  it  is 
not  only  a  part  of  the  Common  Law,  but 
"has  become  by  adoption  that  of  the  United 
States.'* 

If  these  rindications  of  the  respectability 
of  the  Law  of  Nations  seem  somewhat  an- 
tiquated, I  may,  perhaps,  be  permitted  to 
recall  the  fact  that,  in  his  address  before  the 
New  York  State  Bar  Association,  last  year, 
the  eminent  Attorney-General  of  Great 
Britain,  Sir  Frederick  Smith,  informed  his 
hearers  that  when,  during  the  war,  it  became 
his  official  duty  to  urge  upon  the  Privy  Coun- 
cil the  idea  that  no  prize  court  in  Great  Brit- 
ain had  the  right  to  challenge  or  call  in  ques- 
tion the  Orders  in  Council  of  His  Majesty 
the  King,  the  Appellate  Prize  Court  decided 
against  the  contention  of  the  Attorney-Gen- 
eral and  declared:  "We  sit  here  as  a  Court 
of  International  Law,  and  in  spite  of  what 
our  enemies  have  done  we  still  believe  there 
are  binding  doctrines  of  International  Law, 
and  sitting  here  as  we  do  sit  as  a  Court, 
whose  duty  it  is  to  construe  those  doctrines, 

71 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

we  utterly  refuse  to  be  bound  by  Orders  in 
Council  issued  by  the  Executive." 

The  Honorable  Attorney- General  stated 
that,  "whether  right  or  wrong/'  this  was  the 
decision  of  the  Court.  The  reasons  why  the 
Court  thought  its  decision  right  are  fully 
given  by  the  late  Lord  Parker  of  Wadding- 
ton,  in  the  Report  on  the  case  of  The 
'Zamora.  "In  the  first  place,"  he  says,  "all 
these  matters  upon  which  the  Court  is  author- 
ized to  proceed,  are,  or  arise  out  of,  acts  done 
by  the  sovereign  power  in  right  of  war.  It 
follows,  the  King  must  directly  or  indirectly 
be  a  party  to  all  proceedings  in  a  court  of 
prize.  In  such  a  Court  his  position  is,  in 
fact,  the  same  as  in  the  ordinary  courts  of 
the  realm  upon  a  petition  of  right  which  has 
been  duly  fiated.  Rights  based  on  sover- 
eignty are  waived,  and  the  Crown,  for  most 
purposes,  accepts  the  position  of  an  ordinary 
litigant.  A  Prize  Court  must,  of  course, 
deal  judicially  with  all  questions  which  come 
before  it  for  determination,  and  it  would  be 
impossible  for  it  to  act  judicially  if  it  were 

72 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  POLICY 

bound  to  take  orders  from  one  of  the  par- 
ties to  the  proceedings." 

"In  the  second  place,"  continues  the  Re- 
port, "the  law  which  the  Prize  Court  is  to  ad- 
minister is  not  the  National,  or,  as  it  is  some- 
times called,  the  Municipal  Law,  but  the 
Law  of  Nations — in  other  words,  Inter- 
national Law.  ...  It  is  obvious  that,  if  and 
so  far  as  a  Court  of  Prize  in  this  country  is 
bound  by  and  gives  effect  to  Orders  of  the 
King  in  Council  purporting  to  prescribe  or 
alter  the  International  Law,  it  is  administer- 
ing not  International  Law  but  Municipal 
Law ;  for  an  exercise  of  the  prerogative  can- 
not impose  legal  obligation  on  any  one  out- 
side the  King's  dominions  who  is  not  the 
King's  subject.  .  .  .  On  this  part  of  the 
case,  therefore,  their  Lordships  hold,  that 
Order  XXIX,  Rule  1,  of  the  Prize  Court 
rules,  construed  as  an  imperative  direction 
of  the  Court,  is  not  binding.  .  .  .  Their 
Lordships  will  humbly  advise  His  Majesty 
accordingly." 

It  is  a  grateful  and  refreshing  assurance 
to  all  those  who  believe  in  and  love  the  reign 
73 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

of  law,  to  know  that  there  is,  in  at  least  one 
country  in  the  world,  a  Court  that,  even  in 
the  midst  of  war,  has  the  purity  and  the 
sense  of  responsibility  to  assert,  against  the 
Law  Officers  of  the  Crown,  that  it  will  take 
no  orders  from  those  whose  authority  is 
merely  the  national  interests  of  the  moment ; 
but  it  is  still  more  reassuring  to  know  that, 
in  the  judgment  of  such  a  Court,  Inter- 
national Law,  despised,  rejected,  and  re- 
viled by  those  who  should  be  its  champions, 
not  only  lives  and  speaks  with  a  voice  of 
authority,  but  that  its  voice  commands 
silence  on  the  part  of  the  interests  even  of 
the  State. 

Happily,  this  is  no  new  doctrine.  For  us, 
as  Mr.  Justice  Gray,  speaking  for  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  has 
said,  in  the  case  of  The  Paquete  Habana,  in 
1899,  "International  Law  is  part  of  our  law, 
and  must  be  ascertained  and  administered 
by  the  courts  of  justice  of  appropriate  juris- 
diction, as  often  as  questions  of  right  depend- 
ing upon  it  are  duly  presented  for  determi- 
nation" ;  and  it  is  no  reflection  upon  the  loyal 

74 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  POLICY 

adherence  of  the  United  States  to  this  prin- 
ciple that,  in  appealing  to  International 
Law  as  binding  in  questions  of  prize,  the 
British  Prize  Courts  have  themselves  ap- 
plied the  decisions  of  American  judges  to 
which  objection  was  once  raised  in  the  period 
of  tke  Civil  War. 

Even  a  moment's  reflection  will  show  that, 
in  determining  to  decide  cases  of  prize  by  the 
Law  of  Nations,  and  not  under  the  Orders  in 
Council  of  the  King,  the  British  Court  was 
following  a  rule  of  action  that  was  less 
warped  by  private  interest  and  more  in- 
fluenced by  the  spirit  of  equity.  It  was,  in 
fact,  deciding  according  to  International 
Law,  because  it  is  better  law. 

And  why  is  it  better  law?  It  is  better  law 
because  it  is  in  no  sense  ex  parte.  It  is  law 
fit  to  be  made  universal.  Even  in  the  more 
liberal-minded  States,  the  development  of 
law  is  under  the  restraint  of  the  class  of  in- 
terests that  have  acquired  power,  whatever 
they  may  be,  and  proceeds  with  little  control 
by  interests  that  are  just  as  real  but  less  in- 
fluential. 

75 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

When  it  comes  to  the  absolute  govern- 
ments, there,  Law  is  merely  a  decree ;  and  is 
in  no  sense  based  upon  its  true  foundation, 
which  is  mutual  obligation,  recognized  and 
rendered  effectual  by  reciprocal  agreement 
to  adopt  a  controlling  principle.  It  is  of 
the  very  essence  of  absolutism  that  it  is 
against  every  principle  that  will  bind  itself, 
and  for  every  advantage  that  will  increase 
the  power  of  the  ruler  over  the  ruled. 

Now  the  underlying  conception  of  the 
Law  of  Nations  is  this :  that  there  are,  in  this 
realm  of  legal  relations,  no  rulers  who  alone 
can  make  the  law,  and  no  subjects  who  are 
compelled  to  submit  to  it.  It  is  a  realm  in 
which  the  jurist  seeks  to  discover  what  is 
just;  and  the  nations,  after  considering 
whether  or  not  it  is  so,  agree  to  accept  and 
abide  by  the  results. 

It  did  not  take  long  for  independent 
minds  seeking  new  foundations  for  the  State, 
to  perceive  that,  underlying  this  conception 
of  law,  there  is  the  basis  of  a  new  system  of 
political  philosophy,  the  idea  of  natural 
rights ;  which,  from  the  time  of  Grotius,  had 

76 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  POLICY 

been  given  wide  publicity  as  a  revival  of  doc- 
trines fundamental  to  the  Roman  Law. 

It  had  not  been  very  distinctly  recalled 
until  a  foreigner,  Professor  De  Lapradelle, 
reminded  us  that  from  1758  to  1776,  when 
American  political  conceptions  were  in  pro- 
cess of  formation,  the  great  jurists  who  wrote 
of  Natural  Law  as  the  basis  of  the  Law 
of  Nations,  such  as  Grotius,  Pufendorf,  and 
Burlamaqui,  "were  read,  studied,  and  com- 
mented upon  in  the  English  colonies  of 
America."  As  early  as  1773,  the  Law  of 
Nations  was  taught  in  King's  College  (now 
Columbia  University) ,  and  "in  1774  Adams, 
and  in  1775  Hamilton,  quote  or  praise  Gro- 
tius and  Pufendorf." 

A  very  considerable  influence  appears  to 
have  been  exercised  upon  our  revolutionary 
fathers  by  the  Swiss  jurist,  Vattel,  whose 
work  on  "The  Law  of  Nations  or  the  Prin- 
ciples of  Natural  Law"  was  inspired  by  a 
spirit  of  political  liberalism,  that  was  without 
precedent.  No  previous  writer  had  ven- 
tured to  class  a  sovereign  as  a  criminal,  but 
Vattel  had  the  courage  to  write : 

77 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

"If  then  there  should  be  found  a  restless 
and  unprincipled  Nation,  ever  ready  to  do 
harm  to  others,  to  thwart  their  purposes,  to 
stir  up  civil  strife  among  their  citizens,  there 
is  no  doubt  but  that  all  the  others  would  have 
the  right  to  unite  together  to  discipline  it, 
and  even  to  disable  it  from  doing  further 
harm." 

Not  hesitating  to  place  such  nations  in  the 
criminal  class,  he  does  not  shrink  from  ap- 
plying to  them  the  rigors  of  the  criminal 
law.  "They  should  be  regarded,"  he  says, 
"as  enemies  of  the  human  race,  just  as  in  civil 
society  persons  who  follow  murder  and  arson 
as  a  profession  commit  a  crime  not  only 
against  the  individuals  who  are  victims  of 
their  lawlessness,  but  against  the  State,  of 
which  they  are  the  declared  enemies."  And, 
in  closing  his  paragraph  with  the  recommen- 
dation of  punishment,  he  adds,  "Of  that 
character  are  the  various  German  tribes  of 
whom  Tacitus  speaks." 

Three  copies  of  Vattel's  book,  brought  out 
in  a  new  edition  specially  adapted  for 
America,  in  1775,  by  Dumas,  a  Swiss  re- 

78 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  POLICY 

publican  resident  in  Holland,  were  sent  to 
Franklin;  who,  in  acknowledging  it,  says: 
"It  came  to  us  in  good  season,  when  the 
circumstances  of  a  rising  State  make  it  neces- 
sary frequently  to  consult  the  Law  of 
Nations."  One  copy  was  sent  to  Harvard 
College,  another  was  deposited  with  the 
Library  Company  of  Philadelphia,  and  of 
Franklin's  own  copy  he  says,  "it  has  been 
continually  in  the  hands  of  the  members  of 
our  Congress  now  sitting." 

States,  according  to  this  teaching,  are 
subject  to  the  principles  of  "right  reason," 
supplemented  by  compacts  freely  made  be- 
tween them.  Thus,  in  the  minds  of  the  co- 
lonial statesmen  of  America,  in  connection 
with  the  Common  Law  they  had  brought 
from  England,  law,  in  its  political  sense, 
came  to  be  identified  with  covenants  of  peo- 
ples or  covenants  of  States,  freely  entered 
into,  in  a  manner  explicit  or  implicit.  Con- 
stitutions, statutes,  and  treaties  had,  in  their 
view,  the  same  ultimate  authority,  the  rights 
of  man:  Constitutions  as  concessions  to  the 
necessity  of  government,  which  they  limited 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

and  defined;  statutes  as  concessions  to  the 
necessity  of  civil  order,  within  the  limits  of 
ordained  government;  and  treaties  as  conces- 
sions to  the  necessity  of  coexistence,  har- 
mony, and  safety,  between  independent 
States. 

Quite  logically,  for  the  first  time  in  history, 
they  wrote  into  the  Federal  Constitution  the 
remarkable  words:  "This  Constitution  and 
the  Laws  of  the  United  States  which  shall 
be  made  in  pursuance  thereof ;  and  all  Trea- 
ties made  or  which  shall  be  made,  under  the 
Authority  of  the  United  States,  shall  be  the 
Supreme  Law  of  the  Land ;  and  the  Judges 
in  every  State  shall  be  bound  thereby,  any- 
thing in  the  Constitution  or  Laws  of  any 
State  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding." 
(Article  VI.) 

I  have  referred  to  these  as  "remarkable 
words,"  because  they  not  only  recognize  in 
treaties  the  quality  of  legal  perfection,  but 
actually  incorporate  the  covenants  entered 
into  by  the  United  States  as  constituting 
equally  with  the  Constitution  itself,  "the 
Supreme  Law  of  the  Land." 
80 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  POLICY 

In  this  the  action  of  the  United  States 
stands  alone,  the  highest  tribute  ever  paid  to 
the  authority  of  law. 

In  this  country  there  has  never  been  any 
doubt  that  international  morality  is  binding 
upon  sovereign  States;  but  not  in  a  strictly 
legal  sense.  Nor  is  it  possible  to  consider  as 
law,  in  its  proper  meaning,  those  usages 
which  are  not  in  harmony  with  the  social 
standards  and  necessities  of  the  present  age. 
In  so  far  as  these  elements  in  the  Law  of 
Nations  are  antiquated  or  without  the 
authority  created  by  consent,  the  fields  of 
activity  they  cover  need  to  be  provided  for 
in  a  new  fashion,  namely,  by  duly  considered 
special  agreements. 

It  is,  therefore,  necessary  to  place  em- 
phasis upon  the  other  element  in  the  Law  of 
Nations,  which  is  incontestably  not  only  per- 
fect law,  according  to  the  most  severe  cri- 
teria of  legality,  but  the  most  perfect  ex- 
ample of  lawmaking  in  the  whole  broad  field 
of  legislation.  I  refer,  of  course,  to  treaties 
and  conventions,  freely  and  deliberately  ne- 

81 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

gotiated  and  ratified  by  a  constitutionally 
authorized  legislative  body. 

It  is  impossible,  in  view  of  the  modern 
methods  of  lawmaking,  any  longer  to  accept 
the  idea  of  law  expressed  in  the  classic  defi- 
nition of  the  distinguished  English  jurist, 
John  Austin,  who  defines  law,  as  "The  com- 
mands issued  by  a  sovereign  authority  to  per- 
sons in  general  subjection  to  it";  which  is  a 
description  of  law  in  an  order  of  things  that 
has,  for  the  most  part,  passed  away. 

Under  such  a  definition,  there  could,  of 
course,  be  no  place  for  International  Law, 
— a  law  created  between  sovereign  States  for 
their  mutual  governance ;  nor  could  there  be 
law  of  any  kind,  in  the  modern  legislative 
sense,  for  any  self-governing  people.  Where 
may  we  look  for  a  "sovereign  authority"  that 
can  issue  "commands"  to  sovereign  States? 

Such  an  authority  would  be  a  superstate, 
a  new  entity,  holding  formerly  sovereign 
States  "in  general  subjection  to  it." 

And  yet,  sovereign  States,  which  do  not, 
and  cannot,  subordinate  themselves  without 
self -extinction,  to  a  supernational  authority, 

82 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  POLICY 

do  and  must  create  law  for  the  regulation 
of  their  own  conduct  toward  one  another, — 
a  law  not  imposed  from  above,  but  created 
by  themselves,  valid  and  binding  between 
them; — in  strict  and*  literal  expression,  a 
law  international. 

It  would,  I  think,  not  be  an  error  to  say, 
that  International  Law,  when  made  by  gen- 
eral treaties,  illustrates  the  perfection  of  the 
law-making  process;  because  it  is  the  result 
of  a  mode  of  procedure  in  which  there  is  a 
complete  substitution  of  agreement  for  com- 
mand. If  it  is  true,  that  government  by  the 
consent  of  the  governed  is  the  highest 
political  ideal;  then  the  agreements  of  par- 
liaments, congresses,  councils,  and  legisla- 
tures representing  the  people  are  the  highest 
type  of  law ;  and,  indisputably,  international 
treaties  and  conventions,  ratified  reciprocally 
by  legislative  bodies,  are  the  most  perfect 
examples  of  this  type.  They  possess  an  ideal 
authority  which  no  other  form  of  law  can 
surpass. 

Under  this  system,  a  great  body  of  posi- 
tive law,  freely  and  deliberately  agreed 

83 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

upon,  and  to  a  great  extent  with  the  added 
quality  of  unanimity,  has  been  written  into 
treaties  and  conventions  solemnly  and  duly 
ratified,  according  to  the  laws  of  each  signa- 
tory Power. 

In  the  development  of  this  procedure,  the 
United  States  has  been  a  leader,  because  it 
has  introduced  the  participation  of  a  repre- 
sentative legislative  body  in  the  treaty-mak- 
ing process.  The  law-making  treaties  of  the 
United  States  are  of  their  very  essence  ex- 
amples of  positive  law,  not  only  because 
treaties  are  declared  by  the  Constitution  to 
be  "the  Supreme  Law  of  the  Land/'  but  be- 
cause they  require  the  specific  approval  of 
the  highest  legislative  branch  of  the  Gov- 
ernment. 

Originally,  before  the  adoption  of  the  Con- 
stitution, under  the  Articles  of  Confeder- 
ation, the  making  of  treaties  was  the  duty 
of  the  Congress ;  but,  being  feeble  as  an  ex- 
ecutive, Congress  found  itself  confronted 
with  the  more  difficult  task  of  making  them 
respected.  In  1786,  Washington,  in  a  pri- 
vate letter,  wrote  to  Jay,  the  accusation  that 

84 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  POLICY 

the  legislatures  of  the  States  were  violating 
the  treaty  of  peace  with  Great  Britain  "was 
greeted  by  them  with  laughter."  The  States 
had  not  all  developed  the  sense  of  national 
responsibility;  but  national  responsibility 
was  the  imperative  need,  if  the  Union  was  to 
endure,  and  that  is  what  was  created  by  the 
provisions  of  the  Constitution  in  the  Conven- 
tion of  1787. 

In  a  letter  written  by  Jay  to  the  States,  of 
the  Confederation,  on  April  13,  1787,  and 
approved  by  the  Congress,  it  was  declared: 
4 'Contracts  between  nations,  like  contracts 
between  individuals,  should  be  faithfully  ex- 
ecuted, even  though  the  sword  in  the  one 
case  and  the  law  in  the  other  did  not  com- 
pel it.  Honest  nations,  like  honest  men,  re- 
quire no  restraint  to  do  justice;  and  though 
impunity  and  the  necessity  of  affairs  may 
sometimes  afford  temptations  to  pare  down 
contracts  to  the  measure  of  convenience,  yet 
it  is  never  done  but  at  the  expense  of  that 
esteem,  and  confidence,  and  credit  which  are 
of  infinitely  more  worth  than  all  the  momen- 
85 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

tary  advantages  which  such  expedients  can 
extort." 

In  this  spirit  was  the  constitutional  pro- 
vision made,  that  the  engagements  of  treaties 
and  the  rules  of  action  to  which  they  pledged 
the  signatories,  should,  in  the  United  States, 
at  least,  themselves  possess  the  quality  of 
being  the  supreme  law  of  the  land. 

As  Mr.  Chief  Justice  Marshall  afterward 
stated,  speaking  for  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States:  "A  treaty  is  to  be  re- 
garded in  Courts  of  Justice  as  equivalent 
to  an  act  of  the  legislature,  whenever  it 
operates  of  itself,  without  the  aid  of  any  leg- 
islative provision."  And,  indeed,  the  making 
of  treaties  very  narrowly  escaped  remaining, 
under  the  Constitution,  what  it  had  been 
under  the  Confederation,  an  act  entrusted  to 
the  legislative  branch  alone.  It  was  only 
toward  the  end  of  the  sessions  that  the  pre- 
vious method  was  modified. 

"It  was  evident,"  says  Farrand,  in  his 
"Framing  of  the  Constitution,"  "that  the 
convention  was  growing  tired.  The  commit- 
tee had  recommended  that  the  power  of  ap- 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  POLICY 

pointment  and  the  making  of  treaties  be 
taken  from  the  Senate  and  vested  in  the 
President,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  con- 
sent of  the  Senate.  With  surprising  una- 
nimity and  surprisingly  little  debate,"  he 
adds,  "these  important  changes  were  agreed 
to." 

By  this  division  of  the  process  of  treaty- 
making,  the  Executive  was,  in  effect, 
charged  with  the  duty  of  recommending  leg- 
islation which  he  might  find  desirable  and 
practicable,  but  upon  which  a  truly  legis- 
lative seal  was  to  be  placed  only  by  and  with 
the  advice  and  consent  of  a  law-making  body. 

Regarding  the  motives  for  this  decision, 
Alexander  Hamilton  wrote,  in  "The  Feder- 
alist": "However  proper  and  safe  it  may 
be  in  governments  where  the  executive  mag- 
istrate is  an  hereditary  monarch,  to  commit 
to  him  the  entire  power  of  making  treaties, 
it  would  be  utterly  unsafe  and  improper  to 
entrust  that  power  to  an  elective  magistrate 
of  four  years'  duration.  .  .  .  The  history 
of  human  conduct  does  not  warrant  that  ex- 
alted opinion  of  human  virtue  which  would 
87 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

make  it  wise  in  a  nation  to  commit  interests 
of  so  delicate  and  momentous  a  kind,  as  those 
which  concern  its  intercourse  with  the  rest 
of  the  world,  to  the  sole  disposal  of  a  magis- 
trate created  and  circumstanced  as  would  be 
the  President  of  the  United  States. 

"To  have  entrusted  the  power  of  making 
treaties  to  the  Senate  alone,"  he  continues, 
"would  have  been  to  relinquish  the  benefits 
of  the  constitutional  agency  of  the  President 
in  the  conduct  of  foreign  negotiations.  .  .  . 
Though  it  would  be  imprudent  to  confide  in 
him  solely  so  important  a  trust,  yet  it  cannot 
be  doubted  that  his  participation  would 
materially  add  to  the  safety  of  the  society. 
It  must  indeed  be  clear  to  a  demonstration 
that  the  joint  possession  of  the  power  in 
question,  by  the  President  and  Senate,  would 
afford  a  greater  prospect  of  security  than 
the  separate  possession  of  it  by  either  of 
them." 

The  judgment  of  American  statesmen  and 
the  results  of  experience  have  confirmed  the 
view  expressed  by  Hamilton.  It  has  been 
the  custom  of  the  Executive,  in  matters  of 

88 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  POLICY 

large  import  to  avail  itself  of  "the  advice 
and  consent  of  the  Senate,"  at  all  stages  of 
negotiation;  and,  in  fact,  the  need  of  negoti- 
ations on  particular  subjects  has  sometimes 
been  first  brought  to  the  attention  of  the 
Executive  by  the  legislative  branch  of  the 
government.  Much  of  this  exchange  of  views 
is  not,  however,  a  matter  of  record;  for  it 
has  been  in  great  part  oral,  and  the  nature  of 
the  questions  under  discussion  often  render 
these  private  conversations  too  delicate  to 
be  given  publicity  when  opinion  on  all  sides 
was  still  merely  in  a  state  of  formation  by  the 
competent  participants. 

It  is,  however,  a  notable  fact  that  the  tra- 
ditions of  the  Senate  have  always  been  tena- 
cious regarding  the  responsibility  which  the 
Constitution  places  upon  it,  and  justly  so; 
for,  if  treaties  are  not  merely  executive  en- 
gagements, and  in  reality  are  both  supreme 
law  binding  upon  the  nation  and  destined  to 
affect  and  to  modify,  to  its  benefit  or  to  its 
injury,  the  whole  fabric  of  International 
Law,  such  engagements  become  the  most 
solemn  transactions  which  it  is  the  duty  of 
89 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

a  government  to  perform.  As  it  is  the  func- 
tion of  the  Congress  to  judge  of  the  causes 
for  which,  and  the  occasions  when,  it  may  be 
necessary  to  declare  war,  it  is  not  unreason- 
able that  one  branch  of  it,  at  least,  should 
interest  itself  in  the  conditions  which  may 
determine  the  vital  questions  of  future  peace ; 
and  nothing  is  so  closely  connected  with  the 
possibilities  of  war  and  peace  as  the  engage- 
ments into  which  nations  mutually  enter  by 
formal  treaties.  Involving,  as  they  do, 
pledges  of  action  as  well  as  pledges  of  ab- 
stention, they  may  easily  contain,  under  the 
smoothest  and  most  peaceful  forms  of  ex- 
pression, the  most  pestilent  seeds  of  future 
discord. 

In  the  year  1899,  and  again  in  1907,  an 
opportunity  was  afforded,  at  the  two  Hague 
Conferences,  to  perform  a  large  task  in  im- 
proving International  Law  by  law-making 
treaties. 

The  results  were  less  than  had  been  hoped 
for,  but  they  marked  an  advance  upon  any- 
thing that  had  before  been  attempted.  Not- 
withstanding the  efforts  made  by  Germany 

90 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  POLICY 

and  her  allies  to  prevent  any  general  under- 
standing based  on  the  authority  of  law,  an 
important  corpus  juris  of  an  international 
character  had  been  brought  into  existence, 
which  even  the  obstructive  Powers  had, 
under  the  pressure  of  public  opinion,  found 
it  expedient  to  accept,  and  had  solemnly 
given  their  pledges  to  observe. 

It  was  no  outworn  and  obsolete  rules  of 
conduct,  but  laws  as  authoritative  as  human 
ingenuity  can  devise  that  have  been  openly, 
shamelessly  and  brutally  violated  by  nations 
claiming  to  rank  among  the  most  highly  cul- 
tivated of  modern  peoples.  By  our  consti- 
tutional provision,  these  laws,  embodied  in 
a  series  of  treaties  duly  ratified  and  pro- 
claimed, were  not  only  laws  to  which  we  had 
subscribed,  they  were  an  integral  part  of  the 
supreme  law  of  the  United  States. 

I  bring  no  accusation  of  negligence;  but 
I  do  not  hesitate  to  say,  that  an  immediate 
and  earnest  protest  against  the  first  violation 
of  these  laws  was  not  only  justified,  but  a 
duty  which  this  nation  owed  to  the  dignity 
of  the  law  itself. 

91 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

I  submit,  that  there  has  been  no  question 
before  the  delegates  of  the  Powers  victorious 
in  the  Great  War  assembled  in  Paris  to  con- 
clude a  world  peace  that  compares  in  im- 
port and  consequence  to  mankind  with  the 
issue:  What,  in  the  future,  is  to  be  the 
authority  of  International  Law?  To  what 
end  are  new  geographic  boundaries  to  be 
drawn  on  the  map  of  Europe  and  of  the 
world,  oppressed  nations  to  be  endowed  with 
a  right  of  self-determination  which  needs  to 
be  guaranteed  by  others,  territories  restored 
to  their  rightful  national  connection  by  a 
treaty  of  peace,  and  partial  reparation  made 
for  reparable  damages  inflicted,  if  Inter- 
national Law  is  to  be  left  without  permanent 
defense? 

This  then  is  the  fundamental  issue  of  the 
hour.  The  whole  edifice  of  law  is  menaced, 
not  merely  in  its  superstructure,  but  at  its 
foundations;  for,  in  the  modern  conception 
of  it,  it  is  not  a  system  of  regulations  im- 
posed from  above,  and  always  and  every- 
where enforced  by  the  physical  power  of  the 
stronger  against  the  will  of  the  weaker;  but 

92 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  POLICY 

a  system  arrived  at  by  the  voluntary  con- 
sent, and  maintained  by  the  voluntary  sup- 
port of  those  who  believe  in  the  essential  dig- 
nity and  authority  of  law. 

What  then  is  to  be  done  to  maintain  that 
authority? 

Up  to  this  point,  I  believe,  I  have  said  only 
that  upon  which  we  can  all  substantially 
agree.  But  when  we  come  to  methods  of  sus- 
taining the  law  we  leave  the  domain  of  law 
in  its  proper  sense  and  pass  into  the  realm 
of  policy;  which  is,  to  a  certain  degree,  a 
field  of  theory. 

Here  I  shall  not  presume  to  enter,  either 
to  construct  or  to  destroy  the  fabrics  of  the 
mind.  My  firm  conviction  is  that  we  shall 
do  well  to  avoid  the  magical  charm  of  phrases 
and  catchwords,  and  to  fix  our  attention 
upon  realities. 

The  authority  of  International  Law  rests 
on  national  character.  We  cannot  change 
that  by  forming  new  partnerships,  and  par- 
ticularly not  by  receiving  into  them  a  doubt- 
ful member,  in  the  hope  of  rendering  the  de- 
faulter and  the  embezzler  an  honest  man  by 
93 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

giving  him  an  interest  in  a  business  for  which 
we  are  to  furnish  the  most  of  the  capital. 

I  profoundly  distrust  the  professions  and 
the  plausibilities  of  death-bed  repentances, 
even  among  nations;  and  also  the  improve- 
ments of  society  which  result  from  merely 
emotional  impulses.  If  we  are  to  build 
wisely,  we  shall  build  on  the  foundations  of 
tested  knowledge  and  experience.  We  shall 
put  no  trust  in  any  "scrap  of  paper,"  no 
matter  with  what  pious  phraseology  it  may 
be  inscribed,  except  in  so  far  as  we  know  that 
there  are  both  strength  and  character  behind 
it.  We  went  into  this  war  a  free  people.  Let 
us  come  out  of  it  a  free  people.  Men  talk 
glibly  of  world  federation.  What  does  it 
mean?  It  means,  if  it  signifies  anything,  that 
this  nation,  with  other  nations,  is  to  place 
itself  under  some  kind  of  a  central  authority, 
with  power  to  raise  and  expend  taxes,  to  or- 
ganize and  command  armies,  to  regulate  the 
trade  and  commerce  of  the  world,  and  upon 
occasion  to  declare  war,  powers  which, 
under  our  National  Constitution — the  most 
far-seeing  document  of  government  ever 
94 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  POLICY 

written  by  the  hand  of  man — are  placed 
solely  in  the  control  of  the  responsible  rep- 
resentatives of  the  people  of  the  United 
States.  Those  powers  will,  I  believe,  never 
be  transferred  to  a  new  nation,  of  which  the 
United  States  would  be  only  a  parochial 
part;  nor  will  they  ever  be  subject  to  being 
overruled  by  the  decisions  of  any  associa- 
tion whatever,  without  the  free  consent  of 
our  own  law-making  bodies. 

We  have,  during  the  war,  put  to  the  test 
the  strength  of  our  free  institutions,  and  we 
have  found  them  adequate  for  war  as  well  as 
for  peace.  They  have  been  adequate,  be- 
cause we  have  never  for  a  moment  lost  the 
conviction  that  we  are  a  free  people,  and  that 
we  were  acting  in  perfect  freedom.  Had  the 
matter  of  our  food  been  under  the  control  of 
a  supernational  body,  had  our  young  men 
been  ordered  by  an  authority  not  American 
to  leave  their  business  and  report  for  con- 
scription to  cross  the  sea  and  fight  at  the  dic- 
tation and  in  the  interest  of  a  foreign  people, 
had  the  occasion  called  for  action  that  was 
in  any  degree  doubtful  to  the  American  con- 
95 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

science,  this  people  would  not  have  made  the 
sacrifices  of  life  and  treasure  which  they 
have  gladly  made  with  unreluctant  consecra- 
tion of  mind  and  body. 

There  is  a  limit  to  national,  as  there  is  to 
personal  responsibility.  Nationally,  that 
limit  is  defined  by  the  maintenance  and  vin- 
dication of  law.  I  fear  the  imperial  sodal- 
ity of  Great  Powers  associated  for  any  other 
purpose.  No  condominium  has  ever  been 
free  from  jealousies  and  friction.  Even  so 
trifling  a  partnership  as  the  control  of  the 
Samoan  Islands  was  a  thorn  in  the  side  of 
three  nations  until  it  was  dissolved.  Every 
such  condominium  has  ended  either  in  quar- 
rel or  partition,  or  in  both;  and  the  net  re- 
sult is  always  merely  deferred  annexation. 
A  partnership  for  equal  economic  opportu- 
nities among  unequal  nations  offers  the  pros- 
pect of  unexpected  demands;  which,  if  not 
granted,  will  lead  to  the  accusation  of  bad 
faith. 

How  then  can  we  find  a  modus  Vivendi  for 
sovereign  States?  How,  indeed,  if  not  in  a 
united  support  of  law,  the  recognition  of 

96 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  POLICY 

their  equal  freedom,  and  their  mutual  obli- 
gations? Law  does  not  require  a  renuncia- 
tion of  rights ;  it  affirms,  guarantees  and  pro- 
tects them.  That  is  its  very  purpose  and  its 
whole  significance. 

Let  there  be  then  a  union  for  the  main- 
tenance of  the  law.  Such  a  union  now  hap- 
pily exists.  It  consists  of  the  nations  that 
have  had  the  force  and  the  courage  to  enter 
the  war,  in  order  to  bring  the  law-breakers 
to  justice,  and  of  no  others.  I  say  of  no 
others,  because  a  nation  is  of  value  in  pro- 
viding a  real  sanction  to  the  authority  of  law 
only  when  it  is  ready  to  defend  the  law.  A 
neutral  nation  at  best  only  renders  a  pas- 
sive respect  to  the  authority  of  the  Law  of 
Nations.  In  the  cause  of  equity  it  is  not  an 
asset,  it  is  only  a  liability. 

I,  of  course,  do  not  overlook  the  fact  that 
the  prevention  of  war  is  of  great  interest  to 
neutrals,  for  they  are  necessarily  involved 
in  its  hardships  by  the  restriction  of  their 
trade.  In  a  speech  delivered  by  the  late 
Lord  Parker,  a  short  time  before  his  death, 
he  predicted  that,  if  in  future  it  were  made 

97 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

clear  that  there  could  be  no  neutrality,  the 
danger  of  war  would  be  minimized,  because 
its  risks  would  be  increased.  Then  all 
nations  would  be  more  anxious  to  prevent  it, 
in  so  far  as  it  is  in  their  power  to  do  so. 
Mediation  would  be  a  necessary  act  of  self- 
preservation;  and  for  this  there  is  full  justi- 
fication. There  is  an  old  English  form  of 
indictment,  I  am  told,  that  bases  arrest  on 
the  violation  of  "the  peace  and  dignity  of  the 
King."  There  may  well  be  a  form  of  inter- 
national indictment  against  those  who  would 
disturb  the  peace  and  dignity  of  mankind. 

For  my  own  part,  speaking  now  as  a  real- 
ist, I  look  for  the  prevention  of  war  chiefly 
to  the  command  of  the  sea.  I  do  not  rest  my 
faith  on  "the  freedom  of  the  sea" — we  have 
seen  what  that  may  mean — but  on  the  law  of 
the  sea;  and  that  law  should  be  simply  the 
principle  set  up  in  opposition  to  the  un- 
limited right  of  war,  namely,  the  inviolability 
of  the  innocent,  for  which  the  Entente  Allies 
have  been  fighting. 

On  the  20th  of  November,  1918,  the  cul- 
prit fleet  of  Germany — in  the  presence  of 
98 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  POLICY 

British,  American,  and  French  warships — 
coming  forth  from  its  lair,  marshaled  by  the 
British  light  cruiser  Cardiff,  swept  across 
the  North  Sea  through  the  morning  mist  in 
gloomy  procession,  to  be  shepherded  into 
captivity.  "Ignominious  and  yet  magnifi- 
cent," as  a  writer  describes  them,  the  Seyd- 
litz,  the  Moltke,  the  Derfflinger,  the  Hinden- 
burg,  and  the  Von  der  Tann,  boastful  battle 
cruisers,  the  pride  of  the  German  Emperor, 
that  had  long  celebrated  "The  Day"  when 
commanding  the  empire  of  the  sea  they 
could  bring  the  world  into  subjection, 
swept  through  the  mist,  followed  by  the  nine 
battleships,  then  the  fifty  destroyers  and  the 
great  flotilla  of  guilty  submarines.  "It's  a 
fine  sight,"  a  sailor  exclaimed,  "but  I 
wouldn't  be  on  one  of  those  ships  for  all  the 
world." 

Unconsciously,  this  lad  felt  in  his  heart 
what  every  true  sailor  hopes  will  be  the 
future  law  of  the  sea.  It  was  on  the  sea 
that  International  Law  had  its  birth  in  the 
old  sea  codes,  the  "Table  of  Amalfi,"  the 
"Consolato,"  the  "Jugemens  d'Oleron,"  and 
99 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

the  "Laws  of  Wisby,"  which  made  the  sea, 
because  it  is  the  highway  of  the  world,  a 
place  where  above  all  others  the  rights  of 
man  should  be  respected  and  maintained. 
Brave  to  battle  with  wind,  and  wave,  and 
storm,  the  true  sailor  scorns  a  Power  that 
would  add  to  the  struggle  with  nature  the 
inhumanity  of  man.  The  sea  is  the  realm 
of  humanity's  defense.  Closed  by  the  will  of 
all  civilized  peoples  to  the  greed  of  the  pi- 
rate, the  united  navies  of  the  Entente  must 
make  its  law  the  inviolability  of  the  inno- 
cent. And  this  can  be  done. 

If  the  Entente  Allies,  who  have  fought  to- 
gether in  this  war  to  vindicate  the  rights  of 
nations,  are  not  to  be  trusted,  and  there  is 
in  them  no  soul  of  honor,  then  the  outlook 
for  mankind  is,  indeed,  a  hopeless  one.  But 
if  they  can  be  trusted  in  so  great  a  matter, 
the  formula  for  the  defense  of  right  is  very 
simple. 

I  take  a  leaf  from  the  diplomatic  corre- 
spondence of  the  British  Secretary  of  State 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  then  Sir  Edward,  now 
Viscount  Grey. 

100 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AMD  POLICY 

Writing  to  M.  Paul  Cambon,  French 
Ambassador  in  London,  on  November  22nd, 
1912,  he  said:  "You  have  pointed  out  that, 
if  either  Government  had  grave  reason  to 
expect  an  unprovoked  attack  by  a  third 
Power,  or  something  that  threatened  the 
general  peace,  it  might  become  essential  to 
know  whether  it  could  in  that  event  depend 
upon  the  armed  assistance  of  the  other.  I 
agree  that,  if  either  Government  had  grave 
reason  to  expect  an  unprovoked  attack  by  a 
third  Power,  or  something  that  threatened 
the  general  peace,  it  should  immediately  dis- 
cuss with  the  other  whether  both  Govern- 
ments should  act  together  to  prevent  aggres- 
sion and  to  preserve  peace,  and,  if  so,  what 
measures  they  would  be  prepared  to  take  in 


common." 


This  understanding  was  a  menace  to  no 
honorable  nation.  It  was,  in  fact,  one  in 
which  all  honorable  governments  might  join. 
It  suppressed  no  one's  freedom;  it  looked 
toward  peace,  and  not  toward  war;  and  it 
has  saved  Europe! 

A  more  inclusive  formula  might  possess 
101 


IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

the  same  qualities  and  serve  the  same  pur- 
pose. It  might  read:  "We,  the  signatories, 
agree  that,  if  peace  should  be  anywhere 
threatened,  we  will  together  inquire  into  the 
cause  of  aggression;  and  if  we  find  that  the 
Law  of  Nations  has  been  anywhere  violated, 
we  will  by  mediation  together  use  our  best 
endeavors  to  avoid  strife.  If  war  is  begun, 
we  will  together  consider  what  measures  we 
should  take  in  common.  And  we  mutually 
agree  to  submit  any  difference  we  may  have 
with  one  another  or  with  other  nations  to  a 
like  mediation.  To  this  end  we  continue  our 
close  association  of  intimate  counsel,  and  will 
receive  into  our  understanding  other  gov- 
ernments when  circumstances  may  render  it 
proper  to  do  so." 

.  To  many  minds  this  may  seem  too  atten- 
uated, too  much  dependent  upon  good  will 
and  a  common  purpose.  To  that  I  have  only 
to  say  this.  Without  good  will  and  without 
a  community  of  purpose  there  is  no  agree- 
ment and  there  is  no  sure  keeping  of  en- 
gagements among  men.  Underlying  all  hu- 
man endeavor  and  cooperation,  the  strong- 
102 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  POLICY 

est  motive  is  a  love  of  freedom.  Unless  they 
are  forced  to  yield  to  some  type  of  imperial- 
ism— personal,  national,  or  multiform — 
which  they  will  never  cease  to  resent,  men 
who  believe  that  there  is  no  true  government 
that  is  not  founded  upon  the  consent  of  the 
governed,  will  not  consider  themselves 
bound,  even  by  the  authority  of  the  law,  if 
they  discover  that  by  its  mandates  they  are 
no  longer  free. 


i 


IV 

THE    CORPORATE    CHARACTER    OF    THE 
LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 

IF  language  is  to  have  any  exact  meaning, 
it  cannot  be  pretended  that  a  League  of 
Nations  can  be  identified  with  the  entire 
Society  of  States.  Sovereign  States,  under 
the  Law  of  Nations  as  it  exists,  are  equal 
before  the  law,  regardless  of  their  military 
power,  physical  magnitude,  or  economic  im- 
portance. They  are  to  be  treated  under  In- 
ternational Law  as  legal  persons,  possess- 
ing rights  inherent  in  their  sovereignty, 
which  all  civilized  nations  are  bound  to  re- 
spect. 

The  work  in  which  the  Conference  at 
Paris  has  been  engaged  is  not,  properly 
speaking,  the  formation  of  a  universal  So- 
ciety of  States,  such  as  that  contemplated 
y  International  Law,  but  the  creation  of  a 
104 


CHARACTER  OF  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

predominant  group  within  this  more  gen- 
eral association.1 

In  the  minds  of  those  who  are  the  most 
active  in  commending  this  League,  there  is 
apparently  no  very  precise  conception  of  its 
real  nature.  They  have  spoken  alternately 
of  a  "Treaty,"  of  a  "Covenant,"  and  of  a 
"Constitution,"  without  making  any  distinc- 
tion between  them,  or  seeming  to  realize  that 
this  is  a  matter  of  the  least  importance.  To 
them  it  is  an  agreement  to  end  war ;  and  they 
appeal  for  support  on  this  ground,  with  lit- 
tle regard  to  the  obligations  involved  or  the 
ultimate  consequences  which  may  follow 
from  accepting  them. 

When  it  is  pointed  out  that  participation 
in  this  League,  in  the  form  proposed,  might 
prove  disadvantageous  to  the  United  States, 
some  of  its  advocates  reply,  "After  all,  it  is 
only  a  treaty,  and  a  treaty  can  be  abrogated 
at  any  time." 

This  assumption  is  based  on  the  statement 
in  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 

*The  original  and  the  final  forms  of  the  "Covenant"  are 
printed  in  full  at  the  end  of  this  volume. 

105 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

that  "All  treaties  made,  or  which  shall  be 
made,  under  the  authority  of  the  United 
States,  shall  be  the  supreme  law  of  the  land." 
Being  a  law,  it  is  contended,  a  treaty  may  be 
nullified  by  any  subsequent  law  which  con- 
tradicts its  provisions  or  prevents  the  execu- 
tion of  them;  and  such  a  law  it  is  always 
within  the  power  of  Congress  to  enact. 

If  this  were  the  nature  of  treaties  made 
by  the  United  States  of  America  with  other 
nations,  it  would  be  difficult  to  find  any  oth- 
ers that  would  care  to  enter  into  treaty  rela- 
tions with  the  United  States.  By  asserting 
it,  we  should  put  ourselves  on  a  lower  level 
of  ignominy  and  dishonor  than  that  which 
Germany  has  occupied,  and  which  we  have 
denounced  with  bitter  scorn;  for  we  should 
be,  in  effect,  declaring  that  we  regard  a  sol- 
emn compact  as  "a  scrap  of  paper,"  not  be- 
cause of  changed  circumstances  or  national 
necessities,  but  because  it  was  intended  that 
it  might  be  nullified  even  before  it  was 
signed. 

A  treaty,  even  the  least  important,  is 
something  more  than  a  law;  it  is  a  contract. 
106 


CHARACTER  OF  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

However  the  legal  effect  of  such  a  document 
might  be  changed,  as  a  contract  it  is  not  af- 
fected by  a  change  in  the  law;  and  it  cannot 
be  denounced,  except  by  its  own  specified 
termination  or  the  consent  of  the  other  con- 
tractants,  without  incurring  the  hostility  of 
those  who  insist  upon  the  fulfilment  of  its 
obligations.  The  only  remedy  for  this  de- 
fault is  war,  and  the  non-performance  of  the 
obligations  of  the  contract  is  a  legitimate 
casus  belli. 

It  may,  indeed,  be  said  that  there  have 
been  instances  of  failure  to  keep  treaty  en- 
gagements, which  have  been  nullified  either 
by  the  refusal  to  pass  the  laws  necessary  to 
the  execution  of  the  treaty,  or  by  the  enact- 
ment of  legislation  forbidding  the  acts  which 
it  requires.  But  the  United  States  has  never 
done  this  in  the  case  of  any  Great  Power  able 
to  enforce  the  obligation  thus  repudiated. 
It  would  have  been  a  simple  matter,  for  ex- 
ample, to  pass  the  necessary  legislation  and 
proceed  to  the  building  of  an  isthmian  canal, 
regardless  of  the  famous  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  with  Great  Britain.  It  was,  however, 
107 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

never  claimed  that  an  act  of  legislation  by 
the  Congress  of  the  United  States  could  ab- 
solve this  country  from  the  embarrassing  ob- 
ligations of  that  treaty;  although  it  could 
have  been  argued  that  it  was  already  invali- 
dated by  acts  performed  by  Great  Britain. 
But  so  long  as  those  arguments  were  not  ac- 
cepted by  the  other  contractant,  it  was  neces- 
sary to  admit  that  a  denunciation  of  the 
treaty  would  have  been  a  breach  of  faith  and 
even  a  casus  belli  had  Great  Britain  chosen 
to  consider  it  in  that  sense.  It  is  futile, 
therefore,  to  maintain  that  treaties  may  be 
abrogated  by  a  unilateral  legislative  act. 

It  may  be  said  of  the  proposed  League  of 
Nations,  although  the  word  Constitution  is 
now  omitted,  that  it  is  much  more  than  a 
mere  treaty  involving  mutual  obligations. 
It  is  spoken  of  as  a  "Covenant,"  but  it  is 
much  more  than  an  assemblage  of  reciprocal 
promises.  If  the  League  were  a  mere  pledge 
to  do  or  not  to  do  certain  things,  it  would 
never  have  seemed  to  require  a  "Constitu- 
tion," which  implies  the  creation  of  a  new 
entity,  something  which  can  perform  certain 
108 


CHARACTER  OF  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

actions  by  itself;  and,  beyond  all  possible 
contradiction,  this  League  is  such  an  entity, 
and  is  endowed  with  powers  of  immense  con- 
sequence which  prior  to  its  creation  have 
never  had  a  legalized  existence. 

Perhaps  the  most  important  of  all  the  con- 
siderations thus  far  emphasized  by  those  who 
have  discussed  this  project  of  a  League  is 
the  legal  interpretation  of  the  original  form 
of  this  document  made  by  Mr.  Justice  Staf- 
ford, of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  District 
of  Columbia,  in  his  discriminating  analysis. 
He  finds  it  to  be  not  merely  a  treaty  of  alli- 
ance or  agreement  to  preserve  peace,  but  the 
creation  of  a  corporate  entity  possessing  not 
only  advisory  but  strictly  governmental 
powers.  He  considers  that  these  powers  may 
come  into  conflict  with  those  of  the  separate 
governments  that  enter  into  the  League. 
That  is  a  question  which  I  shall  not  discuss 
at  this  time;  but  I  shall  undertake  to  show 
that  the  League,  even  in  its  revised  form,  as 
a  distinct  corporate  entity,  exercising  a  will 
not  identical  with  that  of  all  the  separate 
members,  is  organized  with  power  to  coerce 
109 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

other  States  not  belonging  to  it,  to  act  un- 
der its  own  rules  and  by  its  own  judgment, 
and  even  to  dictate  the  form  of  government 
and  degree  of  authority  to  be  exercised  over 
wide  areas  and  great  populations  subjected 
to  its  control.  Whatever  ambiguities  this 
document  may  contain — and  they  are  many 
— upon  these  subjects  it  is  unequivocal. 

If  the  League  wrere  based  merely  on  a 
"Covenant,"  the  mutual  agreements  would 
be  the  whole  substance  of  the  document. 
But  this  is  by  no  means  the  case.  The 
League  of  Nations,  as  here  planned,  is  not 
a  federation,  in  which  the  component  States 
are  combined  into  a  new  political  organism. 
It  is  an  autonomous  corporation,  endowed 
with  its  own  organs  of  action.  Its  being  and 
its  powers,  when  once  constituted,  would  per- 
sist if  a  great  part  of  the  constituents  should 
perish. 

A  mere  agreement  between  sovereign 
States  for  their  mutual  defense,  like  that  in 
Article  X,  requires  no  such  organic  law.  An 
agreement  implies  merely  an  assent,  an  asso- 
ciation, or  a  partnership  of  persons,  natural 
110 


CHARACTER  OF  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

or  legal,  for  certain  specified  purposes,  which 
may  terminate  when  its  ends  have  been  ac- 
complished by  the  performance  of  certain 
definite  acts  on  the  part  of  the  contractants 
thus  making  the  agreement.  This  so-called 
Covenant  is  not  such  an  agreement  or  part- 
nership. It  creates  a  new  legal  person,  act- 
ing by  itself  in  a  manner  to  be  determined 
by  itself,  and  in  accordance  with  rules  to  be 
adopted  by  itself.  It  creates  a  body,  at  first 
called  the  Executive  Council,  which,  in  turn, 
chooses  and  directs  its  own  organs  of  action, 
defines  their  rights  and  duties,  and  confers 
new  authority  upon  them.  It  creates  obliga- 
tions on  the  part  of  the  nations  composing 
the  League  which  these  nations  owe  not  to 
one  another  but  to  the  League,  as  a  distinct 
and  separate  legal  person,  who  can  call  them 
to  account  for  non-performance  of  duty  and 
inflict  punishment  upon  them.  It  attributes 
to  the  League  as  a  corporate  entity,  powers 
which,  under  International  Law,  the  separ- 
ate States  do  not,  either  singly  or  in  com- 
bination, themselves  possess;  thus  creating 
an  imperium  over  States  not  belonging  to  the 
111 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

League,  which  is  empowered  to  coerce  and 
punish  them  for  not  submitting  to  its  deci- 
sions. The  duties  of  the  officers  of  the 
League  are  duties  to  the  League,  not  to  the 
component  States,  which  cannot  separately 
hold  them  to  accountability  or  punish  them 
for  excesses  or  disobedience.  The  League 
is  empowered  to  govern  through  its  manda- 
taries certain  colonies  and  territories  ac- 
quired by  conquest.  These  mandataries  are 
required  to  exercise  their  authority,  which 
is  derived  entirely  from  the  League,  as  ex- 
plicitly directed  by  the  Council  in  a  special 
"Act  or  Charter";  which  is,  in  effect,  a  royal 
prerogative,  such  as  that  which  the  Kings  of 
England  exercised  in  granting  colonial  char- 
ters in  America.2 

From  this  enumeration  of  powers  it  is  evi- 
dent that  the  League  created  by  this  Consti- 
tution is  not  merely  a  corporate  entity  but  in 
effect  a  super-government.  If  a  sovereign 
State,  cited  to  appear  as  provided  under  Ar- 
ticle XVII,  should  refuse  the  "invitation," 

*  The  words  of  the  original  draft.  The  words  are  omitted 
in  the  revision,  but  the  intention  is  not  changed.  See  Ar- 
ticle XXII,  next  to  last  paragraph. 

112 


CHARACTER  OF  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

and  commit  a  breach  of  Article  XII,  all  the 
provisions  of  Article  XVI  would  become  ap- 
plicable to  it.  All  the  members  of  the 
League  would  then  be  in  a  state  of  war  with 
the  offending  State.  If  it  continued  to  be 
refractory,  and  refused  to  yield  its  independ- 
ence by  submitting  to  the  decision  of  the  Ex- 
ecutive Council,  the  League  would  make  war 
upon  it.  If  the  result  should  be  subjugation 
and  conquest,  the  occasion  would  arise  for 
designating  a  mandatary ;  and  the  imperium 
of  the  League  would  thus  be  imposed  upon 
the  conquered  State.  That  a  defenseless 
State  would  probably  prefer  obedience  to 
conquest  does  not  in  the  least  modify  the 
imperial  character  of  the  League. 

When  we  pass  from  the  general  nature  of 
the  League  of  Nations  to  examine  more 
closely  the  extent  and  character  of  the  pow- 
ers possessed  by  the  League,  as  a  corporate 
entity,  it  is  evident  that,  if  these  powers  are 
real  and  become  operative,  and  are  not 
merely  advisory  or  minatory,  they  derogate 
materially  from  the  independence  and  sov- 
ereignty of  the  States  composing  the 
113 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

League.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  these  powers 
are  not  real  and  operative,  but  merely  ad- 
visory, then  the  League  possesses  only  an 
apparent  but  altogether  illusory  authority. 

The  ambiguity  of  this  document,  as  orig- 
inally worded,  whether  called  a  "Covenant" 
or  a  "Constitution,"  is  generally  admitted. 
It  has  received  from  persons  supposed  to  be 
competent  diametrically  opposite  interpreta- 
tions, and  such  conflicting  views  have  been 
expressed  even  by  the  same  person,  at  differ- 
ent times,  and  upon  different  occasions. 

More  precision  is  still  necessary  regarding 
the  exact  force  of  the  expression  "recom- 
mend." When  so  serious  a  matter  as  the 
punishment  or  compulsion  of  a  refractory 
State  comes  up  for  action,  the  Council  is  to 
"recommend"  what  effective  military  or  na- 
val force  the  members  of  the  League  shall 
severally  contribute  to  the  armed  forces  to 
be  used  to  protect  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  (Article  XVI). 

Is  it  conceivable  that  such  a  contribution, 
thus  demanded,  can  honorably  be  refused? 
To  what  purpose,  then,  is  the  recommenda- 
114 


CHARACTER  OF  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

tion  made,  or  authorized?  Such  a  refusal 
would  have  two  effects:  it  would  produce 
among  members  a  general  condemnation  of 
the  delinquent  Power  for  failure  to  support 
the  League;  and  it  would  render  the  Ex- 
ecutive Council  derisory  as  an  organ  of 
executive  action.  No  self-respecting  man 
would  long  consent  to  retain  an  office  of  such 
responsibility  when  its  purpose  was  thus 
treated  with  contempt  and  left  ineffective. 
We  must  assume,  therefore,  that,  while 
terms  of  courtesy  are  employed  in  this  docu- 
ment, that  the  "recommendations"  of  the 
Council  are  to  be  respected;  and  that  no  ob- 
stacles of  the  nature  of  mere  expense,  incon- 
venience, or  national  preference  are  to  be 
placed  in  the  way  of  their  prompt  and  effec-r 
tive  execution.  It  should,  then,  be  clearly 
understood  that  this  virtually  terminates  the 
independent  foreign  policy  of  the  separate 
members  of  the  League,  and  places  the  guid- 
ance and  control  of  strictly  foreign  affairs  in 
the  hands  of  a  Council,  in  which  the  United 
States  has  but  a  single  voice,  and  we  do  not 
know  what  voice  it  may  be,  while  there  are 
115 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

eight  others  that  may  assent  or  oppose.  If 
decisions  were  made  by  a  majority,  the 
American  member  might  be  at  any  time 
overruled.  If  they  are  to  be  made  by  una- 
nimity, as  for  most  cases  is  now  proposed, 
he  could  prevent  undesirable  action;  but  the 
League  could  seldom  hope  to  arrive  at  any 
positive  conclusion,  and  the  liberum  veto 
would  virtually  paralyze  all  policy  what- 
ever. 

We  are  here  confronted  with  the  question, 
whether  or  not  the  League,  as  finally  pro- 
posed, offers  any  promise  of  being  really 
effective.  Between  free  self-governing  na- 
tions on  the  one  hand  and  a  super-govern- 
ment on  the  other,  there  is  no  intermediate 
condition,  no  third  alternative.  It  is  a  case 
of  what  the  logicians  call  "excluded  middle." 
It  is  a  choice  between  "free"  and  "not-free." 

There  is,  no  doubt,  a  possible  case  of  inter- 
national understanding  which  does  not  in- 
volve this  dilemma.  A  declaration  of  prin- 
ciples, with  a  solemn  pledge  to  support  them, 
does  not  necessarily  create  a  super-govern- 
ment, and  would  leave  the  nations  making 
116 


CHARACTER  OF  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

the  declaration  free.  But  there  is  in  this 
Covenant  no  such  declaration.  The  determi- 
nation to  treat  persistently  turbulent  or  ag- 
gressive States  as  public  enemies,  and  to  de- 
clare that  they  should  be  suppressed,  would 
involve  no  limitation  of  national  freedom. 
An  agreement  between  nations  to  arbitrate 
justiciable  differences,  not  to  make  war  upon 
one  another  without  cause,  and  to  submit 
what  they  believe  to  be  just  causes  to  exam- 
ination and  mediation,  would  involve  no 
alienation  of  sovereignty.  A  combination  of 
all  these  "covenants,"  if  one  chooses  to  call 
them  by  this  name,  would  be  a  durable  and 
effective  "Entente  of  Free  Nations";  that 
is,  a  mutual  understanding  and  agreement 
that  certain  principles  are  to  be  sacredly  re- 
spected and  defended,  leaving  the  decision  of 
the  manner  of  action  to  the  participants,  in 
view  of  the  circumstances  that  may  arise. 

As  between  the  actual  co-belligerents  of 
the  existing  Entente,  such  a  covenant  is  pos- 
sible and  desirable ;  and  the  proof  of  it  is  that 
it  has  freely  come  into  existence,  has  won  the 
war,  and  is  capable  of  making  peace.  There 
117 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

can,  therefore,  be  no  doubt  regarding  its  ef- 
fectiveness. It  was  conceived  in  freedom, 
and  it  should  be  perpetuated  with  honor. 

It  may  be  said — indeed,  it  is  sometimes  in- 
sisted upon — that  an  Entente  of  Free  Na- 
tions is  precisely  what  the  League  is  intend- 
ed to  be.  It  is  impossible  to  give  the  Cove- 
nant of  the  League  of  Nations  this  interpre- 
tation. The  League  professes  to  bind  its 
members  to  united  action,  and  it  is  in  the 
next  breath  pretended  that  there  is  nothing 
binding  about  it !  The  choice  must  be  made, 
and  it  is  important  that  it  should  be  clearly 
understood.  Does  the  League  invite,  or  does 
it  command?  If  it  only  invites,  it  is  not  a 
League.  If  it  commands,  it  is  a  super-gov- 
ernment. 

If  it  is  not  a  super-government,  if  the  Ex- 
ecutive Council  cannot  bring  an  army  into 
the  field  to  enforce  its  decisions,  the  provi- 
sions of  this  Covenant  create  enormous  risks 
and  positive  dangers.  Although  it  is  one  of 
the  alleged  objects  of  this  League  to  prevent 
war,  war  is  not  only  distinctly  provided  for, 
but  the  occasions  when  it  must  occur  are 
118 


CHARACTER  OF  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

plainly  indicated  and  are  even  rendered  nec- 
essary. Suppose  one  of  these  occasions  to 
arise,  which  may  easily  happen  through  a 
misunderstanding  or  even  a  misrepresenta- 
tion, when  another  procedure  might  avert  it ; 
having  foreordained  the  war  by  prescrip- 
tion, having  defined  the  circumstances  in 
which  it  must  occur,  what  becomes  of  the 
League  if  the  recommendation  of  the  Ex- 
cutive  Council  is  not  promptly  and  effec- 
tively followed  ? 

The  truth  is,  if  the  conditions  in  which 
military  action,  or  even  economic  action,  will 
be  unitedly  undertaken  are  distinctly  pre- 
scribed beforehand,  when  that  action  is  called 
for  it  must  be  taken,  or  the  whole  plan  is 
ridiculous.  The  same  cannot  be  said  of  an 
Entente,  which  lays  down  certain  principles 
which  it  agrees  to  support  and  maintain.  It 
does  not  say  that,  in  such  and  such  condi- 
tions, it  will  act  thus  and  so.  It  says,  We 
stand  for  the  arbitration  of  justiciable  dis- 
putes, for  International  Law  as  a  standard 
of  conduct,  for  a  court  of  justice,  for  concil- 
iation and  mediation,  and  we  shall  both  re- 
119 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

spect  and  support  these  purposes.  If  you 
make  war  and  disregard  the  rights  of  hu- 
manity, we  are  against  you.  We  do  not  tell 
you  now  what  we  shall  do;  but  we  shall  do 
what  we  think  right,  as  we  have  in  the  Great 
War.  You  may  judge  for  yourself  whether 
you  want  the  United  States  on  your  side. 
We  are  with  all  of  you,  so  long  as  you  live 
according  to  law ;  but  we  shall  stand  for  the 
law. 

No  one  can  carefully  examine  this  Cove- 
nant without  discerning  that  it  is  the  work 
of  politicians  and  not  the  work  of  jurists. 
They  have  created  an  organ  of  power,  but 
not  an  institution  of  justice.  They  have  not 
distinctly  recognized  any  rights,  or  made  any 
provision  for  determining  them  on  judicial 
grounds. 

As  Mr.  Elihu  Root  has  well  said  of  the 
original  draft: 

"The  scheme  practically  abandons  all  ef- 
fort to  promote  or  maintain  anything  like  a 
system  of  International  Law  or  a  system 
of  arbitration,  or  of  judicial  settlement, 
through  which  a  nation  can  assert  its  legal 
120 


CHARACTER  OF  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

rights  in  lieu  of  war.  It  is  true  that  Article 
XIII  mentions  arbitration  and  makes  the 
parties  agree  that  whenever  a  dispute  arises 
which  they  recognize  to  be  suitable  for  sub- 
mission to  arbitration  they  will  submit  it  to 
a  court  'agreed  upon  by  the  parties.'  That, 
however,  is  merely  an  agreement  to  arbitrate 
when  the  parties  choose  to  arbitrate,  and  it 
is  therefore  no  agreement  at  all.  It  puts  the 
whole  subject  of  arbitration  back  where  "it 
was  twenty-five  years  ago. 

"Instead  of  perfecting  and  putting  teeth 
into  the  system  of  arbitration  provided  for 
by  the  Hague  Conventions  it  throws  those 
conventions  upon  the  scrap  heap.  By  cov- 
ering the  ground  of  arbitration  and  prescrib- 
ing a  new  test  of  obligation  it  apparently  by 
virtue  of  the  provisions  of  Article  XXV  ab- 
rogates all  the  200  treaties  of  arbitration  by 
which  the  nations  of  the  world  have  bound 
themselves  with  each  other  to  submit  to  arbi- 
tration all  questions  arising  under  Interna- 
tional Law,  or  upon  the  interpretation  of 
treaties. 

"It  is  to  be  observed  that  neither  the  Ex- 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

•ecutive  Council  nor  the  Body  of  Delegates 
to  whom  disputes  are  to  be  submitted  under 
Article  XV  of  the  agreement  is  in  any  sense 
whatever  a  judicial  body  nor  an  arbitral 
body.  Its  function  is  not  to  decide  upon 
anybody's  right. 

"This  is  a  method  very  admirable  for  deal- 
ing with  political  questions ;  but  it  is  wholly 
unsuited  to  the  determination  of  questions 
of  right  under  the  Law  of  Nations." 

The  attitude  of  this  Covenant,  even  in  its 
revised  form,  toward  International  Law  is, 
indeed,  surprising.  It  nowhere  makes  refer- 
ence to  it,  except  briefly  in  the  Preamble; 
and  it  does  not  even  there  commit  itself  to 
the  support  of  it  or  the  improvement  of  it.  It 
speaks  of  "understandings  of  International 
Law,"  but  it  does  not  admit  the  authority  of 
International  Law  as  an  accepted  corpus 
juris  to  which  civilized  nations  have  already 
agreed.  It  does  not  state  whose  "under- 
standings" are  to  be  applied,  and  it  does  not 
inform  us  where  or  how  any  "understand- 
ings" are  to  be  obtained.  It  leaves  the  sub- 
ject with  ground  for  inference  that  they  are 


CHARACTER  OF  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

to  be  discovered,  if  at  all,  only  in  its  own  de- 
cisions. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  League  as  it 
will  be  constituted  is  an  exclusive  corpora- 
tion, to  which  only  those  it  is  willing  to  re- 
teive  can  be  admitted,  it  is  evident  that  by 
itself  it  will  not  be  a  body  competent  to  make 
laws.  It  will  probably  consist,  if  it  comes 
into  existence,  of  a  minority  of  the  sovereign 
States  of  the  civilized  world.  Even  if  it  were 
a  majority  it  would  not  be  sufficient.  It  may 
through  its  preponderance  of  power  be  able 
to  command,  and  even  to  enforce  its  will, 
but  law  does  not  rightly  issue  from  mere 
power,  or  rest  on  power.  It  can  never  just- 
ly claim  obedience  merely  because  it  is  an 
expression  of  somebody's  will.  It  must  be 
the  offspring  of  reason,  or  it  cannot  claim  to 
be  law  in  any  true  juristic  sense.  It  will  re- 
main only  policy. 

There  is  in  the  Covenant  no  provision  for 
a  legislative  body.  Neither  the  Council  nor 
the  Assembly  is  such  a  body.  They  do  not 
claim  to  be,  yet  they  propose  to  decide  and 
to  enforce  their  decisions.  The  Council  gives 
123 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

or  withholds  its  "permission."  It  proposes 
to  settle  disputes  "upon  such  conditions  as 
the  Council  may  deem  just,"  and  to  apply  its 
provisions  "with  such  modifications  as  may 
be  deemed  necessary  by  the  League."  It 
even  summons  other  States,  not  members  of 
the  League,  having  disputes  either  with 
members  of  the  League  or  with  States  not 
members  of  the  League,  to  appear  before  it, 
to  accept  its  judgment,  and  to  become  sub- 
ject to  the  provisions  of  this  Covenant. 

In  order  that  my  affirmation  on  this  point 
may  not  stand  alone,  I  quote  the  following 
statement  from  one  of  the  ablest  advocates 
of  the  League,  whose  eminence  as  a  lawyer 
no  one  will  dispute,  Mr.  Henry  W.  Taft. 
Commenting  on  Article  XVII,  he  says: 

"This  article  is  designed  to  bring  to  bear 
upon  the  States  which  do  not  become  mem- 
bers of  the  League  the  coercive  effect  of  the 
covenants  so  as  to  prevent  disputes  among 
them  from  leading  to  war.  It  provides  for 
cases  of  dispute  between  a  member  and  a 
non-member  and  between  States  which  are 
non-members.  For  the  sole  purpose  of  the 


CHARACTER  OF  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

settlement  of  the  dispute,  non-members  are 
invited  to  become  members  of  the  League, 
and  upon  the  acceptance  of  such  invitation 
an  investigation  and  a  recommendation  is 
made  by  the  Executive  Council.  In  case  a 
non-member  State  refuses  to  accept  the  invi- 
tation and  thus  to  subject  itself  to  the  provi- 
sions of  Article  XII,  postponing  the  com- 
mencement of  war,  the  member  nations  agree 
to  apply  to  the  refusing  State  the  boycott 
provided  for  in  the  first  paragraph  of  Arti- 
cle XVI.  Thus  the  drastic  measures  of  that 
article  will  be  resorted  to  for  the  purpose  of 
preventing  war,  not  alone  among  members 
of  the  League,  but  also  among  all  the  na- 
tions of  the  earth.  Article  XVII  also  pro- 
vides that  where  two  non-members  refuse  to 
accept  the  invitation  to  assume  the  obliga- 
tions of  membership  for  the  purposes  of  the 
dispute,  the  Executive  Council  may  take 
such  action  and  make  such  recommendations 
as  will  prevent  hostilities  and  result  in  the 
settlement  of  the  dispute." 

By  what  principles  of  law  does  the  Coun- 
cil of  this  League  "bring  to  bear  the  coercive 
125 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

effect  of  the  covenants"  upon  States  that  do 
not  belong  to  the  League,  citing  a  State  to 
appear  before  it  even  before  any  violation 
of  International  Law  has  been  committed? 

Nominally,  no  doubt,  it  does  this  in  the 
interest  of  peace;  and  I  shall  not  deny  that 
this  interest  may  be  so  great  that  the  effort 
to  settle  a  dispute  should  be  made,  but  this 
right  of  coercion  by  a  self-constituted  body 
has  no  justification  in  law,  as  International 
Law  now  exists,  nor  is  there  here  any  means 
proposed  to  secure  the  recognition  of  such 
coercion  as  a  legal  right. 

It  may,  of  course,  be  that  the  will  of  the 
Council  of  this  League  will  always  be  a 
righteous  will;  but  it  cannot  be  denied  that, 
if  it  is  to  be  exercised  in  this  manner,  it  is  an 
imperious  will.  It  can  be  justified  only  by 
the  assumption  that  the  League  possesses  an 
imperium  over  States  outside  its  member- 
ship. It  claims  a  sovereignty  that  nullifies 
the  sovereignty  of  the  States  which  it  sum- 
mons for  judgment,  for  it  insists  that,  unless 
its  judgment  is  accepted,  the  League  will  en- 
force it  by  war. 

126 


CHARACTER  OF  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

A  State  which  is  a  member  of  the  League 
• — especially  a  very  powerful  State — may  on 
Complaint,  under  this  Covenant,  bring  any 
other  nation  into  its  own  court  in  a  dispute 
of  which  it  is  itself  the  author.  Thus  a  Euro- 
pean government  might  bring  a  case  against 
the  Republic  of  Cuba,  for  the  recovery  of 
debts  dating  from  the  Spanish  occupation, 
in  which  technically  Cuba  would  be  held  lia- 
ble for  the  payment  of  securities  issued  to 
oppress  her  people  and  prevent  her  inde- 
pendence. If  the  case  were  submitted,  a 
European  court  might  justify  the  claim;  at 
least,  I  know  of  jurists  who  believe  it  would 
be  thus  collectible.  Should  Cuba  be  advised 
to  accept  a  trial  in  such  a  case? 

In  this  connection  the  question  inevitably 
arises,  How  far  would  the  mere  policies  of 
the  League  become,  in  its  own  understand- 
ing, identified  with  International  Law,  as  its 
Executive  Council  would  apply  it?  By  what 
code,  or  rules,  or  standards  of  international 
conduct  would  this  Council  render  its  deci- 
sions ?  If  the  answer  is,  by  the  principles  and 
maxims  of  International  Law  at  present 

m 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

generally  accepted,  its  procedure  in  citing 
nations  not  members  of  the  League,  as  we 
have  seen,  would  be  illegal.  It  would,  there- 
fore, undoubtedly  undertake  to  alter,  and 
even  to  create,  rules  of  law.  By  what  au- 
thority could  a  limited  number  of  Powers  do 
this?  And  what  would  the  attitude  of  inde- 
pendent sovereign  States  outside  of  this 
League — which  would  probably  for  some 
time,  and  possibly  always,  constitute  the  mi- 
nority of  States — continue  to  be?  Could 
they  accept  decisions  regarding  the  princi- 
ples and  maxims  of  International  Law,  ar- 
bitrarily made  by  a  limited  body  in  which 
they  were  wholly  without  representation? 

The  policy  of  the  League  appears  to  be 
that  neutrality  is  to  be  abolished.  That  is  the 
assumption  underlying  the  President's  aban- 
donment of  the  "freedom  of  the  seas,"  and 
his  acceptance  of  Great  Britain's  retention 
of  her  supremacy  at  sea,  on  the  ground  that 
when  the  League  comes  into  being  there  are 
to  be  no  neutrals.  But  who  can  affirm  that 
there  are  to  be  no  neutrals?  By  what  right 
can  this  League  declare  that  there  are  no 
128 


CHARACTER  OF  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

neutrals?  And  if  there  are  neutrals,  what 
is  to  become  of  the  existing  rights  of  neu- 
trals under  International  Law?  Is  neutral 
territory  no  longer  to  be  inviolable  ?  Are  the 
armies  of  the  League  to  march  freely  against 
its  enemies  across  neutral  territory,  without 
regard  to  the  wishes  of  neutral  States  ?  Are 
there  to  be  no  neutral  rights  on  the  sea? 
What  is  to  happen  when  the  League  declares 
an  economic  boycott  against  an  offending 
State  ?  Are  all  States,  even  the  neutralized, 
like  Switzerland,  which  desires  to  retain  that 
status,  to  be  compelled  to  observe  it? 

According  to  International  Law  as  it  ex- 
ists, and  is  now  understood,  the  rights  of 
neutrals  on  the  sea  are  definitely  recognized. 
Has  any  single  group  of  nations,  or  a  league 
created  by  them,  acting  as  a  corporate  entity, 
the  right  either  morally  or  in  a  jural  sense, 
to  violate  or  arbitrarily  to  abrogate  the  laws 
protecting  them  ? 

The  attitude  of  Switzerland  on  this  point 

has  been  affirmed  by  the  Swiss  Confederation 

in  a  separate  plan  for  a  League  of  Nations 

completed  in  January,  1919.     In  the  sixth 

129 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

article  it  is  demanded  that  the  "permanent 
neutrality"  of  Switzerland,  and  also  of  other 
States  which  desire  to  maintain  neutrality, 
shall  continue  to  be  recognized ;  and  it  is  de- 
clared: "The  territory  of  these  States  is 
inviolable  and  shall  always  remain  outside 
military  operations,  in  case  of  wars  in  which 
States  not  forming  a  part  of  the  League  of 
Nations  participate,  as  well  as  when  military 
measures  are  taken  by  members  of  the 
League  itself,  in  order  to  secure  respect  for 
law  or  the  maintenance  of  peace."  It  is, 
therefore,  obvious  that  the  Swiss  Confedera- 
tion cannot  accept  the  proposed  Constitu- 
tion of  the  League,  if  Article  XVI  retains 
the  clause  in  which  the  members  agree  that 
"they  will  take  the  necessary  steps  to  afford 
passage  through  their  territory  to  the  forces 
of  any  members  of  the  League  which  are  co- 
operating to  protect  the  covenants  of  the 
League."  Furthermore,  Switzerland  de- 
clares her  intention  to  protect  her  territory 
with  force  of  arms. 

The  three  Scandinavian  Kingdoms — Swe- 
den, Denmark  and  Norway — have  also,  in 
130 


CHARACTER  OF  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

January,  1919,  prepared  a  separate  project 
of  an  "International  Juridical  Organiza- 
tion," in  which  a  protest  is  offered  against  an 
"international  parliament"  which  would  con- 
stitute an  "authority  superior  to  the  States" ; 
and  it  is  declared  that  the  small  States,  in 
particular,  would  offer  "energetic  opposi- 
tion," if  an  attempt  were  made  in  an  associ- 
ation of  this  kind  following  any  system  what- 
ever implying  a  "graduated  scale"  in  the 
classification  of  States. 

The  so-called  secondary  States  are  evi- 
dently resolved  to  oppose  an  attempt  to  deny 
their  right  of  neutrality  or  to  create  Inter- 
national Law  without  their  consent,  as  this 
League  of  Nations  may  undertake  to  do. 

If  this  group,  or  this  artificial  entity,  has 
the  physical  strength  to  do  so,  it  can  un- 
doubtedly violate  these  rights  and  disregard 
existing  laws;  but  it  would  be  possible  to  do 
so  only  by  force  majeure — by  the  exercise  of 
arbitrary  power  in  defiance  of  law. 

This  is  imperialism.  It  may  be  well-mean- 
ing— imperialism  always  pretends  to  be  be- 
nevolent— but  if  the  war  in  which  we  have 
131 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

participated  was  a  war  to  destroy  imperial- 
ism, and  to  establish  the  self-determination 
of  free  nations  under  law,  which  should  be 
the  expression  of  their  consent,  a  plan  which 
merely  establishes  a  composite  imperialism, 
the  arbitrary  power  of  a  single  group  of  na- 
tions, would  be  not  a  victory  for  freedom, 
but  its  defeat. 

The  contention  that  this  Covenant  creates 
an  imperium  does  not  rest  alone  on  its  atti- 
tude toward  States  outside  the  League.  Un- 
der Article  XXII  the  Council  undertakes  to 
govern,  through  its  appointed  agents,  vast 
areas  and  numerous  populations.  It  may 
govern  well,  or  it  may  govern  ill,  but  it  as- 
sumes the  right  to  govern. 

Whence  does  the  Council  derive  its  right 
to  issue  mandates,  "according  to  the  stage 
of  the  development  of  the  people,  the  geo- 
graphic situation  of  the  territory,  its  eco- 
nomic conditions,  and  other  similar  circum- 
stances"? It  is  true,  as  it  is  alleged,  that 
the  wishes  of  these  communities,  in  the  case 
of  the  Turkish  Empire,  must  be  a  principal 
consideration  in  the  selection  of  the  manda- 
132 


CHARACTER  OF  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

tory  Power;  but  in  the  case  of  those  in  Af- 
rica or  in  the  South  Pacific,  although  certain 
rights  of  the  population  are  recognized,  and 
"equal  opportunities  for  the  trade  and  com- 
merce of  other  members  of  the  League,"  but 
not  of  others,  are  secured,  they  fall  com- 
pletely under  the  sovereignty  of  the  League. 
Full  sovereignty  is  surrendered  to  it,  and  it 
becomes,  as  a  corporation,  a  sovereign 
Power.  Or  is  it  possible  that  this  sovereignty 
is  some  time  in  the  future  to  be  reclaimed 
by  the  separate  conquerors?  For  the  pres- 
ent, at  least,  this  sovereignty  is  so  complete 
that,  as  the  Covenant  provides,  "The  de- 
gree of  authority,  control,  or  administration 
to  be  exercised  by  the  mandatary  shall,  if  not 
previously  agreed  upon  by  the  members  of 
the  League,  be  explicitly  defined  in  each  case 
by  the  Council."  3  Can  it  be  held,  in  the 
light  of  this,  that  the  League,  which  is  per- 
petual, is  not  in  law  a  new  sovereign  and  im- 
perial Power?  Or  must  this  transfer  of 
power  be  classed  as  a  wholly  lawless  pro- 
ceeding? 

8  The  original  text  says,  "in  a  special  Act  or  Charter." 
133 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

We  must,  no  doubt,  admit  that  there  are 
"backward  peoples,"  as  they  are  called.  Con- 
fessedly, they  present  a  difficult  problem  to 
solve.  It  may  be  that  this  is,  on  the  whole, 
the  best  solution  of  it;  but  the  questions  of 
duty  and  of  responsibility  arising  out  of  it 
are  very  serious,  especially  for  a  people  bred 
to  consider  and  respect  the  love  of  freedom. 
We  have  been  forced  to  accept  the  "white 
man's  burden"  in  the  Philippines  and  else- 
where, but  we  have  never  rejoiced  in  the  ne- 
cessity, and  we  have  never  approached  our 
task  in  an  imperial  spirit,  although  we  can- 
not deny  that  the  attempt  to  rule  a  subject 
race  involves  the  exercise  of  an  imperiit/m. 

It  is,  no  doubt,  better  for  us  as  a  people 
that  we  should  never  again  undertake  an 
imperial  partnership.  We  had  a  woeful  ex- 
perience in  the  Samoan  Islands,  and  we  were 
glad  to  get  out  of  it  without  involving  our- 
selves, as  we  came  near  doing,  in  a  scene  of 
continuous  bloodshed  brought  on  by  intrigue. 
As  President  Cleveland  said  of  our  experi- 
ment, in  a  message  to  Congress:  "This  in- 
cident and  the  events  leading  up  to  it  sig- 
134 


CHARACTER  OF  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

nally  illustrate  the  impolicy  of  entangling 
alliances  with  foreign  Powers."  If  any  one 
wishes  to  know  what  the  responsibilities  of 
a  mandatary  under  the  Executive  Council 
of  the  League  might  involve,  let  him  read  the 
pathetic  story  of  the  disappointment  of  the 
Samoans  in  their  civil  wars  and  their  descent 
from  the  promise  of  autonomy  to  the  com- 
plete deprivation  of  their  rights,  as  related 
by  Willis  Fletcher  Johnson  in  his  history 
of  "America's  Foreign  Relations."  "The 
United  States,"  he  writes,  in  closing  the 
chapter  on  this  subject,  "began  by  abandon- 
ing two  of  its  most  important  principles  of 
foreign  policy — that  the  United  States 
should  refrain  from  intervention  in  the  do- 
mestic affairs  of  other  nations,  unless  in  the 
necessitous  emergency  of  its  own  self -protec- 
tion, and  that  it  should  avoid  entangling  alli- 
ances with  other  and  particularly  European 
Powers.  ...  It  was  guilty  of  savage  cruel- 
ties which  would  have  been  regarded  as  mon- 
strous in  the  least  civilized  of  the  Samoans 
themselves.  It  was  guilty  of  bad  faith  to 
Samoans  who  trusted  it.  It  failed  to  win 
135 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

for  its  iniquitous  policy  the  poor  vindication 
of  efficiency  and  success,  confessing  at  the 
end  that  it  was  a  wretched  failure.  And  it 
finally  abandoned  that  policy  not  because  it 
was  wrong,  but  because  it  was  too  costly  and 
troublesome  to  continue." 

And  now  the  Samoans  have  again  been 
made  victims  of  international  strife.  Rely- 
ing upon  this  infamous  precedent  of  the 
triple  protectorate  over  Samoa,  a  distin- 
guished advocate  of  the  League,  in  order  to 
show  that  this  treaty  is  within  the  constitu- 
tional power  of  the  United  States,  cites  this 
Samoan  example,  saying:  "The  three  sig- 
natory nations  undertook  a  guardianship  of 
the  islands  similar  to  that  which  is  contem- 
plated in  the  proposed  Covenant  of  the 
League  with  reference  to  backward  coun- 
tries!" 

But,  it  appears,  we  are  not  now  to  stop 
with  simple  islanders.  Among  our  suggest- 
ed allotments  in  this  program  of  joint  im- 
perialism, in  which  our  participation  is  ex- 
pected to  justify  the  perpetuation  of  the 
whole  colonial  system,  are  Constantinople, 
136 


CHARACTER  OF  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

the  worst  center  of  racial  and  diplomatic  in- 
trigue in  Europe;  Armenia,  which  contains 
a  vast  Turkish  and  Russian  population,  face 
to  face  with  Russian  Bolshevism,  backed  by 
Turkish  machinations  to  regain  control,  in 
case  it  is  actually  ever  taken  from  the  Turk, 
which  has  not  yet  been  accomplished;  and 
Persia,  which  we  once  tried  to  help  in  the 
person  of  an  American  financial  administra- 
tor, whose  work  was  rendered  futile  by  Rus- 
sian and,  alas !  British  intervention.  Large- 
ly because  of  this,  a  correspondent  of  the 
"Manchester  Guardian"  considers  that  Per- 
sia should  be  placed  by  the  League  under 
the  United  States  as  a  mandatary.  "Persia," 
he  says,  "can  trust  America  as  she  can  trust 
no  other  Power." 

But  what  does  he  say  of  the  other  Powers? 
"It  is  obivous,"  he  continues,  "that  great  care 
will  be  necessary  if  the  whole  of  this  mandate 
system  is  not  to  become  an  abuse."  "Out- 
wardly," he  goes  on,  "the  world  has  accept- 
ed the  revolutionary  conceptions  which  un- 
derlie President  Wilson's  scheme" — meaning 
a  League  of  Nations — "but  it  has  not  yet 
137 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

emancipated  itself  from  the  view  that  a  na- 
tion counts  in  the  world  by  its  direct  politi- 
cal influence.  Nor  have  we  destroyed  the 
spirit  that  seeks  commercial  advantages  in 
political  expansion." 

This  candid  Englishman  frankly  lacks 
confidence  in  General  Smuts'  system  of  man- 
dataries. "If  the  mandate  system  so  works 
in  practice  that  the  mandatory  Power  draws 
some  economic  advantages  from  its  position, 
or  if  it  fastens  the  hold  of  the  mandatory 
Power  more  firmly  than  ever  on  the  depend- 
ent people,  then,"  he  says,  "we  may  live  to 
regret  the  day  when  our  statesmen  invented 
a  scheme  which  has  become  merely  a  device 
for  giving  a  decent  look  to  the  bad  habits 
of  the  past."  Knowing  that  past,  this  writer 
does  not  hesitate  to  speak  of  "intrigues  to 
bring  about  a  change  of  mandate  for  selfish 
reasons";  and  he  considers  it  "important  also 
to  prevent  a  conspiracy  among  the  manda- 
tory Powers  to  screen  each  other  from  criti- 
cism" ! 

Imperialism  is  imperialism,  whether  it  be 
joint  or  single;  and  it  is  not  a  business  that 
138 


CHARACTER  OF  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

tends  toward  democracy  or  toward  justice. 
Even  in  its  purity  and  at  its  best  estate  it  is 
a  dangerous  enterprise  for  a  free  people  to 
engage  in,  and  it  is  more  dangerous  than 
ever  when  innocence  and  good  intention  be- 
come the  parters  of  seasoned  experience  in 
a  game  for  power. 


V 

THE    TREATY-MAKING    POWER    UNDER    THE 
CONSTITUTION    OF    THE    UNITED   STATES 

WHEN  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland  enters  into  agreements 
with  foreign  nations,  it  is  the  King  who 
grants  authority.  He  speaks  as  a  sovereign. 
The  formula  of  the  full  powers  of  his  pleni- 
potentiary is:  "George,  by  the  Grace  of 
God,  of  the  'United  Kingdom  of  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland  of  the  Dominions  be- 
yond the  seas  King,  Defender  of  the  Faith, 
Emperor  of  India.  To  all  and  singular  to 
whom  these  presents  come,  Greeting." 

Full  powers  to  negotiate  and  conclude  a 
treaty  proceed  exclusively  from  the  King  as 
a  sovereign,  who  grants  authority,  as  the  for- 
mula runs,  "to  sign  for  Us  and  in  Our  name, 
everything  so  agreed  upon  and  concluded, 
.  .  .  in  as  ample  manner  and  form,  and  with 


THE  TREATY-MAKING  POWER 

equal  force  and  efficiency,  as  We  Ourselves 
could  do,  if  personally  present." 

There  is  no  one  in  the  United  States  who 
can  thus  speak  as  a  sovereign  except  the 
whole  people,  and  they  have  never  thus 
spoken.  They  have  created  a  National  Gov- 
ernment, but  they  have  definitely  limited  its 
powers;  and  it  possesses  none  that  are  not 
delegated  to  it  in  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States. 

There  is,  therefore,  occasion  to  point 
out  that  alliances  and  compacts  affecting  the 
condition  and  destinies  of  the  European  na- 
tions, whose  laws  and  traditions  entitle  a 
personal  sovereign  to  act,  are  entered  into 
with  more  assurance  and  less  reserve,  are 
more  customary,  and  therefore  less  subject 
to  popular  judgment,  than  is  the  case  in  the 
United  States  of  America;  whose  Govern- 
ment is  not  a  sovereign,  but  derives  all  its 
powers  from  the  people,  who  have  delegated 
to  it  only  a  partial  representation  of  the 
sovereign  authority  which,  in  this  country, 
the  people  alone  possess. 

At  the  time  when  our  National  Govern- 
141 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ment  was  established,  this  distinction  was 
well  understood  and  jealously  guarded.  It 
was  believed  by  the  founders  of  our  Govern- 
ment that  they  had  forever  ended  the  sub- 
jection of  themselves  and  their  descendants 
to  absolute  power.  They  had  revolted 
against  a  personal  sovereign  who  was  in- 
spired by  his  absolutist  aspirations  to  over- 
throw the  liberties  that  had  been  secured  by 
previous  revolution  in  England,  and  also 
against  a  Parliament  in  which  they  were  not 
represented  and  over  which  the  King  had, 
contrary  to  the  wishes  of  perhaps  a  majority 
of  Englishmen,  obtained  control;  and  they 
had  resolved  that  their  freedom  should  never 
again  be  thus  compromised. 

That  was  the  spirit  in  which  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  was  conceived  and 
adopted.  During  a  hundred  and  thirty 
years  that  charter  of  American  liberty,  which 
has  since  in  some  degree  been  an  inspiration 
and  a  model  to  every  free  people,  has  contin- 
ued to  be  the  fundamental  law  upon  which 
legislation  and  judicial  decisions  in  the 
United  States  have  been  based,  and  without 


THE  TREATY-MAKING  POWER 

which  our  Federal  Government  in  all  its 
branches  would  have  no  authority. 

Since  that  auspicious  solution  of  the  prob- 
lem of  reconciling  liberty  and  government, 
afterward  extended  over  a  wide  and  diversi- 
fied area  and  a  highly  composite  population, 
in  which  the  offspring  of  previously  hostile 
races  have  together  found  peace  and  pros- 
perity, many  new  influences  have  affected 
the  American  people ;  and  some  of  them  have 
become  hostile  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  and,  indeed,  to  any  funda- 
mental law  whatever.  Forgetful  of  the 
blessings  of  liberty,  some  of  these  hostile 
groups  would  prefer  a  regime  of  unlimited 
social  reconstruction  of  their  own  devising, 
and  are  ready  for  the  most  radical  experi- 
ments, even  for  a  return  to  absolutism  un- 
der omnipotent  governmental  control,  pro- 
vided they  are  permitted  to  exercise  their 
authority. 

A  movement  even  more  subversive  of  the 
original  American  conception  of  government 
than  that  which  tends  toward  the  establish- 
ment of  a  Socialistic  State,  but  kindred  to 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

it,  is  the  disposition  to  repudiate  the  idea  of 
the  nation  altogether,  and  by  a  wide  sweep 
of  inclusion  abandon  our  separate  existence 
as  a  people,  thus  merging  us  with  the  whole 
of  humanity  in  some  form  of  vague  inter- 
nationalism. 

In  practice  it  is  seen  that  to  apply  this  idea 
universally  is  at  present  impossible.  The  di- 
versities and  the  conflicts  of  races  and  of 
stages  of  development  would  mean  not  only 
the  abolition  of  nations,  which  are  substan- 
tial historical  achievements  in  the  progress 
of  civilization,  but  the  destruction  of  civiliza- 
tion itself;  as  we  have  seen  it  illustrated  in 
the  disintegration  of  the  Russian  Empire, 
which  has  reached  a  stage  of  complete  social 
anarchy,  general  impoverishment,  and  a 
reign  of  terror. 

It  is,  on  the  other  hand,  sometimes  repre- 
sented that  closer  federation  is  the  remedy 
for  international  strife,  and  that  the  union 
of  the  American  colonies  under  the  present 
Constitution  indicates  the  path  that  should 
be  followed  to  avoid  conflicts  and  preserve 
144 


THE  TREATY-MAKING  POWER 

the  peace  of  the  world.  The  League  of  Na- 
tions, it  is  urged,  would  be  such  a  union. 

It  would  be  misleading  to  regard  that 
great  act  of  federation  as  bearing  any  anal- 
ogy to  the  plan  now  under  consideration. 
The  founding  of  the  Republic  of  the  United 
States  was  the  establishment  of  a  "more  per- 
fect Union"  between  States  contiguous,  ho- 
mogeneous and,  in  fact,  already  confeder- 
ated, possessing  a  close  community  of  inter- 
ests and  identity  of  language  and  political 
traditions,  all  sprung  from  a  common  mother 
and  long  subject  to  the  same  sovereign  rule. 
It  would  be  quite  a  different  matter  to  merge 
in  one  corporate  existence  nations  far  re- 
moved in  space,  composed  of  distinct  races, 
diversified  in  their  political  institutions,  with 
varied  responsibilities,  and  some  of  them 
with  unsettled  claims  upon  one  another. 

We  have,  however,  developed  in  this  hem- 
isphere a  group  of  distinct  nations,  primar- 
ily modeled  upon  the  constitutional  system 
first  adopted  by  the  United  States.  These 
republics  have  passed  through  grave  crises 
and  occasional  reversion  to  despotic  rule; 
145 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

but  they  have,  after  bitter  experiences, 
emerged  as  a  system  of  independent  sover- 
eign States,  with  serious  race  problems,  but 
with  a  reasonable  vindication  of  the  national 
and  constitutional  ideals  by  which  they  have 
been  inspired.  Taking  the  American  Re- 
publics as  a  whole,  they  not  only  constitute 
a  "going  concern,"  but  they  look  forward  to 
a  peaceful  and  prosperous  future. 

This  achievement  has  been  owing  to  their 
separation  from  the  hostilities,  the  intrigues, 
and  the  ambitions  of  the  Old  World.  It  has 
been  made  possible  by  the  insistence  of  the 
United  States  that  they  should  be  left  to 
themselves,  and  permitted  to  work  out  their 
own  development  in  their  own  way. 

It  is  true  that  we  have,  in  the  past  four 
years,  passed  through  a  deep  experience, 
from  which  we  emerge  with  new  obligations 
that  must  be  honorably  discharged;  but  it 
does  not  follow  that  our  whole  theory  of 
national  development  was  wrong.  It  may 
be  that  we  shall  find  an  advantage  in  new 
understandings  and  in  new  associations,  the 
value  and  character  of  which  the  Great  War 
146 


THE  TREATY-MAKING  POWER 

has  revealed;  but  we  should  not  forget  that 
it  is  our  example,  and  not  our  interventions, 
that  has  been  of  most  benefit  to  the  world. 
What  we  have  done  in  the  war  was  done  be- 
cause we  were  true  to  ourselves,  to  our  own 
fellow-citizens  whose  rights  had  been  cruelly 
violated,  to  our  own  dignity  as  a  nation,  and 
to  our  own  sense  of  honor.  Had  we  not  been 
a  nation,  free,  unpledged,  and  strong  in  our 
manhood,  we  should  not  have  been  able  to 
perform  the  part  we  have  performed. 

We  are  now  invited  to  join  with  other  na- 
tions with  which  we  have  recently  been  en- 
gaged in  a  common  cause,  to  set  up  a  world- 
wide, international  directorate  in  which  we 
are  called  upon  to  play  a  new  and  untried 
role,  going  forth  to  regulate  the  life  of  dis- 
tant peoples  in  a  spirit  of  benevolent  joint 
imperialism.  We  are  urged  to  transfer  our 
life  and  activity  permanently  into  another 
hemisphere,  and  in  compensation  to  welcome 
the  preponderant  influence  of  others  in  our 
own.  The  only  argument  for  this  is  that,  in 
spite  of  the  evident  contradiction,  we  may 
call  the  new  adventure  by  the  old  name.  In- 
147 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

stead  of  permitting  the  so-called  "new"  na- 
tions and  the  tribal  groups  not  yet  formed 
into  nations  to  develop  as  other  nations  have 
done,  it  is  now  proposed,  through  central 
control  hy  a  small  group  of  Great  Powers 
and  a  retinue  of  small  ones,  to  exercise  an 
imperium  over  the  whole  earth,  nominally  in 
the  interest  of  peace,  but  practically  by  re- 
garding every  local  strife  as  a  reason  for  a 
general  war. 

Can  the  Government  of  the  United  States, 
constituted  as  it  is,  participate  in  such  an 
imperium?  Is  there  in  any  part  of  the  Ameri- 
can Government,  or  in  the  whole  of  it  com- 
bined, legal  authority  to  enter  into  a  compact 
of  that  kind?  Has  the  sovereign  of  this  na- 
tion, the  People,  in  whose  name  the  Govern- 
ment has  been  created,  ever  authorized  it,  or 
ever  intended  it? 

The  question  has  been  answered  both  af- 
firmatively and  negatively  by  men  who  en- 
joy the  reputation  of  being  competent  in 
questions  of  constitutional  law. 

Let  us  then  consider  a  few  propositions 
148 


THE  TREATY-MAKING  POWER 

which,  wholly  apart  from  this  issue,  are  not 
open  to  debate. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  is 
a  government  of  delegated  powers  estab- 
lished by  a  sovereign  people.  The  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  is  the  sole  charter 
of  that  Government.  Some  of  its  powers  are 
definitely  expressed,  others  are  implied,  still 
others  are  reserved  to  the  States  or  to  the 
people.  The  authority  of  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  is  limited  (1)  by 
the  terms  of  the  power  granted;  (2)  by  the 
purposes  for  which  it  is  delegated;  and  (3) 
by  the  distribution  of  power  among  its  re- 
spective agents. 

If  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
decides  to  adopt  the  Constitution  of  a 
League  of  Nations,  it  will  do  so  by  becom- 
ing a  signatory  to  the  so-called  "Covenant," 
which  it  is  intended  shall  be  a  part  of  a  treaty 
of  peace.  The  right  of  the  Government  to 
enter  into  this  engagement  is  derived,  if 
it  exists,  entirely  from  the  treaty-making 
power  delegated  to  it  in  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States.  That  power  is  conferred 
149 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

in  the  following  terms  and  with  the  follow- 
ing effect: 

"The  President  shall  have  power,  by  and 
with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate, 
to  make  treaties,  provided  two-thirds  of  the 
Senators  present  concur."  (Article  II,  Sec- 
tion 2,  Clause  2.) 

"This  Constitution,  and  the  laws  of  the 
United  States  which  shall  be  made  in  pursu- 
ance thereof;  and  all  treaties  made,  or  which 
shall  be  made,  under  the  authority  of  the 
United  States,  shall  be  the  supreme  law  of 
the  land."  (Article  VI,  Clause  1.) 

The  full  meaning  of  these  provisions  will 
be  better  understood  when  we  contrast  them 
with  those  which  prevail  in  the  law  and  usage 
of  Great  Britain,  from  which  the  framers  of 
the  Constitution  intended  to  depart. 

In  Great  Britain,  as  has  been  already 
stated,  treaties  are  made  by  the  King  and  in 
the  King's  name.  In  reality,  at  the  present 
time,  they  are  made  by  the  King's  Ministers 
and  not  personally  by  the  King,  and  the 
Ministers  are  responsible  to  the  Parliament. 
In  the  beginning  it  was  not  so.  The  change 
150 


THE  TREATY-MAKING  POWER 

has  been  brought  about  by  a  revolt  from  ab- 
solutism in  Great  Britain  as  it  was  in  Amer- 
ica. In  the  British  system,  however,  the  con- 
clusion of  treaties  is  solely  entrusted  to  the 
Ministers,  and  not  to  any  portion  of  the  Par- 
liament as  such ;  but  a  change  is  imminent. 

In  October,  1918,  Sir  R.  Cooper,  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  asked  the  Prime  Minis- 
ter if  he  intends  to  take  steps  to  secure  that 
"any  agreement  for  peace  shall  in  general 
principles  be  in  accordance  with  the  wishes 
of  the  majority  of  the  members  of  this 
House."  Mr.  Bonar  Law  answered:  "The 
Government  (meaning  the  Ministers)  must, 
I  think,  be  the  interpreter  of  the  views  of 
the  House  and  the  nation  in  this  matter." 
Sir  R.  Cooper  then  inquired,  "Is  it  the  fact 
that  the  country  will  be  committed  to  a  se- 
cret peace  compact?"  to  which  Mr.  Bonar 
Law  replied  that  he  did  not  see  any  way  in 
which  the  country  could  be  represented  ex- 
cept by  a  referendum  unless  by  the  Ministers, 
thus  virtually  excluding  Parliament  from  a 
voice ;  and  this  is  the  historic  British  attitude 
on  the  subject.  The  reason  for  it,  no  doubt, 
151 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

is  that  Great  Britain  has  often  entered  into 
secret  treaties,  and  has  considered  it  neces- 
sary to  preserve  this  right,  which  compul- 
sory reference  to  Parliament  would  destroy. 

In  opposition  to  this  established  practice, 
however,  the  British  Premier,  Mr.  Lloyd 
George,  on  February  11,  1919,  stated  in  the 
House  of  Commons  that,  after  it  was  signed 
at  the  Peace  Conference,  the  treaty  would 
be  placed  before  the  House  for  ratification, 
and  he  added:  "If  the  House  of  Commons 
chooses  to  repudiate  the  treaty,  the  House 
of  Commons  is  all  powerful." 

Two  days  later,  on  February  13,  Mr.  Bo- 
nar  Law  expressed  a  different  opinion.  In 
reply  to  Mr.  Lambert's  question  whether  or 
not  the  British  Delegation  to  the  Peace  Con- 
ference had  plenary  powers  to  bind  the  coun- 
try, Mr.  Law  answered:  "So  far  as  the 
British  Government  is  concerned,  it  will  not 
be  ratified  until  it  has  been  laid  upon  the 
table  and  Parliament  has  an  opportunity  of 
expressing  an  opinion";  but  in  answer  to  a 
further  question,  whether  or  not  the  treaty 
of  peace  would  be  submitted  to  Parliament 


THE  TREATY-MAKING  POWER 

before  it  was  presented  to  the  enemy  coun- 
tries, Mr.  Law  responded,  "Oh,  no,  I  cannot 
say  that.  The  treaty  will  presumably,  after 
it  has  been  arranged  by  the  Allies,  be  signed 
by  the  enemy  countries." 

In  this  the  contemporary  British  practice 
indicates  an  approximation  to  our  constitu- 
tional provision  by  admitting  the  legislative 
body  to  some  ultimate  cooperation  in  deter- 
mining what  the  terms  of  a  treaty  shall  be; 
but  it  has  not  reached  the  stage  to  which  the 
framers  of  our  Constitution  had  arrived  in 
the  beginning  by  authorizing  the  advice  and 
consent  of  the  Senate.  If,  however,  action 
by  the  Senate  can  be  had  only  after  a  treaty 
is  signed,  and  then  only  to  accept  or  reject 
it,  our  procedure  will  have  receded  toward 
the  conception  of  absolutism  as  much  as  the 
British  has  advanced  toward  parliamentary 
representation  in  the  treaty-making  power. 

There  is  another  important  difference  be- 
tween the  American  and  the  British  concep- 
tion of  the  treaty-making  power.  Under  the 
American  Constitution  a  treaty  becomes  the 
"supreme  law  of  the  land,"  but  only  in  so 
153 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

far  as  it  is  of  a  nature  to  become  a  law.  As 
a  contract  it  is  not  open  to  judicial  interpre- 
tation. From  that  point  of  view  it  belongs 
exclusively  to  the  political  department  of  the 
Government.  When  a  treaty  is  self -execut- 
ing, that  is,  when  it  does  not  require  supple- 
mentary legislation,  it  becomes  a  part  of  the 
law  of  the  land,  and  may  be  treated  as  a  stat- 
ute. As  Chief  Justice  Marshall  declared, 
"When  the  terms  of  the  stipulation  import 
a  contract — when  either  of  the  parties  agrees 
to  perform  a  particular  act — the  treaty  ad- 
dresses itself  to  the  political,  not  the  judicial 
department;  and  the  Legislature  must  exe- 
cute the  contract  before  it  can  become  a  rule 
for  the  court." 

In  England  a  treaty  does  not  become  the 
law  of  the  land,  and  care  has  to  be  taken  that 
its  stipulations  are  not  contrary  to  the  law; 
or,  if  they  are  so,  that  the  law  be  amended 
so  that  the  law  and  the  treaty  shall  agree. 
Where  the  terms  of  the  treaty  involve  the 
payment  of  money,  for  example,  the  money 
is  not  directly  promised,  since  Parliament 
alone  has  the  right  to  appropriate  it  and  the 
154 


THE  TREATY-MAKING  POWER 

treaty  reads:  "His  Majesty  undertakes  to 
recommend  to  His  Parliament  to  vote  a  sum 
of  money."  Thus,  it  is  held,  no  breach  of 
the  treaty  would  result  if  Parliament  should 
fail  to  comply  with  the  recommendation. 

The  question  naturally  arises — Do  the 
grants  of  authority  contained  in  the  Consti- 
tution of  the  United  States  authorize  the 
treaty-making  power  vested  in  the  Presi- 
dent, "by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of 
the  Senate,"  to  enter  into  every  conceivable 
international  arrangement? 

It  would  appear  from  the  fact  that  all  the 
power  possessed  by  the  President  and  Sen- 
ate is  delegated  power,  and  not  power  inher- 
ent in  these  officers,  that  it  is  limited  not  only 
by  the  terms  of  its  delegation — that  is,  to  be 
exercised  in  conjunction — but  by  the  pur- 
poses for  which  it  is  delegated.  It  cannot, 
therefore,  be  maintained  that,  merely  because 
the  United  States  is  classed  as  a  "sovereign 
nation,"  the  Government,  or  any  part  of  it, 
can  therefore  perform  a  sovereign  act  be- 
yond the  scope  of  the  purposes  for  which  it 
was  created,  for  although  the  nation  is  sov- 
155 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ereign,  the  Government  is  not.  Complete 
sovereignty  resides  in  the  people  as  a  whole, 
and  not  in  any  or  all  of  the  public  officers. 

That  this  is  the  correct  interpretation  of 
delegated  authority  under  the  Constitution 
is  evident  from  the  procedure  found  neces- 
sary for  the  extension  of  Congressional' 
power.  The  Constitution  originally  quali- 
fied the  conditions  under  which  direct  taxes 
could  be  laid.  It  was  necessary  to  apportion 
them  among  the  several  States  according  to 
population.  They  could  not  under  the  Con- 
stitution be  laid  in  any  other  way  than  that 
specified,  until  the  power  to  do  so  was  spe- 
cifically granted  by  an  amendment. 

The  treaty-making  power,  as  stated  in  Ar- 
ticle II,  is  not  specifically  restricted  in  the 
terms  of  the  grant,  but  there  is  an  implied 
restriction  in  the  purposes  for  which  the  Con- 
stitution is  framed;  for,  except  as  distinctly 
delegated,  all  sovereign  power  is  retained 
by  the  States  and  the  people.  The  purposes 
for  which  the  "more  perfect  Union"  was 
formed  by  "the  People"  are:  "to  establish 
justice,  insure  domestic  tranquillity,  provide 
156 


THE  TREATY-MAKING  POWER 

for  the  common  defense,  promote  the  gen- 
eral welfare,  and  secure  the  blessings  of  lib- 
erty to  ourselves  and  our  posterity."  (Pre- 
amble.) 

All  these  purposes  relate  exclusively  to 
the  interests  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States.  There  is  no  constitutional  provision 
delegating  authority  to  any  part  of  the  Gov- 
ernment for  any  other  purposes.  If  any 
other  purpose  had  been  contemplated,  it 
would  have  been  expressed.  There  is  here 
no  appended  et  cetera.  Indeed,  the  last 
clause  in  this  Preamble  may  be  regarded  as 
a  perfect  summary  of  all  that  has  preceded, 
for  all  are  involved  in  it,  namely,  "to  secure 
the  blessings  of  liberty  to  ourselves  and  our 
posterity." 

For  the  "common  defense,"  where  that  is 
the  obvious  purpose,  alliances  with  other 
Powers  may,  undoubtedly,  be  made ;  but  it  is 
not  apparent  that  these  could  be  formed  for 
other  purposes  without  exceeding  the  inten- 
tions of  the  Constitution. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  evident  that  no 
foreign  engagements  were  contemplated,  or 
157 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

could  be  regarded  as  authorized,  which  in 
any  degree  tended  to  defeat  or  destroy  the 
affirmative  purposes  named  in  the  Preamble. 
Especially  might  any  treaty  be  regarded  as 
ultra  vires,  and  even  violative  of  the  Consti- 
tution, if  its  consequences  were  to  disturb  do- 
mestic tranquillity,  sacrifice  the  general  wel- 
fare, or  deny  the  blessings  of  liberty  by  im- 
posing on  the  population,  in  the  interest  of 
a  foreign  country,  any  such  burden  or  de- 
privation as  might  arouse  a  spirit  of  domes- 
tic revolt  or  unrest,  except  as  action  might 
be  rendered  necessary  for  the  common  de- 
fense of  the  people  of  this  country. 

An  equally  peremptory  limitation  upon 
the  treaty-making  power  is  imposed  by  the 
distribution  of  authority  among  the  different 
agents  of  the  Government.  A  treaty  is  of 
no  value  unless  it  can  be  executed.  The  Pres- 
ident, "by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent 
of  the  Senate,"  can  make  many  kinds  of 
promises  which  they  would  not  have  the 
power  to  fulfil. 

It  is  a  part  of  the  theory  of  our  Constitu- 
tion that  there  is  safety  in  the  distribution 
158 


THE  TREATY-MAKING  POWER 

of  power.  In  general,  every  power  of  govern- 
ment, the  legislative,  the  judisial,  and  the  ex- 
ecutive, is  to  some  extent  distributed  between 
the  Federal  Government  and  the  States. 
In  the  treaty-making  power  the  States  have 
no  part;  but,  undoubtedly,  some  of  their 
rights  are  reserved.  As  Mr.  Elihu  Root  has 
said:  "The  treaty-making  power  is  not  dis- 
tributed ;  it  is  all  vested  in  the  National  Gov- 
ernment." This  involves  an  immense  re- 
sponsibility. The  President  and  the  Senate 
act  for  every  citizen  throughout  the  whole 
country,  and  if  they  should  pledge  the  con- 
trol of  the  war  power  to  other  nations,  or  in- 
volve it  in  a  mechanism  that  would  automati- 
cally by  prescription  draw  this  nation  into 
foreign  wars,  their  action  would  affect  the 
fortune  and  the  life  of  every  citizen  in  a  seri- 
ous manner. 

Does  any  thoughtful  person  presume  to 
say  that  the  power  to  do  this  is  an  unlim- 
ited power?  that  less  than  a  hundred  men 
are  wholly  uncontrolled  by  any  legal  obliga- 
tion, and  may  negotiate  and  conclude  under 
this  treaty-making  power  any  engagement 
159 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

they  may  individually  please  to  incur  for 
their  fellow-citizens,  and  for  all  time? 

"It  is,  of  course,  conceivable,"  writes  Mr. 
Root,  "that,  under  pretense  of  exercising  the 
treaty-making  power,  the  President  and 
Senate  might  attempt  to  make  provisions 
regarding  matters  which  are  not  proper  sub- 
jects of  international  agreement,  and  which 
would  be  only  a  colorable — not  a  real — ex- 
ercise of  the  treaty-making  power."  There 
are  then  matters  which  are  "not  proper  sub- 
jects of  international  agreement";  but  in 
what  manner  can  we  determine  what  is  a 
"real"  and  what  is  only  a  "colorable"  exer- 
cise of  that  power,  if  not  by  the  purposes  for 
which  the  "more  perfect  Union"  was  formed 
and  the  restraints  created  by  the  distribution 
of  power  among  the  different  organs  of  the 
Government? 

In  most  matters  the  distribution  of  power 
is  clear  and  specific;  but  in  the  case  of  the 
treaty-making  power  the  division  between 
the  President  and  the  Senate  has  given  rise 
to  controversy.  The  evident  intention  of  the 
Constitution  is  that  the  President  and  the 
160 


THE  TREATY-MAKING  POWER 

Senate  should  cooperate  in  the  making  of 
treaties,  but  the  precise  manner  in  which  they 
are  to  proceed  is  not  defined.  Such  defini- 
tion was  clearly  thought  unnecessary,  for  it 
could  reasonably  be  presupposed  that  they 
would  work  together  in  confidence,  in  a  spirit 
of  mutual  respect,  and  with  unfailing  cour- 
tesy and  consideration. 

No  one  has  ever  doubted  that  the  Presi- 
dent is  the  designated  medium  of  communi- 
cation with  foreign  governments,  and  there- 
fore in  direct  control  of  the  process  of  nego- 
tiation. It  falls  to  him  to  direct  the  immediate 
policy  of  the  country  in  foreign  affairs,  and 
to  instruct  his  diplomatic  agents.  He  is, 
therefore,  in  a  position  to  use  his  own  judg- 
ment as  to  the  extent  and  the  manner  of  tak- 
ing the  "advice"  and  seeking  the  "consent" 
of  the  Senate.  On  the  other  hand,  he  cannot 
conclude  any  treaty  without  the  "consent"  of 
the  Senate.  Either  can  completely  block  the 
intentions  of  the  other,  but  neither  can  force 
the  other;  and  herein  lies  the  wisdom  of  the 
arrangement,  for  while  the  President  has  the 
initiative  and  can  begin  and  carry  on  nego- 
161 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

tiations  on  any  subject  and  with  any  country, 
the  utility  and  propriety  of  his  agreements 
are  subject  to  the  judgment  of  a  large  body 
of  experienced  men,  representing  varied  in- 
terests and  points  of  view,  and  he  must  con- 
vince two-thirds  of  them  that  what  he  pro- 
poses is  both  constitutional  and  expedient 
before  he  can  accomplish  any  final  result. 

The  superior  power  of  the  President  lies  in 
the  fact  that  he  can  create  conditions  which 
may  embarrass  the  free  judgment  of  his  col- 
leagues in  exercising  the  treaty-making 
power.  While  they  are  of  various  opinions, 
he  can  shape  circumstances  in  such  a  manner 
as  suddenly  to  confront  them  with  a  choice 
between  alternatives  neither  of  which  is  ac- 
ceptable to  them. 

It  has  been  said  that  the  Constitution  does 
not  require  the  President  to  accept  or  fol- 
low the  advice  of  the  Senate;  but,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  does  not  require  the  Senate  to 
approve  what  the  President  may  finally  pre- 
sent to  it  for  ratification.  If  an  impasse  is 
created  intentionally,  the  fault  lies  with  him 
who  has  intentionally  created  it ;  for  it  is  not 


THE  TREATY-MAKING  POWER 

legally  in  the  power  of  either  participant  in 
the  process  to  destroy  the  freedom  of  judg- 
ment of  the  other.  The  whole  purpose  of  the 
partnership  is  that  nothing  shall  be  done  to 
which  both  parties  do  not  freely  agree.  That 
is  the  reason  why  the  making  of  treaties  was 
not  left  to  the  President  alone,  or  assigned 
to  the  Congress  as  under  the  Confederation. 
Its  safety  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  is  a  joint 
procedure. 

Applying  the  principle  broadly,  the  con- 
tention that  one  department  of  the  Govern- 
ment may  in  any  way  coerce  another  is  a 
repudiation  of  the  very  purpose  of  the  divi- 
sion of  power,  and  would  result  in  the  de- 
struction of  that  freedom  under  law  which 
the  Constitution  aims  to  establish.  If  such 
an  attempt  were  for  any  reason  successful, 
it  would  result  in  the  establishing  of  an  au- 
tocratic form  of  government.  Absolutism, 
which  the  Constitution  was  intended  to  pre- 
vent, might  thus  creep  in  through  the  usur- 
pation of  power  by  a  single  department,  or 
even  by  a  single  officer  of  the  Government. 
There  could  be  no  greater  offense  against  the 
163 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Constitution  than  this,  and  public  opinion 
should  unite  in  condemning  even  the  sugges- 
tion of  it. 

A  limitation  of  equal  importance  upon  the 
treaty-making  power  resulting  from  the  dis- 
tribution of  authority  arises  from  the  de- 
pendence upon  Congress  as  a  whole  to  pro- 
vide the  means  for  executing  the  obligations 
of  a  treaty.  The  powers  of  Congress  are 
very  precisely  enumerated  in  the  Constitu- 
tion (Article  I,  Sections  7  and  8).  In  any 
case  where  war  or  administration  is  involved, 
there  can  be  no  execution  of  a  treaty  without 
the  action  of  Congress,  which  alone  has 
power  "to  lay  and  collect  taxes,  duties,  im- 
ports and  excises,  to  pay  the  debts  and  pro- 
vide for  the  general  welfare  of  the  United 
States;  to  define  and  punish  piracies  and 
felonies  committed  on  the  high  seas,  and  of- 
fenses against  the  law  of  nations;  to  declare 
war,  grant  letters  of  marque  and  reprisal, 
and  make  rules  concerning  captures  on  land 
and  water;  to  raise  and  support  armies,  but 
no  appropriation  of  money  to  that  use  shall 
be  for  a  longer  term  than  two  years;  to  pro- 
164 


THE  TREATY-MAKING  POWER 

vide  and  maintain  a  navy ;  to  make  rules  for 
the  government  and  regulation  of  the  land 
and  naval  forces;  to  provide  for  calling  for 
the  militia  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union, 
suppress  insurrections,  and  repel  invasions." 
Further,  "all  bills  for  the  raising  of  revenue 
shall  originate  in  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives; but  the  Senate  may  propose  or  concur 
with  amendments  as  on  other  bills/' 

Practically  here  is  a  formidable  restraint 
upon  the  effect  of  the  treaty-making  power. 
The  authority  of  Congress  in  all  these  mat- 
ters cannot  be  denied,  limited,  or  transferred 
to  others  by  the  President  and  Senate  of  the 
United  States.  If  any  exercise  of  these 
powers  is  necessary  to  execute  the  obliga- 
tions of  a  treaty,  it  depends  on  the  will  of 
Congress  whether  or  not  they  will  be  exer- 
cised. 

It  is  undoubtedly  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  Congress  itself  to  determine  the  question 
of  its  duties  and  its  powers  in  this  respect. 
There  is  in  the  Constitution  no  provision  for 
either  executive  or  judicial  determination  in 
this  regard.  If,  therefore,  Congress — a  body 
165 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

subject  to  frequent  change — considers  that 
a  treaty  which  it  is  asked  to  execute  by  sup- 
plementary legislation,  such  as  a  declaration 
of  war,  the  raising  of  an  army,  or  an  appro- 
priation of  money  to  be  used  for  the  main- 
tenance of  an  expeditionary  force,  exceeds 
the  limits  of  engagement  authorized  by  the 
Constitution,  there  is  no  power  in  the  remain- 
der of  the  Government  to  compel  its  action. 

No  treaty  relation,  therefore,  should  ever 
be  entered  into  which  Congress  would  have 
good  cause  for  declining  to  support. 

For  the  foregoing  reasons,  while  it  is  con- 
ceded that  the  treaty-making  power  is  not 
specifically  limited,  from  the  beginning  of 
our  Government  it  has  always  been  held  that 
it  is  not  unlimited. 

When  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution 
was  under  discussion,  in  answer  to  a  question 
regarding  the  extent  of  the  power  to  make 
treaties,  Madison  said: 

"In  the  existing  confederacy,  Congress  is 

authorized    indefinitely    to    make    treaties. 

Does  it  follow  because  the  power  is  given  to 

Congress  that  it  is  absolute  and  unlimited? 

166 


THE  TREATY-MAKING  POWER 

...  I  do  not  believe  that  power  is  given  to 
the  President  and  Senate  to  dismember  the 
empire  or  to  alienate  any  great  essential 
right.  I  do  not  think  the  whole  legislative 
authority  have  this  power.  The  exercise  of 
the  power  must  be  consistent  with  the  object 
of  the  delegation." 

At  a  later  period,  John  C.  Calhoun  de- 
clared: "Although  the  treaty-making  power 
is  exclusively  vested,  and  without  enumera- 
tion or  specification,  in  the  Government  of 
the  United  States,  it  is  nevertheless  subject 
to  several  important  limitations.  It  is,  in  the 
first  place,  strictly  limited  to  questions  inter 
alios;  that  is,  to  questions  between  us  and 
foreign  powers  which  require  negotiation  to 
adjust  them.  All  such  clearly  appertain  to 
it.  But  to  extend  it  beyond  these,  be  the 
pretext  what  it  may,  would  be  to  extend  it 
beyond  the  allotted  sphere,  and  thus  a  pal- 
pable violation  of  the  Constitution.  ...  It 
can  enter  into  no  stipulation  calculated  to 
change  the  character  of  the  Government;  or 
to  do  that  which  can  only  be  done  by  the  Con- 
stitution-making power;  or  which  is  incon- 
167 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

sistent  with  the  nature  and  structure  of  the 
Government,  or  the  objects  for  which  it  was 
formed." 

"Let  it  be  supposed,"  said  the  elder  St. 
George  Tucker,  in  his  edition  of  Blackstone, 
"that  the  President  and  Senate  should  stip- 
ulate by  treaty  with  any  foreign  nation,  that 
in  case  of  war  between  that  nation  and  any 
other,  the  United  States  should  immediately 
declare  war  against  that  nation.  Can  it  be 
supposed  that  such  a  treaty  would  be  so  far 
the  law  of  the  land,  as  to  take  from  the 
House  of  Representatives  their  constitution- 
al right  to  deliberate  on  the  expediency  or 
inexpediency  of  such  a  declaration  of  war, 
and  to  determine  and  act  thereon,  according 
to  their  own  judgment?"  And  as  John 
Randolph  Tucker  said,  in  1882 :  "The  ques- 
tion is  not  whether  Congress  can  annul  a 
valid  treaty,  but  is  a  treaty  valid  and  bind- 
ing on  the  United  States  which  divests  Con- 
gress of  its  constitutional  functions  without 
its  sanction  and  consent?" 

Very  few  treaties,  and  none  relating  to 
war,  can  operate  proprio  vigore.  "Suppose," 
168 


THE  TREATY-MAKING  POWER 

Tucker  continues,  "a  treaty  with  Great  Brit- 
ain should  provide  that  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  should  never  raise  armies, 
or  provide  a  navy" — or,  it  might  be  added, 
should  raise  armies  or  provide  a  navy  of  only 
a  given  size — "can  it  be  held  that  the  Presi- 
dent and  Senate  may  by  treaty  thus  divest 
Congress  of  its  constitutional  duty  to  do 
these  things?  If  so,  then  the  treaty-making 
power  may  amend,  alter,  and  destroy  the 
Constitution,  and  hold  us  bound  to  submit 
to  this  claim  of  a  foreign  power  conferred 
and  sanctioned  by  treaty.  This  cannot  be 
true.  It  is  absurd.  These  express  powers 
to  Congress  are  limitations  on  the  general 
power  to  make  treaties."  And  this  learned 
jurist  concludes:  "From  this  review  I  feel 
justified  in  holding  that  if  any  treaty  seeks 
to  bind  the  United  States  to  a  foreign  coun- 
try in  respect  of  the  functional  powers  of 
Congress,  we  are  not  open  to  a  charge  of  bad 
faith  if  Congress  refuses  to  sanction  a  divest- 
iture of  its  constitutional  authority  to  deal 
with  any  subject  entrusted  to  it  by  specifi- 
169 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

cally  granted  powers  in  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States." 

We  must  not  permit  ourselves  to  overlook 
the  fact  that  ours  is  a  popular  government, 
in  which  the  will  of  the  people  is  a  constant 
factor  in  shaping  public  policy.  This  will 
is  revised  at  short  intervals  in  the  choice  of 
the  House  of  Representatives,  elected  every 
two  years.  It  is  expressly  prescribed  in  the 
Constitution  that  "no  appropriation  of 
money  for  military  purposes  shall  be  for  a 
period  longer  than  two  years."  This  limita- 
tion profoundly  affects  the  probability  of  the 
execution  of  any  military  obligations  with 
other  nations  in  the  form  of  treaties;  for, 
if  it  should  be  the  popular  will  not  to  en- 
force the  conscription  of  armies  for  the  pur- 
pose of  interfering  in  matters  which  the  peo- 
ple considered  did  not  concern  them,  it  is 
almost  certain  that  Congress  would  not  re- 
gard itself  bound  by  any  treaty,  especially 
one  of  long  standing,  to  supply  the  means 
for  carrying  it  into  effect  against  the  popu- 
lar conviction  regarding  the  national  duty. 

There  is  force,  no  doubt,  in  the  contention 
170 


THE  TREATY-MAKING  POWER 

that  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  is 
under  a  moral  obligation  to  maintain  the 
honor  of  the  nation,  which  implies  the  strict 
fulfilment  of  all  pledges  made  by  the  treaty- 
making  power ;  but  there  is  even  more  weight 
in  the  affirmation  that  the  treaty-making 
power  is  under  a  moral  obligation  not  to 
pledge  the  honor  of  the  nation  in  doubtful 
conditions,  as  well  as  under  a  legal  obligation 
not  to  destroy  the  freedom  of  a  coordinate 
branch  of  the  Government  by  pledging  it  to 
a  performance  beyond  the  intentions  of  the 
Constitution,  from  which  all  its  authority  is 
derived.  A  treaty  that  should  do  that  would, 
without  doubt,  be  ultra  vires;  and,  therefore, 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Congress,  null 
and  void  from  the  beginning. 

In  the  period  of  our  national  development 
when  there  was  still  divergence  of  opinion 
regarding  the  relation  of  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment to  the  States,  two  schools  arose  as 
to  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  powers  dele- 
gated by  the  Constitution.  The  devotees  of 
State  Rights  were  disposed  to  seek  limita- 
tions upon  all  the  Federal  powers.  The  ad- 
171 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Vocates  of  strong  central  authority,  on  the 
contrary,  laid  emphasis  on  the  necessity  of 
an  unlimited  authority  at  least  in  the  treaty- 
making  power,  resulting  from  the  sovereign- 
ty of  the  nation,  as  contrasted  with  the  pow- 
ers of  the  States.  That  debate  is  now  closed. 
The  question  that  is  at  present  pressed  upon 
our  attention  is  of  a  character  wholly  new, 
and  not  considered  in  the  learned  works  of 
our  great  standard  authorities  on  the  treaty- 
making  power,  such  as  Butler,  Crandall  and 
Devlin.  A  new  situation  has  been  thrust 
upon  us  by  the  proposal  to  create  a  League 
of  Nations,  involving  responsibilities  never 
before  imagined  to  be  possible. 

The  position  reached  before  this  new  pro- 
posal is  well  summed  up  by  Devlin  when  he 
says:  "The  treaty  power  is  in  a  measure  in- 
cidental to  the  war  power,  and  under  the  ne- 
cessity for  national  preservation,  or  even  for 
national  benefit,  many  things  can  be  done 
that  are  not  explicitly  enumerated  in  the 
Constitution."  This  is  true,  and  it  has  been 
well  not  to  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  the 
United  States  is  a  sovereign  nation,  and  may 
172 


THE  TREATY-MAKING  POWER 

under  its  sovereign  power  do  what  is  really 
necessary  for  the  national  interests.  And  yet, 
as  this  writer  continues,  "It  cannot  be  said 
that  the  treaty-making  power  is  unlimited. 
What  the  limits  are,  no  one  can  correctly 
state,  and  it  is  possible  that  no  treaty  wrill 
ever  be  made  in  which  the  power  to  make  the 
treaty  will  be  seriously  questioned.  But  if 
there  ever  appears  a  clear  case  in  which  a 
treaty  conflicts  with  the  Constitution,  then 
either  the  Constitution  or  the  treaty  must 
govern,  and  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  in 
such  a  case  the  treaty  would  yield  to  the  Con- 
stitution." 

The  immediate  question  is,  Has  such  a 
case  now  arisen?  If  a  super-government  is 
about  to  be  created,  to  which  the  United 
States  is  asked  to  make  itself  subject,  then 
such  a  case  has  arisen ;  and  it  is  clear  that  the 
Constitution  forbids  the  President  and  the 
Senate  to  make  a  treaty  involving  such  sub- 
jection. They  do  not  possess  the  legal  power 
to  enter  into  such  an  engagement.  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  Constitution  of  a  League 
of  Nations  is  nothing  more  than  an  under- 
173 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

standing  between  the  signatories  to  act  to- 
gether in  their  own  way,  and  according  to 
their  own  will,  to  accomplish  certain  common 
objects,  and  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  is  not  in  any  way  subordinated  to  a 
super-government,  there  may  be  a  perfect 
right  to  conclude  such  a  treaty. 

There  remains,  however,  another  question. 
The  Constitution  of  a  League  of  Nations 
may  be  so  construed  as  to  leave  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  free  to  act  or  not 
to  act  upon  the  recommendations  of  the 
Council,  and  even  to  prevent  by  the  opposi- 
tion of  the  representative  of  a  single  Power 
making  any  recommendations  or  decisions 
of  any  kind.  In  that  case  it  seems  futile 
to  pretend  that  it  is  in  any  substantial  sense 
a  "League,"  or  even  an  efficient  "Entente." 
But,  unless  it  is  further  modified,  it  does 
create  an  imperium  in  which  all  the  signa- 
tories have  a  part;  for  it  proposes  to  coerce 
sovereign  States  which  are  not  members  of 
the  League,  to  abolish  existing  laws  of  neu- 
trality, and  absolutely  to  govern  through  its 
mandataries,  under  its  own  "Acts  and  Char- 
174 


THE  TREATY-MAKING  POWER 

ters,"  dependent  peoples  placed  under  its 
sovereign  authority. 

Should  the  United  States  become  a  signa- 
tory of  such  a  treaty,  even  though  it  refused 
to  become  subordinate  to  this  new  govern- 
ment by  service  as  a  mandatary,  it  would  still 
constitute  a  part  of  this  new  imperium.  Its 
representative  in  the  Council  of  the  League 
would  exercise  one-eighth  of  the  sovereign 
power  which  that  corporation  will  possess, 
and  he  would  exercise  it  without  the  author- 
ity or  the  restraint  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States. 

In  1803,  President  Jefferson  doubted  the 
constitutional  authorization  of  the  American 
Government  to  acquire  by  treaty  and  to  gov- 
ern the  Louisiana  Purchase.  That  point  has 
long  since  been  settled.  But  one  does  not 
find  a  ready  answer  to  the  question,  How 
can  the  United  States,  in  the  person  of  a  rep- 
resentative appointed  by  the  President,  even 
if  confirmed  by  the  Senate,  participate  in 
issuing  "Acts  and  Charters"  for  the  govern- 
ment of  territory  not  owned  by  the  United 
States,  and  not  subject  either  to  the  Consti- 
175 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

tution  of  the  United  States  or  to  the  laws  of 
Congress? 

The  disgraceful  triple  protectorate  of  the 
Samoan  Islands  by  the  United  States,  Great 
Britain,  and  Germany  has  been  referred  to 
as  furnishing  a  precedent  for  the  scheme  of 
mandatory  government.  The  reference  is 
unfortunate,  both  with  respect  to  its  results, 
which  were  shameful,  and  its  nature,  which 
was  a  threefold  promise  to  protect  the  neu- 
trality and  autonomy  of  the  native  govern- 
ment under  a  puppet  king.  It  was  not  a  con- 
tract to  govern  the  islands  jointly,  but  an  ar- 
rangement to  prevent  either  of  the  three 
Powers  from  governing  at  all. 

Aside  from  the  difficulties  which  the 
United  States  would  have  either  in  accepting 
the  responsibility  of  a  mandatary  or  in  con- 
trolling mandatory  Powers,  it  is  important 
to  comprehend  the  conception  which  lies  back 
of  this  new  corporate  imperialism. 

This  is  most  clearly  obtained  from  the 
original  plan  for  a  League  of  Nations  de- 
signed by  General  Smuts  on  which  the  sys- 
tem of  mandataries  is  founded. 
176 


THE  TREATY-MAKING  POWER 

"So  far  as  the  peoples  and  territories 
formerly  belonging  to  Russia,  Austria-Hun- 
gary and  Turkey  are  concerned,"  he  says, 
"the  League  of  Nations  should  be  considered 
as  the  reversionary  in  the  most  general  sense 
and  as  clothed  with  the  right  of  ultimate  dis- 
posal.'' How,  one  may  ask,  did  the  United 
States  ever  become  a  participant  in  this  al- 
leged reversionary  right  in  the  remains  of 
these  extinct  empires? 

"Any  authority,  control,  or  administration 
which  may  be  necessary  in  respect  of  these 
territories  and  peoples,  other  than  their  own 
self-determined  autonomy,  shall  be  the  ex- 
clusive function  of  and  shall  be  vested  in  the 
League  of  Nations  and  exercised  by  or  on 
behalf  of  it."  Where  has  the  United  States 
acquired  a  share  in  this  exclusive  function? 

"The  degree  of  authority,  control,  or  ad- 
ministration exercised  by  the  mandatory 
State  shall  'in  each  case  be  laid  down  by  the 
League  in  a  special  Act  or  Charter,  which 
shall  reserve  to  it  complete  power  of  ultimate 
control  and  supervision.'  "  Whence  then  pro- 
ceeds the  right  to  accord  this  "complete 
177 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

power  of  ultimate  control"  which  the  United 
States  would  share  in  issuing  such  mandates  ? 
Plainly,  whatever  pretences  of  democracy 
and  self-determination  may  be  put  forward 
in  defense  of  this  scheme,  it  is  nothing  less 
than  the  creation  of  an  imperial  syndicate 
to  rule  a  large  portion  of  Asia  and  Africa. 
Two  further  statements  in  the  Smuts  pro- 
gram establish  this  beyond  contradiction. 
One  is  that  the  League  is  "modeled  on  the 
British  Empire,  including  its  crown  colonies 
and  protectorates."  "The  two  systems," 
Smuts  expressly  declares,  "would  closely  re- 
semble each  other" ;  and  he  adds,  "Where  the 
British  Empire  has  been  so  eminently  suc- 
cessful as  a  political  system,  the  League, 
working  on  somewhat  similar  lines,  could  not 
fail  to  achieve  a  reasonable  measure  of  suc- 
cess." The  other  statement  is — and  this  is 
Smuts'  exact  expression — "The  League  will 
have  a  very  real  role  to  play  as  the  successor 
to  the  empires."  To  this  is  added  that  "no 
new  State  arising  from  the  old  empires  shall 
be  recognized  or  admitted  into  the  League, 
except  as  it  shall  conform  to  the  requirements 
178 


THE  TREATY-MAKING  POWER 

of  the  League";  that  is,  that  it  shall  never, 
except  by  permission  of  the  League,  become 
a  recognized  Sovereign  State! 

It  is  for  the  people  of  the  United  States  to 
consider  whether  such  an  enterprise  as  this  is 
one  of  the  purposes  for  which  they  entered 
into  the  war;  and  it  is  certainly  a  proper 
question  to  be  answered  by  the  constitu- 
tionally authorized  treaty-making  power, 
whether  or  not  it  is  an  enterprise  to  which 
the  United  States  has  the  constitutional 
right  to  pledge  the  efforts,  the  resources,  and 
the  lives  of  future  generations  of  its  citizens. 


VI 

THE    OBSTRUCTION    OF    PEACE 

THE  decision  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States  to  abandon  the  long-estab- 
lished traditions  of  the  Republic  by  absent- 
ing himself  from  the  country  and,  without 
consultation  with  the  Senate,  personally  con- 
ducting negotiations  in  a  foreign  capital, 
aroused  in  many  American  citizens  of  all 
political  parties  a  mingled  sentiment  of 
astonishment  and  opposition.  The  appre- 
hension was  inevitable  that  some  very  un- 
usual project  was  in  the  President's  mind; 
and  his  silence,  even  to  his  official  advisers, 
seemed  to  confirm  this  conclusion. 

Subsequent  developments,  particularly 
the  President's  speechmaking  tour  in  Eng- 
land and  on  the  Continent,  soon  made  it  evi- 
dent that  it  was  his  purpose  to  carry  into 
effect  the  establishment  of  a  "general  asso- 
ciation of  nations"  suggested  in  the  four- 
ISO 


THE  OBSTRUCTION  OF  PEACE 

teenth  rubric  of  his  peace  terms  of  January, 
1918;  and  that  he  was  relying  upon  popular 
confidence  in  his  personal  leadership  to  cause 
the  European  governments  to  conform  to  his 
views. 

Although  many  Americans  thought  that 
the  first  necessity  was  the  prompt  conclusion 
of  a  peace  of  victory  with  Germany,  and 
were  fearful  that  the  discussion  of  theoretical 
questions  would  postpone  it,  they  awaited 
in  silence  the  disclosure  of  the  President's  in- 
tentions. 

When,  on  February  fifteenth,  they  were 
able  to  form  at  least  a  preliminary  judgment 
regarding  the  "Constitution  of  the  League 
of  Nations"  which  was  then  published,  it  was 
by  no  means  unanimous.  The  document  in 
question  was  variously  understood  and  was 
in  evident  need  of  authoritative  interpreta- 
tion.1 

It  was  with  surprise  and  regret,  therefore, 
that  the  country  received  the  announcement, 
on  the  occasion  of  the  President's  brief  visit 

1  See  the  Covenant  as  originally  agreed  upon  at  Paris  at 
the  end  of  this  volume. 

181 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

to  the  United  States,  in  his  speech  at  Boston, 
that  he  resented  any  dissent  from  his  deci- 
sions and  any  criticism  of  the  document  pre- 
pared at  Paris.  As  very  little  criticism  had 
at  that  time  been  expressed,  since  the  coun- 
try was  awaiting  further  enlightenment,  the 
public  was  amazed  at  the  President's  ex- 
pressed desire  for  a  "challenge,"  which  he 
declared  he  would  consider  as  an  "indul- 
gence," accompanied  with  a  reference  to  his 
"fighting  blood"  and  a  wish  for  an  oppor- 
tunity to  "let  it  have  scope." 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  people  were  ex- 
pecting from  the  President  a  clear  and  dis- 
passionate exposition  of  the  purport  of  the 
project  of  a  League  of  Nations  and  its  re- 
lation to  the  interests  of  the  United  States, 
and  were  waiting  to  receive  from  him  with 
respectful  attention  a  message  which  would 
aid  them  in  forming  a  judgment  of  its  merits, 
they  were  unable  to  understand  the  belliger- 
ent mood  with  which  the  duty  of  immediate 
and  unqualified  acceptance  of  the  project 
was  urged;  and  this  unexpected  display  of 
personal  resentment  of  any  independent 
182 


THE  OBSTRUCTION  OF  PEACE 

judgment  on  the  part  of  the  public  desiring 
enlightenment  on  a  subject  of  such  great 
consequence,  and  even  on  the  part  of  the 
Senate  of  the  United  States,  was  regarded 
as  a  rather  grotesque  method  of  approaching 
the  discussion  of  universal  peace. 

That  some  new  international  undertaking 
should  result  from  the  experience  of  the 
Great  War  was  evident  to  all  thoughtful 
men,  but  the  problem  of  the  nature  and  ex- 
tent of  new  and  perpetual  obligations  to  be 
assumed  by  the  United  States  regarding 
other  countries,  is  too  serious  to  be  treated  in 
a  light  manner,  and  the  solution  of  it  too 
heavily  charged  with  consequences  to  be  ac- 
cepted without  careful  consideration  by  all 
whom  the  consequences  will  affect. 

The  circumstances  in  which  this  country 
has  been  placed  by  the  President's  decision 
to  carry  into  execution  a  policy  in  contra- 
diction to  all  the  traditions  of  the  Republic 
find  no  parallel  in  the  history  of  any  free 
people  in  the  enjoyment  of  constitutional 
liberty.  They  recall  the  occasion  when  the 
former  German  Emperor,  without  consult- 
183 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ing  the  constitutionally  authorized  officers 
of  the  German  Empire,  undertook,  in  his 
private  capacity,  to  carry  on  negotiations 
with  a  foreign  power  by  procuring  an  alli- 
ance with  the  Czar  of  Russia;  and  the  other 
occasion  when  the  same  sovereign  attempted 
to  influence  the  sentiments  of  the  British 
people  by  an  expression  of  his  personal 
news  in  a  published  interview,  and  was  called 
to  account  by  the  Reichstag.  In  these  in- 
stances of  purely  personal  diplomacy,  which 
have  been  severely  criticized  both  in  Ger- 
many and  elsewhere,  the  sovereign  merely 
assumed  that  he  had  a  perfect  right  to  pro- 
pose and  carry  into  effect  what  he  believed 
would  be  for  the  good  of  his  country.  The 
ground  of  objection  to  his  conduct  was  not 
that  as  sovereign  he  did  not  have  charge  of 
the  foreign  relations  of  the  Empire, — a  duty 
which  the  Imperial  Constitution  imposed 
upon  him, — but  that  he  had  exceeded  the 
constitutional  limits  in  his  method  of  pro- 
cedure; in  brief,  that  his  authority  was  not 
personal  but  official,  and  that  officially  he 
could  speak  and  act  only  in  conjunction  with 
184 


THE  OBSTRUCTION  OF  PEACE 

other  officers  also  speaking  and  acting  in 
their  joint  capacity. 

It  is,  of  course,  not  disputed  that  the 
President  of  the  United  States  is  charged  by 
the  Constitution  with  the  duty,  "by  and  with 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,"  of 
negotiating  treaties  with  foreign  govern- 
ments. It  has,  however,  been  customary,  and 
it  is  the  evident  intent  of  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States,  that  in  the  process  of 
treaty-making,  even  in  the  most  ordinary 
matters, — much  more  in  the  case  of  the  set- 
tlement of  the  most  important  issue  regard- 
ing the  peace  and  safety  of  the  world  that 
has  arisen  in  the  present  generation,  or  is* 
likely  to  arise, — the  President  should  not 
proceed  alone.  As  Hamilton  wrote  in  the 
"Federalist,"  when  urging  the  adoption  of 
the  Constitution,  "The  history  of  human  con- 
duct does  not  warrant  that  exalted  opinion 
of  human  virtue  which  would  make  it  wise 
in  a  nation  to  commit  interests  of  so  deli- 
cate and  momentous  a  kind,  as  those  which 
concern  its  intercourse  with  the  rest  of  the 
world,  to  the  sole  disposal  of  a  magistrate 
185 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

'Created  and  circumstanced  as  would  be  the 
President  of  the  United  States." 

If  this  caution  was  deemed  necessary  re- 
garding decisions  affecting  merely  those 
matters  relating  in  a  general  way  to  "inter- 
course with  the  rest  of  the  world,"  what  is 
to  be  said  of  a  scheme  to  revolutionize  the 
whole  plan  of  international  relationship,  in- 
volving permanent  and  unalterable  bonds 
of  obligation  between  many  nations  as  yet 
unnamed  in  the  Covenant,  and  thus  far  non- 
existent as  established  and  generally  rec- 
ognized States? 

Certainly,  it  could  never  have  been  con- 
templated by  the  founders  of  this  Republic 
that  one  man,  however  great,  and  wise,  and 
noble,  should  be  empowered  to  pool  the  in- 
terests of  this  nation  with  those  of  other 
nations  unless  "by  and  with  the  advice  and 
consent"  of  at  least  one  branch  of  the  rep- 
resentatives of  the  people,  and  thus  to  com- 
mit both  of  the  legislative  branches  of  the 
government  and  the  property  and  persons 
of  the  people  to  undertakings  incapable  of 
previous  precise  definition  and  in  terms  so 
186 


THE  OBSTRUCTION  OF  PEACE 

broad  that  they  might  easily  give  rise  to  con- 
troversy and  even  to  ultimate  dissent  and  re- 
fusal. 

Could  it  have  been  imagined  that  any  per- 
son honored  with  the  prerogatives  and  re- 
sponsibilities of  the  presidency  of  the  United 
States  would  even  presume,  in  defiance  of 
public  opinion,  to  disregard  the  precedents 
of  more  than  a  century,  and  insist  upon  leav- 
ing this  country  repeatedly,  and  for  long 
periods,  in  the  midst  of  important  public 
business,  and  appoint  himself,  accompanied 
by  a  retinue  of  persons  chosen  only  by  him- 
self and  wholly  subservient  to  his  dictates, 
as  the  personal  negotiator,  not  of  an  imme- 
diate peace,— which  alone  might  justify  an 
unusual  procedure,  in  order  that  the  victors 
in  a  frightful  war  might  promptly  guard 
themselves  against  future  aggression  in  the 
manner  desired  by  those  most  exposed  to 
danger, — but  to  impose  upon  other  nations, 
as  the  price  of  future  American  aid  and 
friendship,  a  plan  of  world  reconstruction 
evolved  from  his  own  inner  consciousness, 
which  had  not  only  never  been  publicly  dis- 
187 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

cussed  by  his  fellow-citizens,  but  had  never 
been  disclosed  even  to  the  coordinate  branch 
of  the  Government  in  the  exercise  of  the 
treaty -making  power? 

Such  a  course  could  certainly  never  be 
taken  "by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of 
the  Senate."  And  it  should  not  be  over- 
looked that  in  the  making  of  treaties  it  is 
"advice,"  as  well  as  consent,  which  is  author- 
ized as  essential  to  the  proper  performance 
of  that  duty. 

Who  of  our  American  Presidents  has  ever 
placed  such  confidence  in  himself,  or  so  pre- 
sumed upon  the  confidence  of  others,  as  to 
demand  the  privilege  of  acting  without  such 
advice,  or  would  exercise  it  without  diffidence 
and  every  fortification  of  wise  counsel,  even 
if  urged  by  his  fellow-citizens  to  assume  this 
responsibility? 

In  Europe,  where  the  head  of  a  State  has 
great  authority,  no  sovereign  would  under- 
take so  large  an  enterprise.  Once,  by  acci- 
dent, the  late  King  of  England,  Edward 
VII,  whose  discretion  was  unusual,  met  and 
held  conversation  with  another  sovereign, 
188 


THE  OBSTRUCTION  OF  PEACE 

without  the  presence  of  a  minister.  There 
were  no  negotiations,  and  probably  there  was 
no  utterance  on  either  side  beyond  what  the 
courtesies  of  casual  intercourse  demanded; 
but  immediately  there  was  public  criticism 
in  the  London  newspapers  of  this  disregard 
of  the  British  Constitution,  and  it  was  de- 
manded as  a  matter  of  public  right  that  the 
sovereign  should  not  hold  such  conversation 
without  the  presence  of  a  minister.  There 
was  probably  only  one  sovereign  in  Europe 
who  would  resent  such  criticism,  and  he  is  no 
longer  a  sovereign. 

An  American  president,  it  may  be  thought, 
is  himself  his  own  prime  minister.  This  is 
an  error.  He  is  a  definitely  delegated  rep- 
resentative of  a  sovereign  people,  possessing 
no  powers  which  are  not  included  in  the 
constitutional  designation  of  his  functions, 
by  which  also  they  are  strictly  limited.  By 
etiquette  he  ranks  with  royalty  in  a  foreign 
country  because  he  is  the  head  of  a  State; 
but  in  point  of  influence  he  is  for  that  rea- 
son more  potent  than  any  minister.  An 
American  president  is  never  embarrassed  by 
189 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

the  presence  of  his  ministers.  A  prime  min- 
ister is  the  creature  of  a  Parliament,  and 
subject  to  its  will.  He  can  be  overthrown 
at  any  moment,  and  a  successor  takes  his 
place.  A  president  can  be  impeached — a 
difficult  process — but  he  is  as  secure  in  the 
exercise  of  power,  within  constitutional 
limits,  during  his  term  of  office,  as  a  treas- 
ure is  secure  in  a  steel  safe-deposit  vault  be- 
hind the  trusty  bolts  that  will  be  withdrawn 
only  when  the  time-lock  releases  them. 

From  a  European  point  of  view,  the 
President  must  be  taken  at  his  own  self- 
valuation.  It  is  naturally  assumed  that 
what  he  promises  he  can  perform.  When, 
therefore,  he  states  what  the  United  States 
will  do  no  one  questions  his  powers  of  ex- 
ecution. He  carries  the  destiny  of  the  coun- 
try in  his  closed  hand  more  effectively  than 
any  king  or  emperor  under  a  parliamentary 
regime  could  do. 

While  an  American  president  has  this  ad- 
vantage over  any  minister  or  even  any  sov- 
ereign in  Europe,  the  President  of  the 
United  States  well  understands  the  embar- 
190 


THE  OBSTRUCTION  OF  PEACE 

rassment  of  the  heads  of  other  governments 
at  a  moment  when  combined  strength  is 
needed  to  facilitate  an  issue  from  a  condition 
of  emergency.  Without  America  the  bal- 
ance of  power  that  has  won  the  war  would 
be  lost  and  the  victory  forfeited. 

In  such  circumstances  the  President  does 
not  hesitate  to  speak  disparagingly  of  Euro- 
pean governments.  Unless  they  adopt  a 
"League  of  Nations/'  he  declares  openly, 
they  are  likely  to  be  brushed  aside.  The 
"people,"  he  affirms,  are  the  ultimate  author- 
ity, and  it  is  to  the  people  that  he  appeals. 
It  is  upon  this  popular  pressure  that  he  de- 
pends to  influence  the  governments,  of  whose 
spontaneous  inclination  he  expresses  doubts. 
"The  nations  of  the  world,"  he  said  in  his 
speech  on  landing  at  Boston,  "have  set  their* 
heads  to  do  a  great  thing,  and  they  are  not 
going  to  slacken  their  purpose."  But  he 
hastens  to  explain  that  he  does  not  mean  the 
governments.  Having  received  the  plaudits 
of  the  multitude  as  a  distinguished  foreigner 
and  apostle  of  liberty,  when  he  made  his  tour 
of  Europe  before  the  Peace  Congress  as- 
191 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

sembled,  he  has  made  evident  to  his  own 
mind  something  which  the  governments  seem 
not  to  have  been  aware  of  before,  but  with 
which  he  affirms  they  are  duly  impressed 
now.  "When  I  speak  of  the  nations  of  the 
world,"  he  says,  "I  do  not  speak  of  the  gov- 
ernments of  the  world.  I  speak  of  the 
peoples  who  constitute  the  nations  of  the 
world.  They  are  in  the  saddle  and  they  are 
going  to  see  to  it  that  if  their  present  gov- 
ernments do  not  do  their  will  some  other 
governments  shall.  And  the  secret  is  out 
and  the  present  governments  know  it." 

What  is  the  nature  of  this  "secret"  ?  With 
whom  has  our  President  been  conferring? 
The  governments  now  also  are  said  to  par- 
ticipate in  this  disclosure,  but  apparently  it 
did  not  come  originally  from  them.  It  is 
something  that  has  been  forced  upon  them 
through  popular  pressure,  and  it  is  upon  this 
that  the  President  counts  as  the  basis  of  the 
"League  of  Nations"  which  the  governments 
will  be  compelled  to  accept  or  give  way  to 
others.  His  confidence  is  not  founded  upon 
those  with  whom  he  has  been  negotiating,  but 


THE  OBSTRUCTION  OF  PEACE 

upon  those  who  will  have  "other  govern- 
ments" decide  the  question  if  their  will  is 
not  obeyed. 

Who  are  those  "other  governments"?  Are 
they  governments  foreign  to  these  people — 
ours  for  example — who  are  to  force  obedience 
to  the  popular  will,  or  are  they  revolutionary 
governments  yet  to  be  created?  Would  the 
President  of  the  United  States  be  pleased  to 
have  any  foreign  potentate,  or  even  an  am- 
bassador, tour  the  United  States,  making 
popular  speeches  in  our  cities,  and  then  make 
such  observations  regarding  the  American 
Government  with  which  the  stranger  had 
come  to  negotiate? 

Judging  by  the  President's  estimate  of  the 
European  nations — and  he  is  speaking  not  of 
governments  but  of  nations  now,  by  which 
he  says  he  means  "peoples" — Europe  is 
sadly  in  need  of  a  guardian,  but  would  prove 
an  unruly  ward. 

Here  is  his  graphic  picture  of  the  nations 
with  which,  in  the  future,  he  desires  us  to  be 
closely  associated,  and  by  whose  collective 
193 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

judgment  he  wishes  our  future  policy  to  be 
determined : 

"You  understand  that  the  nations  of 
Europe  have  again  and  again  clashed  with 
one  another  in  competitive  interest.  It  is 
impossible  for  men  to  forget  these  sharp  is- 
sues that  were  drawn  between  them  in  times 
past.  It  is  impossible  for  men  to  believe  that 
all  ambitions  have  all  of  a  sudden  been  fore- 
gone. They  remember  territory  that  was 
coveted ;  they  remember  rights  that  it  was  at- 
tempted to  extort;  they  remember  political 
ambitions  which  it  was  attempted  to  realize — 
and,  while  they  believe  that  men  have  come 
into  a  different  temper,  they  cannot  forget 
these  things,  and  so  they  do  not  resort  to 
one  another  for  a  dispassionate  view  of  the 
matters  in  controversy." 

If  this  is  a  just  estimate  of  the  European 
nations,  it  would  appear  to  be  the  part  of 
wisdom  for  a  distant  people  to  keep  as  far 
as  possible  from  intervention  in  any  of  their 
quarrels.  The  picture,  however,  is  drawn 
with  no  discrimination,  and  is  as  erroneous 
in  substance  as  it  is  unjust  in  its  implications. 
194 


THE  OBSTRUCTION  OF  PEACE 

It  is  monstrous  to  include  innocent  Belgium, 
which  did  resort  to  the  good  faith  of  others 
for  a  dispassionate  view;  or  France,  which 
has  been  made  the  victim  of  every  crime;  or 
Great  Britain,  which  has  played  a  noble  part 
in  the  endeavor  to  avoid  strife  and  to  save 
the  world  from  the  ruin  of  civilization,  in 
the  picture  of  a  discordant  and  distrustful 
Europe  which  the  President  has  drawn  in 
the  paragraph  just  quoted.  These  countries 
have  stood  together,  and  fought  together, 
amidst  great  sacrifices,  to  put  down  aggres- 
sion; and  this  is  the  first  time  that  any  one 
has  revived  the  unhappy  memories  of  a  past 
that  has  been  buried,  to  question  the  solidar- 
ity and  mutual  confidence  that  existed  in  the 
Entente  before  the  President  went  to 
Europe.  It  is  injurious  and  unpardonable 
to  try  to  make  it  appear  that  America,  and 
America  alone,  can  harmonize  a  discordant 
Europe,  and  lead  the  music  in  a  new  concert 
of  world  power.  The  nations  of  the  Entente 
and  the  governments  of  the  Entente  are  as 
capable  of  pursuing  high  ideals  and  creating 
the  conditions  of  peace  as  America  herself, 
195 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

and  are  as  much  disposed  to  do  so.  It  is  both 
sophistical  and  reprehensible  to  appeal  to 
American  pride,  and  to  exalt  American  con- 
ceit, by  detraction  from  the  capacities  of 
Powers  with  problems  far  more  serious  to 
solve  than  any  which  confront  this  nation. 

The  truth  is  that  America  very  tardily, 
but  with  abundant  and  long  disregarded 
warning  of  what  awaited  her,  finally  came 
into  the  war  in  time  to  prevent  the  defeat  of 
the  Entente  by  adding  a  fresh  force  to  tip 
the  scale  of  the  balance  of  power,  and  it  was 
the  new  equilibrium  that  won  the  war. 

It  will  require  the  maintenance  of  that 
superior  counterpoise  to  conclude  and  en- 
force a  victorious  peace.  That  is  the  imme- 
diate problem,  and  the  only  immediate  prob- 
lem. The  imposing  of  just,  but  necessarily 
punitive,  terms  of  peace  on  Germany  and 
her  allies  would  secure  the  peace  of  the  world 
for  a  long  time  to  come.  Ulterior  questions 
of  international  reorganization  could  then 
be  discussed  calmly  and  effectively  in  the 
light  of  the  conditions  which  would  prevail 
when  peace  had  been  concluded  and  the 
196 


THE  OBSTRUCTION  OF  PEACE 

power  to  enforce  it  has  been  demonstrated. 
Until  that  power  can  be  proved  to  exist  by 
actual  achievement,  the  speculations  about 
permanent  and  universal  peace  are  mere  ex- 
cursions in  dreamland. 

Instead  of  promoting  peace,  the  efforts  of 
the  President  of  the  United  States  to  impose 
his  own  views  and  to  array  the  populations 
of  other  countries  behind  them  by  bringing 
pressure — if  that  has  actually  been  the  case 
— upon  other  governments  have  seriously  im- 
peded and  obstructed  the  only  peace  in  which 
the  world  is  really  interested  at  this  time, 
and  for  the  need  of  which  whole  nations  are 
dying  with  hunger  and  are  kept  in  an  ab- 
normal and  dangerous  state  of  mind  as  a 
climax  to  their  physical  distress.  In  the 
meantime  the  Entente  is  weakening  through 
discouragement  and  the  enemy  is  reorganiz- 
ing, if  not  for  resistance  at  least  to  display  a 
refractory  attitude  toward  conditions  of 
peace  that  could  at  one  time  have  been 
easily  imposed. 

There  is  no  division  of  opinion  in  the 
United  States  regarding  the  duty  of  this 
197 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

country  to  stand  firmly  with  our  allies  in  this 
war  in  the  complete  suppression  of  a  com- 
mon enemy  and  the  maintenance  of  a  peace 
thus  imposed.  Yet  the  President  raises  the 
sophistical  question,  "If  America  were  at  this 
juncture  to  fail  the  world,  what  would  be- 
come of  it?  I  do  not  mean  any  disrespect 
to  any  other  great  people  when  I  say  that 
America  is  the  hope  of  the  world,  and  if  she 
does  not  justify  that  hope  the  results  are 
unthinkable.  Men  will  be  thrown  back  upon 
the  bitterness  of  disappointment  not  only, 
but  the  bitterness  of  despair.  All  nations 
will  be  set  up  as  hostile  camps  again;  the  men 
at  the  peace  conference  will  go  home  with 
their  heads  upon  their  breasts,  knowing  that 
they  have  failed — for.  they  were  bidden  not 
to  come  home  from  there  until  they  did  some- 
thing more  than  sign  a  treaty  of  peace." 

What  necessity  is  there  for  raising  the 
impertinent  and  defamatory  question,  What 
would  become  of  the  world  if  America  failed 
to  do  her  duty?  The  American  people  have 
no  thought  of  failing  in  the  performance  of 
their  duty,  and  the  description  of  what  would 
198 


THE  OBSTRUCTION  OF  PEACE 

happen  if  they  did  fail  is  superfluous.  The 
real  question  is,  What  is  America's  duty? 
and  it  is  not  answered  by  a  dogmatic  asser- 
tion that  America  must  make  herself  respon- 
sible for  the  future  peace  of  the  whole  world, 
which  may  be  beyond  her  powers  of  accom- 
plishment. Her  plain  duty  is  to  do  now  what 
she  can  do,  which  is  by  loyal  cooperation  with 
her  allies  to  impose  and  maintain  immediate 
peace  on  a  common  enemy  growing  every 
day  more  dangerous. 

The  President  has  never  frankly  spoken  of 
the  Powers  with  whom  we  have  together 
fought  in  this  war  as  our  "allies."  For  a 
long  time  he  was  in  a  state  of  cold  neutrality 
regarding  them.  Gradually  they  became  in 
his  mind  "associates,"  but  they  have  never 
seemed  nearer  than  that ;  and  to-day  his  aim 
is  to  place  them,  after  this  intimate  compan- 
ionship in  action  and  suffering,  in  which  our 
soldiers  and  sailors  have  fought  side  by  side 
with  British,  and  French,  and  Belgian,  and 
Italian  combatants  to  win  a  common  cause, 
in  a  "general  association  of  nations"  to  which 
199 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

he  would  have  all  peoples  irrespective  of 
their  affinities  equally  belong. 

The  President's  mind  seems  always  to 
dwell  in  a  region  of  abstractions.  The  con- 
crete does  not  appeal  to  him.  Overlooking 
the  pressing  necessity  of  immediate  peace, 
the  one  imperative  duty  in  this  regard  has 
not  been  performed.  His  policy  has  been, 
and  is,  world  reconstruction  first  and  peace 
afterward.  This  policy  has  obstructed  and 
prevented  the  action  by  the  Entente  Allies 
that  should  have  been  taken,  and  would  have 
been  taken,  but  for  his  personal  interference. 
It  was  the  right  of  the  Entente  Allies,  as 
victors,  to  impose  an  immediate  peace  upon 
the  enemy;  and  it  was  the  duty  of  the  United 
States  not  only  to  aid  in  this,  but  to  secure 
the  execution  and  preservation  of  the  peace 
after  the  treaty  of  peace  was  signed.  It 
could  not  then  be  said  of  it,  as  the  President 
says,  that  such  a  treaty  would  be  a  "scrap 
of  paper." 

If,  in  November,  1918,  when  the  German 
armies  were  defeated  in  the  field  and  called 
for  an  armistice,  a  peace  had  been  signed 
200 


THE  OBSTRUCTION  OF  PEACE 

during  that  month  at  Berlin,  Germany  and 
her  allies  would  have  known  that  they  were 
beaten,  and  that  the  terms  insuring  a  Euro- 
pean peace  would  be  imposed  and  would 
have  to  be  carried  out.  Among  those  terms 
it  would  have  been  proper  to  include  this: 
that  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Central 
Powers  or  their  allies  to  make  an  unprovoked 
attack  upon  any  of  the  Entente  Powers 
would  be  regarded  as  an  attack  upon  all,  in- 
cluding the  United  States.  That  would  have 
been  the  honorable  way  for  America  to  have 
treated  her  co-belligerents  in  the  war  against 
a  common  enemy,  and  that  alone  would 
have  been  sufficient  to  dispel  all  thoughts  of 
war  for  a  long  time  to  come.  Peace  once 
secured,  the  new  nationalities  would  have 
had  an  opportunity  to  complete  their  organi- 
zation under  conditions  of  peace,  and  Rus- 
sian Bolshevism  could  have  been  taken  in 
hand  and  suppressed  by  a  united  Europe. 
France  would  have  been  made  at  once  secure. 
Without  this,  the  war  has  been  virtually  lost. 
That  security  was  the  first  and  most  pressing 
problem,  and  it  is  still  unsolved. 
201 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

And  what  is  the  situation  that  has  been 
allowed  to  develop?  I  quote  the  words  of 
one  of  the  most  candid  and  best  informed 
observers  of  the  proceedings  of  the  Peace 
Conference  now  in  Paris.  "Mr.  Wilson  came 
to  Paris,"  says  Mr.  Frank  H.  Simonds, 
"resolved  that  there  should  be  a  league 
of  nations.  .  .  .  Finding  French  interest 
and  French  attention  fixed  upon  the  salva- 
tion of  France  rather  than  upon  the  formula- 
tion of  the  principles  of  a  league  of  nations, 
Mr.  Wilson  and  those  associated  with  him 
were  not  successful  in  concealing  their  dis- 
appointment or  their  disapproval  of  what 
seemed  to  them  a  particularistic  national 
policy.  When  France  as  a  whole  asked  Mr. 
Wilson  to  go  and  see  her  devastated  regions, 
that  he  might  understand  her  heart,  he  re- 
turned a  cold  and  unequivocal  negative.  I 
do  not  think  that  any  single  act  of  any  man 
ever  carried  with  it  profounder  disappoint- 
ment than  Mr.  Wilson's  refusal  to  go  to»the 
northern  regions  and  see  what  the  boche  had 
done. 

"And  we  have  had  week  after  week,  a 
202 


THE  OBSTRUCTION  OF  PEACE 

slow  but  sure  change  in  French  emotion  with 
respect  to  the  President.  He  was  hailed  by 
the  little  people  of  France  as  a  savior.  He 
was  hailed  as  a  man  who  came  from  another 
world  to  deliver  France  and  other  peoples  of 
the  world  from  the  shadow  of  tragedy  which 
had  been,  and  little  by  little  his  course  here 
had  the  effect  at  least  of  creating  the  impres- 
sion that  he  cared  nothing  for  the  life  or 
death  of  France,  that  he  was  not  concerned 
with  those  things  which  the  tragic  years  of 
war  had  burned  into  the  soul  of  every  French 
man  and  woman. 

"I  do  not  think  it  possible  accurately  to 
represent  how  profound  was  the  disappoint- 
ment of  France  at  this  course  of  the  Ameri- 
can President.  A  sense  first  of  desertion 
and  then  of  utter  isolation  crept  into  the 
French  heart,  as  more  and  more  the  Ameri- 
can attitude  toward  France  passed  from 
mere  coldness  with  respect  of  French  neces- 
sities to  open  criticism  and  hardly  concealed 
suspicion.  I  do  not  think  one  would  exag- 
gerate by  saying  that  three  months  ago 
France  believed  the  war  won  and  to-day,  as 
203 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

a  result  of  what  has  occurred  here  in  the 
peace  conference,  there  is  something  amount- 
ing to  real  terror  lest  the  war  shall  be  lost 
after  all,  and  France  left  alone  again  across 
the  pathway  of  a  Germany  increased  in 
power  and  population  by  the  last  war." 

These  words  were  received  from  Paris  on 
the  very  day  when  the  President  was  deliv- 
ering his  speech  in  Boston,  in  which  there 
was  not  one  word  regarding  the  sufferings 
and  peril  of  France,  but  the  intimation  of 
changes  of  government  in  Europe,  if  a 
"League"  was  not  accepted.  At  the  same 
time  the  newspapers  were  informing  us  that 
the  Constitution  finally  assented  to  as  a  pro- 
ject for  a  "League"  is  by  no  means  a  spon- 
taneous embodiment  of  the  desires  of  the 
fourteen  nations  alleged  to  have  adopted  it. 
We  were  assured  that  the  "League"  had 
been  "on  the  rocks,"  because  Monsieur  Cle- 
menceau  had  urged  that  France  could  not 
subscribe  to  a  compact  that  did  not  offer  her 
security;  whereupon  the  situation  for  the 
"League"  was  saved  by  an  American  diplo- 
mat's sending  for  Monsieur  Bourgeois  and 
204 


THE  OBSTRUCTION  OF  PEACE 

saying  to  him  "that  President  Wilson  was 
very  near  the  limit  of  his  patience  in  the  mat- 
ter," was  very  much  chagrined  by  the  atti- 
tude of  the  French  press,  which  was  plead- 
ing for  the  security  of  France,  and  would 
perhaps  drop  the  whole  question  of  a 
"League  of  Nations."  It  was  then  put 
squarely  to  Monsieur  Bourgeois  that  he 
would  have  to  decide  between  this  compact 
and  no  "League"  at  all.  After  consulting 
Monsieur  Clemenceau,  Monsieur  Bourgeois 
reported  his  reluctant  acceptance  of  the  pro- 
posed covenant  rather  than  permit  France 
to  be  thus  deprived  of  the  goodwill  of 
America. 

It  is  known  that  when  the  President  went 
to  Europe  the  main  object  of  his  going  was 
that  he  might  be  able  to  say  privately  what 
he  did  not  wish  to  write  or  to  discuss  openly. 
He  had  in  mind  a  program  of  universal  peace 
which  he  had  gradually  thought  out  in  isola- 
tion without  giving  it  full  publicity,  based 
on  the  conception  of  a  "League  of  Nations," 
a  project  which  had  been  strongly  advocated 
for  some  years  by  the  "League  to  Enforce 
205 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Peace."  Such  a  "League,"  as  foreshadowed 
by  the  President  in  his  public  speeches,  in- 
volved a  "general  association  of  nations" 
that  would  mutually  guarantee  the  independ- 
ence and  the  territorial  integrity  of  all  its 
members ;  that  would  secure  freedom  of  navi- 
gation upon  the  seas,  alike  in  peace  and  war ; 
and  that,  by  the  removal  of  economic  bar- 
riers, would  establish  equality  of  trade  condi- 
tions for  all  nations. 

At  the  time  this  idea  of  a  "League"  was 
conceived,  it  was  intended  as  a  medium  for 
reconciling  the  differences  made  prominent 
in  the  Great  War  by  securing  a  compromise 
peace  which  might  afterward  be  made  the 
basis  of  a  permanent  peace.  This  was  the 
inner  meaning  of  the  "fourteen  points." 
These  rubrics  were  formulated  at  a  time 
when  victory  on  either  side  was  thought  by 
the  President  to  be  still  doubtful,  and  when 
his  original  idea  of  "a  peace  without  victory" 
may  have  seemed  to  him  the  best  method  of 
demonstrating  the  utter  futility  of  war. 

The  problem  at  that  time  seemed  to  him  to 
be,  to  formulate  a  plan  that  could  be  ac- 
206 


THE  OBSTRUCTION  OF  PEACE 

cepted  by  both  sides  by  promising  to  secure 
in  the  future  the  most  important  interests  of 
all  the  belligerents.  The  wrong  done  to 
France  by  Prussia  in  1871  was  to  be  "righted 
in  order  that  peace  might  once  more  be  made 
secure  in  the  interest  of  all."  Belgium  was 
to  be  "evacuated  and  restored"  as  a  sover- 
eign State,  without  any  stipulation  of  indem- 
nity. In  return,  since  the  new  "association" 
was  to  be  "general,"  Germany  was  to  have  a 
place  in  it,  and  also  to  enjoy  the  status  quo 
determined  by  the  peace  after  surrendering 
the  conquered  territories,  together  with  all 
the  advantages  which  the  plan  implied.  Great 
Britain  was  to  abandon  her  naval  supremacy 
under  the  protection  of  the  "League."  Ar- 
maments were  to  be  reduced  to  the  lowest 
point  consistent  with  domestic  safety.  A 
free,  open-minded,  and  absolutely  impartial 
judgment  of  all  colonial  claims  was  to  be 
assured,  based  upon  a  strict  observance  of 
the  principle  that  in  determining  all  such 
questions  of  sovereignty  the  interests  of  the 
populations  concerned  must  have  equal 
207 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLIQY 

weight  with  the  claims  of  the  government 
whose  title  is  to  be  determined. 

Thus,  it  was  imagined,  the  gates  of  the 
temple  of  Janus  would  be  permanently 
closed.  There  would  never  be  any  more  war, 
because  there  would  remain  no  just  causes 
for  war.  As  to  the  unjust  ambitions  of 
nations,  these  would  of  course  wholly  disap- 
pear! 

As  a  plan  for  universal  and  permanent 
peace,  this  is  comparable  with  the  great  pro- 
posal attributed  by  Sully  to  Henry  IV  of 
France,  and  should  no  doubt  appeal  to  the 
imagination  and  the  sympathies  of  peace- 
loving  men  in  a  similar  manner;  but,  like 
that  and  other  great  and  noble  conceptions 
of  world  reorganization,  its  defect  was  that 
it  did  not  reckon  with  the  fact  that  no  Great 
Power  was  ready  to  accept  it  in  its  entirety 
except  as  the  result  of  military  defeat. 

The  truth  of  this  last  statement  is  demon- 
strated by  the  events  which  have  followed. 
When  the  fourteen  rubrics  of  peace  were 
proposed,  in  January,  1918,  seeing  that  they 
embodied  a  purely  mediatory  proposal,  Ger- 
208 


THE  OBSTRUCTION  OF  PEACE 

many  was  ready  to  accept  five  of  the  four- 
teen points,  but  these  were  the  five  that  the 
Entente  Allies  were  not  willing  to  accept  be- 
cause they  implied  that  Germany  was  to  be 
treated  and  trusted  as  if  she  were  a  just  and 
pacific  nation.  In  October,  1918,  when  the 
certainty  of  her  defeat  dawned  upon  her,  and 
her  allies  were  failing  her,  Germany,  in  the 
belief  that  all  fourteen  were  intended  in  a 
mediatorial  sense,  was  ready  to  accept  them 
all  "as  a  basis  for  discussion."  The  Entente 
Allies  when  invited,  not  wishing  to  alienate 
the  President,  whose  support  was  necessary 
in  the  war,  also  accepted  them  with  one  ex- 
ception, in  the  belief  that  the  conditions  of 
the  armistice  would  be  sufficiently  strong  to 
show  that  a  victory  had  been  won,  and  on 
that  basis  peace  was  possible  with  honor. 

When  the  President  went  to  Europe,  he 
hoped  to  persuade  the  Entente  Allies  to  ac- 
cept his  entire  plan.  He  intended  to  con- 
vince the  British  Government  that  it  would 
be  in  the  interest  of  Great  Britain  to  accept 
his  idea  of  the  "freedom  of  the  seas"  under 
international  control,  for  if  this  were  not 
209 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

accepted,  the  United  States  would  in  future 
prepare  to  hold  the  supremacy  of  the  seas; 
and,  to  impress  this  point,  he  directed  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  propose  immedi- 
ately an  extensive  programme  of  naval  con- 
struction, and  through  him  exhorted  Con- 
gress to  hasten  in  passing  the  necessary  leg- 
islation, subject  to  its  non-execution  if  the 
"League"  were  formed. 

If  the  British  Government  had  resented 
this  proposal,  the  consequences  to  the 
Entente  would  have  been  serious,  indeed, 
but,  retorting  that,  as  the  two  nations  were 
fast  and  inseparable  friends,  the  building  of 
a  greater  navy  by  the  United  States  would 
afford  to  Great  Britain  a  new  sense  of 
security,  the  agile-minded  Premier  convinced 
the  President  that  British  sea-power  could 
not  be  a  menace  to  neutral  nations,  since, 
under  the  "League"  there  would  be  no  neu- 
trals in  any  war  in  which  Great  Britain 
could  engage ;  and  the  President  is  reported 
to  have  declared  that  "the  joke  was  on  him 
for  not  thinking  of  this,"  and  the  "freedom 
of  the  seas"  is  thus  settled! 
210 


THE  OBSTRUCTION  OF  PEACE 

With  regard  to  the  "general  association" 
promised  in  the  fourteenth  point  of  the  Pres- 
ident's peace  programme,  a  similar  renun- 
ciation has  been  made,  as  it  was  certain  from 
the  beginning  it  would  have  to  be.  Nothing 
could  induce  France,  after  what  she  has  en- 
dured, to  enter  any  "general  association"  of 
which  Germany  is  a  member ;  and  of  course 
Russia, — although  arrangements  were  made 
to  negotiate  with  the  Bolsheviki,  in  spite  of 
Monsieur  Clemenceau's  declaration  that 
France  would  never  associate  with  assassins, 
— could  not  be  included.  Germany's  recent 
allies  will  also,  no  doubt,  if  the  "League" 
comes  into  being,  and  probably  some  other 
Powers,  have  to  sit  a  long  time  in  the  ante- 
room, even  if  they  are  on  the  waiting  list. 
As  a  scheme  of  world  organization,  therefore, 
the  President's  plan  is  far  from  being  ac- 
cepted, although  so  recently  as  his  speech  in 
Manchester  on  December  30th,  he  voiced  his 
conception  of  what  the  "League"  should  be 
in  the  words :  "If  the  future  had  nothing  for 
us  but  a  new  attempt  to  keep  the  world  at 
a  right  poise  by  a  balance  of  power,  the 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

United  States  would  take  no  interest,  be- 
cause she  will  join  no  combination  of  Powers 
which  is  not  a  combination  of  all  of  us." 

It  is  precisely  such  a  combination  as  he 
here  repudiates  which  the  President  now  in- 
sists it  is  our  sacred  duty  to  join,  or  remain 
"selfish  and  provincial."  It  is  Monsieur 
Clemenceau  who  has  had  his  way  regarding 
the  "balance  of  power" ;  for  the  "League,"  as 
the  President  represents,  would  be  "a  scrap 
of  paper"  if  the  power  of  the  United  States 
were  not  thrown  into  the  scale  to  render  pre- 
ponderant this  combination  of  four  Great 
Powers  and  some  little  ones,  which  latter 
will  need  but  not  afford  protection. 

From  the  moment  when  the  President  saw 
the  "joke"  regarding  British  naval  suprem- 
acy, the  British  Government  became  as 
eager  for  the  "League"  as  the  President  had 
been.  In  this  the  Government  was  joined 
by  the  British  press  and  British  public  opin- 
ion, for  it  was  seen  that  the  adherence  to 
such  a  combination,  with  the  United  States 
as  a  member,"  would  create  a  preponderant 
balance  of  power.  With  an  American  alli- 


THE  OBSTRUCTION  OF  PEACE 

ance  in  which  the  United  States  would  as- 
sume equal  responsibility  with  the  European 
Entente  Powers  for  the  peace  and  control  of 
the  rest  of  Europe,  a  "League"  would  un- 
doubtedly be  a  great  security  to  them  all. 
It  would,  in  effect,  place  the  balance  of 
power  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  "League." 
It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  Great 
Britain,  with  vast  imperial  interests  in  every 
part  of  the  world  exposed  to  attack,  should 
become  an  eager  advocate  of  the  proposed 
combination.  Retaining  her  naval  suprem- 
acy, acquiring  no  new  obligations,  and  re- 
lieved of  a  share  of  her  responsibility,  Great 
Britain  is  much  interested  in  bringing  the 
"League"  into  being.  General  Smuts,  a 
former  Boer  officer  who  had  become  an  ar- 
dent imperialist,  in  order  to  satisfy  the  Presi- 
dent's desire  for  a  "League"  of  some  kind, 
had  made  ready  for  use  in  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence a  detailed  plan  that  would  be  acceptable 
to  Great  Britain.  That  plan,  which  con- 
tained a  provision  for  the  administration  of 
the  colonies  conquered  from  Germany,  now 
figures  more  largely  in  the  proposed  "Con- 
213 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

stitution  of  a  League  of  Nations"  than  any 
other.  The  idea  of  administration  by  "Man- 
dataries" ingeniously  extricates  those  who 
have  taken  the  German  colonies  from  the 
dilemma  of  either  stultifying  their  claims  to 
democracy  by  annexing  them  outright  or 
returning  them  to  Germany,  by  placing  them 
under  the  administration — temporary,  no 
doubt — of  other  Powers,  preferably  of  the 
United  States,  which  would  thus  be  drawn 
into  the  complications  of  a  joint  imperialism 
in  distant  parts  of  the  world. 

It  is  quite  intelligible  that,  although  it  was 
assumed  in  Europe  that  the  President  speaks 
with  authority  for  the  purpose  and  policy  of 
the  United  States,  there  is  in  this  country 
no  corresponding  unanimity  regarding  the 
obligations  which  the  United  States  should 
undertake  to  assume  in  remote  and  turbulent 
parts  of  Europe,  Asia,  and  Africa,  or  the 
islands  of  the  Pacific. 

In  the  United  States  it  is  clearly  perceived 
that  we  should  be  an  unequal  partner  in  the 
combination  that  is  proposed;  and  the  Presi- 
dent not  only  admits  this,  but  urges  it  as  a 


THE  OBSTRUCTION  OF  PEACE 

reason  for  our  accepting  new  and  unpredict- 
able responsibilities. 

In  stating  the  case  thus  candidly,  there  is 
no  intention  to  disregard  the  strong  friend- 
ship which  has  grown  up  with  Great  Britain 
during  the  latter  years  of  the  war.  On  the 
contrary,  it  is  timely  to  emphasize  the  wish 
that  this  friendship  may  always  continue  to 
be  close,  loyal,  and  permanent;  but  it  is  the 
part  of  wisdom  to  avoid  those  complications 
which,  in  circumstances  that  may  arise,  might 
tend  to  alienate  two  great  nations  by  too 
close  an  intimacy  in  affairs  that  separately 
concern  them.  Great  Britain  and  America 
have  many  great  interests,  as  well  as  many 
strong  bonds  of  sympathy  and  understand- 
ing, in  common.  We  have  among  the 
nations  no  better  friend,  unless  it  is  France, 
for  which  we  have  a  particular  affection  of 
long  date  and  recent  demonstration.  The 
British  fleet,  it  is  true,  annoyed  our  ship- 
ping and  embarrassed  our  trade  early  in  the 
war,  but  before  the  war  was  ended  it  became 
our  faithful  protector  and  co-partner.  Any- 
where in  the  world,  on  sea  or  land,  we  feel 
215 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

safe  where  the  British  flag  floats  over  us,  and 
we  should  not  wish  to  see  it  lowered.  But  be- 
fore we  could  agree  that  we  would  send  our 
sons  and  brothers  across  the  seas  to  fight  to 
keep  it  wherever  it  floats  outside  Great  Brit- 
ain itself, — which  to  many  of  us  is  a  mother- 
land,— we  should  have  to  ask  ourselves 
whether  we  or  our  fathers  would  have  fought 
to  place  it  everywhere  in  the  world  where  the 
policy  of  the  British  Empire  has  carried  it. 

Nations  and  governments,  like  individuals, 
from  their  very  nature,  must  limit  their 
responsibilities.  Without  this  they  weaken 
and  destroy  their  own  capacity  for  useful- 
ness. It  is  necessary  to  be  strong  before  we 
can  help  the  weak,  and  we  render  no  real 
service  to  those  for  whom  we  become  entirely 
responsible.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  we 
ought  not  as  a  nation  to  permit  ourselves  to 
be  influenced  by  an  appeal  to  our  national 
pride  or  the  personal  sentiments  which  might 
properly  control  us  in  affairs  of  a  private 
nature. 

The  personal  experience  of  the  President 
during  his  unprecedented  ovation  in  Europe, 
216 


THE  OBSTRUCTION  OF  PEACE 

as  the  head  of  a  nation  that  turned  the  scale 
in  the  war,  is  of  a  kind  that  appeals  power- 
fully to  the  emotional  element  in  his  nature. 
He  has  led  the  Entente  nations  to  expect 
great  things  of  America,  and  he  undoubtedly 
feels  responsible  for  realizing  these  expecta- 
tions. He  has  held  up  to  enraptured  audi- 
ences that  have  thronged  to  see  and  hear  him 
the  vision  of  a  reconstructed  world.  Natur- 
ally they  have  had  faith  in  him.  They  were 
longing  for  peace,  and  he  has  pictured  to 
them  Utopia.  He  returned  to  America  with 
a  demand  for  the  realization  of  his  promises. 
The  urgent  appeal  to  the  United  States  to 
adhere  to  a  "League"  without  debate,  with- 
out hesitation,  and  without  regard  to  any 
question  of  national  interest  or  expediency, 
is  the  almost  necessary  psychological  conse- 
quence of  the  President's  self-imposed  activ- 
ity. The  Covenant  presented  for  adoption 
is  not,  it  is  true,  the  realization  of  his  original 
purpose;  but  it  is  a  result  of  it, — the  near- 
est approach  to  it  that  he  could  achieve.  To 
reject  it  utterly  would  be  a  repudiation  of 
his  leadership.  The  acceptance  of  it,  at  least 
217 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

in  substance,  is  necessary  to  his  prestige.  It 
is  for  this  that  his  "fighting  blood"  is  aroused. 
It  is  for  this  that  the  President's  public  and 
his  still  more  fervid  and  less  parliamentary 
private  denunciations  of  all  critics  and  oppo- 
nents, have  seemed  to  him  justified.  The 
role  must  be  carried  to  its  logical  conclusion. 

In  commending  immediate  action  the 
President  employs  none  of  the  arguments 
which  would  be  expected  of  a  statesman. 
He  has  found  in  Europe,  he  reports,  a  gen- 
eral confidence  in  the  disinterestedness  of 
America  as  a  country  of  great  ideals.  This 
is  the  chief  impression  of  his  experience.  He 
said  to  his  Boston  audience:  "Every  interest 
seeks  out  first  of  all,  when  it  reaches  Paris, 
the  representatives  of  the  United  States. 
Why?  Because — and  I  think  I  am  stating 
the  most  wonderful  fact  in  history — because 
there  is  no  nation  in  Europe  that  suspects  the 
motives  of  the  United  States." 

It   is    frankly    admitted    that    all    other 

nations    have    "interests,"    that    they    are 

objects  of  contention  among  themselves,  and 

that  all  these  nations  turn  to  the  United 

218 


THE  OBSTRUCTION  OF  PEACE 

States  as  a  great  disinterested  benefactor. 
The  United  States  alone  is  presumed  to  have 
no  interests,  or  to  act  without  regard  to  them. 
The  President  never  mentions  them.  He 
even  scorns  a  reference  to  them.  His  appeal 
to  the  country  is  as  emotional  as  his  experi- 
ence has  been.  We  should,  he  affirms,  act  in 
this  great  emergency  "without  regard  to  the 
things  that  may  be  debated  as  expedient." 
There  is  grave  danger  to  our  national  life 
in  resting  a  decision  upon  an  appeal  to  the 
emotions  of  the  people.  In  the  past  our 
statesmen  have  not  hesitated  to  defend  the 
national  interests  entrusted  to  their  keep- 
ing. These  interests  are  now  deliberately  ex- 
cluded from  view  and  sunk  in  the  advocacy 
of  a  vague  internationalism.  This  is  pro- 
posed ostensibly  in  behalf  of  "peace,"  but 
it  will  have  other  consequences.  The  pros- 
pect is  confessedly  one  of  interminable  sus- 
picion, intervention,  and  restricted  independ- 
ence. In  the  end,  nations  will  settle  their 
differences  in  the  manner  that  seems  to  them 
at  the  time  in  accordance  with  their  highest 
interest.  Nothing  can  more  effectually 
219 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

breed  strife  than  to  mix  them  up  in  one  an- 
other's disputes, — disputes  which,  if  the 
nations  desire  mediation,  can  be  more  readily 
composed  by  a  free,  strong,  united,  and  in- 
dependent America,  whose  word  of  counsel 
would  be  listened  to,  than  by  an  America 
bound  to  the  control  of  a  group  of  Powers, 
constituting  perhaps  a  third  of  Europe,  in 
which  her  voice  would  be  drowned  in  the  gen- 
eral clamor. 

We  have,  of  course,  a  great  interest  in 
peace.  We  have  a  special  and  immediate  in- 
terest in  a  conclusive  and  permanent  settle- 
ment of  the  actual  issues  of  the  war,  in  which 
our  honor  as  well  as  our  interests  as  a  nation 
is  bound  up.  We  cannot  without  disloyalty 
desert  our  allies  so  long  as  we  have  a  com- 
mon enemy,  but  this  does  not  make  it  neces- 
sary to  assume  new  obligations  in  other  parts 
of  the  world.  Unless  we  assume  these,  the 
President  assures  us,  America  "will  have  to 
keep  her  power  for  those  narrow,  selfish,  pro- 
vincial purposes  which  seem  so  dear  to  some 
minds  that  have  no  sweep  beyond  the  nearest 
horizon." 

220 


THE  OBSTRUCTION  OF  PEACE 

It  is  difficult  to  see  the  reason  for  this  re- 
proach, and  it  is  little  short  of  exasperating 
to  those  who  saw  America's  duty  and  urged 
the  performance  of  it  long  before  the  Presi- 
dent's vision  had  swept  beyond  the  nearest 
horizon,  when  he  was  urging  neutrality  in  the 
midst  of  international  outrage,  not  only  on 
the  part  of  the  Government,  but  in  the 
thoughts  as  well  as  the  deeds  of  citizens; 
when  he  was  still  asking  what  the  war  was 
about,  and  declaring  that  we  had  nothing  to 
do  with  its  causes  or  its  results;  when  he  was 
advising  a  peace  without  victory;  when  he 
was  elected  to  the  presidency  because  he  had 
kept  us  out  of  war ;  when  he  was  still  regard- 
ing strict  accountability  as  implying  nothing 
more  than  liability  to  pay  a  money  indemnity 
for  American  lives,  destroyed  ruthlessly  in 
violation  of  International  Law  and  every 
instinct  of  humanity,  and  yet  did  not  see  that 
preparation  for  war  alone  could  rescue  the 
nation  from  contempt.  It  is,  therefore,  im- 
possible not  to  resent  the  attempt  by  mere 
rhetoric  and  insinuation  to  silence  the  free 
speech  of  men  who  are  entitled  to  be  heard 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

on  international  and  constitutional  questions 
affecting  the  destiny  of  the  nation  and  its 
unveiled  future  by  a  public  reference  to  them 
as  "minds  that  have  no  sweep  beyond  the 
nearest  horizon" ;  even  when  this  is  spoken  by 
the  President  of  the  United  States. 

It  is  not  the  path  of  peace  that  is  being 
pursued,  but  a  course  that  is  obstructive  of 
peace.  The  Entente  that  has  saved  Europe 
has  been  strained  by  the  introduction  of  new 
and  irrelevant  issues,  many  months  have  been 
consumed  in  deliberations  and  journeys  not 
related  to  the  ending  of  the  war,  and  the 
American  people  are  in  danger  of  being  seri- 
ously divided  over  a  question  that  can  be 
rightly  settled  only  on  the  basis  of  an  exist- 
ing peace,  when  they  may  act  with  freedom 
and  not  under  compulsion.  If  the  world  is 
to  be  made  safe  for  free  nations,  it  will  be 
by  an  Entente  of  Free  Nations.  While  that 
lasts  there  is  hope ;  but  if  that  ceases  to  exist, 
hope  will  have  departed.  The  moment  bonds 
are  felt  they  will  destroy  the  power  that  has 
won  the  war.  By  whatever  name  it  is  called, 
there  is  no  third  condition  between  super- 


THE  OBSTRUCTION  OF  PEACE 

government  and  the  independence  of  free 
peoples.  Discussion  over  speculations  about 
such  a  possibility  are  but  a  waste  of  time, 
for  the  free  nations  do  not  desire  a  super- 
government.  There  remains,  therefore, 
no  possibility  but  an  Entente  of  Free  Na- 
tions, however  it  may  be  named,  and  our 
one  solicitude  should  be  that  it  be  not  de- 
stroyed. 

To  the  word  * 'League"  there  is  in  itself  no 
objection,  except  to  the  bondage  which  the 
word  implies.  For  the  improvement  and 
enforcement  of  International  Law,  for  the 
pacific  settlement  of  disputes,  for  aid  to  free 
nations  exposed  to  danger,  for  the  suppres- 
sion of  Bolshevism,  and  for  international 
bodies  to  deal  with  these  subjects,  there  is 
great  need.  But  these  ends  cannot  be  ac- 
complished by  mere  paper  machinery,  which 
presents  only  a  new  cause  of  disagreement, 
— a  new  occasion  for  difference  of  opinion 
and  of  strife.  If  the  ideals  of  civilization  are 
not  safe  in  the  hands  of  the  free  nations,  act- 
ing freely,  they  will  remain  in  danger.  What 


,       PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

happens  in  the  future  will  depend  upon  what 
the  free  nations  will  to  do ;  and  the  essential 
element  in  their  unity,  their  security,  and 
their  effective  cooperation  is  precisely  their 
freedom. 


VII 

THE    DEBACLE    OF    DOGMATISM 

ALTHOUGH  during  four  months  of  secret 
negotiation  American  public  opinion  on  the 
League  of  Nations  remained  unsolicited, 
America  has  at  last  spoken.  Whatever  the 
outward  form  of  words  may  be,  her  voice  is 
clearly  against  super-national  government 
and  for  an  Entente  of  Free  Nations.  The 
unpledged  press  and  the  great  hierophants  of 
party  opposition  have  condemned  the  Con- 
stitution of  a  League  of  Nations  as  it  was  in- 
cubated at  Paris,  and  have  demanded  radical 
changes  as  a  condition  of  American  support. 
Every  interpretation  by  its  advocates  and 
every  amendment  proposed  by  its  critics  has 
tended  to  abolish  the  "League"  and  restore 
the  "Entente."1 

1  See  the  amendments  proposed  at  the  end  of  this  volume 
and  compare  the  original  draft  with  the  final  draft  of  the 
"Covenant." 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

When  it  was  first  published  it  seemed  that 
the  "Constitution"  was  intended  not  to  so- 
licit the  cooperation  of  the  nations  to  be 
included  under  it,  but  by  their  agreement  to 
command  their  future  action.  Assailed  as  a 
super-government,  it  was  pleaded  by  its  de- 
fenders that  it  was  not  a  government  at  all, 
but  a  kind  of  international  social  club,  whose 
Executive  Council  possessed  no  real  author- 
ity, and  whose  sole  function  was  to  make 
"recommendations,"  which  might  be  ac- 
cepted or  rejected.  This  defense  reduced  it 
to  something  less  than  an  Entente,  because 
it  threw  doubt  upon  its  sincerity  of  purpose. 

Instead  of  treating  the  "Constitution"  as 
meaningless  for  a  real  community  of  action, 
the  critics  sought  to  endow  it  with  real  ob- 
ligations, by  pruning  its  pretences  and  mak- 
ing it  effective  for  some  at  least  of  its  alleged 
purposes.  It  remains  for  the  world  to  judge 
who  were  the  sincere  friends  of  peace;  and 
especially  of  a  peace  to  end  the  war  in  such 
a  way  that  the  treaty  of  peace,  when  secured, 
would  unquestionably  be  enforced. 

Had  some  open  process  of  this  kind  been 
226 


THE  DEBACLE  OF  DOGMATISM 

adopted  in  the  beginning,  it  would  without 
doubt  have  saved  much  precious  time.  If  it 
were  in  the  order  of  the  day  to  continue  it 
deliberately  after  an  actual  peace  had  been 
declared  upon  conditions  that  would  render 
discussion  wholly  free  and  entirely  amicable, 
the  result  would  be  better  still.  Neverthe- 
less, the  chances  for  the  Entente  of  Free 
Nations  are  to  some  degree  improved  even 
by  the  tardy  and  reluctant  concession  that 
the  document  alleged  to  have  been  "agreed 
upon"  and  to  be  "unalterable"  was  not  too 
perfect  to  be  publicly  discussed. 

It  may  not  perhaps  be  too  late,  now  that 
public  debate  is  not  openly  proscribed  as  a 
manifestation  of  hostility  to  peace,  to  con- 
sider, at  least  in  an  academic  manner,  some 
of  the  provisions  which  it  would  still  be  de- 
sirable to  eliminate  from  this  document  and 
some  of  the  methods  which  it  would  be 
profitable  to  abandon. 

The  Peace  Conference  at  Paris  has  suf- 
fered from  too  much  theory  and  too  little 
regard  to  practical  results.  In  the  mean- 
time, while  the  delegates  have  been  preoccu- 
237 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

pied  with  devising  defenses  against  the  con- 
sequences of  a  remote  future,  events  have  oc- 
curred of  which  they  have  seemed  uncon- 
scious, and  the  irrepressible  stream  of  human 
activities  still  flows  irresistibly  onward.  Oc- 
currences have  at  last  reached  a  point  where 
action  must  take  the  place  of  meditation,  or 
victory  will  be  transformed  into  defeat. 

The  theory  underlying  the  Conference  has 
been  that  all  possible  future  wars  must  be 
prevented  now;  and  that,  unless  this  could 
be  done  immediately,  the  present  war  could 
not  be  ended.  In  other  words,  the  League  of 
Nations,  it  was  held,  must  of  necessity  be  a 
part  of  any  treaty  of  peace. 

This  theory  dates  from  the  attempt  to 
prepare  a  compromise  peace  by  creating  a 
future  situation  with  which  all  the  belliger- 
ents would  be  satisfied.  It  rests  upon  the 
assumption  that  while  governments  are  often 
bad,  peoples  are  always  perfectly  good ;  and 
that,  if  the  governments  could  be  overthrown 
and  the  peoples  could  have  their  way,  there 
would  never  be  any  more  war  in  the  world. 

As  a  proposition  in  political  philosophy 
228 


THE  DEBACLE  OF  DOGMATISM 

this  doctrine  has  never  yet  been  proved  to  be 
true.  In  the  belief  of  many  it  is  not  only 
incapable  of  such  proof  but  is  erroneous.  If 
it  were  true,  we  should  be  able  in  a  very  short 
time  to  secure  universal  peace  by  a  general 
plebiscite.  The  truth  is  that  all  nations  want 
peace,  but  they  want  it  in  their  own  way; 
and,  as  their  own  ways  differ,  they  are  not 
likely  to  consent  to  perpetual  peace  until 
there  is  created  a  common  interest  so  great 
that,  to  secure  it,  they  are  willing  to  forego 
all  less  urgent  aspirations.  The  realization 
of  such  a  community  of  interest  as  this  is 
undoubtedly  an  ideal  to  be  aimed  at ;  and,  in 
time,  it  may  be  possible  to  attain  it.  It  is, 
however,  an  obvious  error  to  insist  that  such 
a  community  of  interest  must  be  made  uni- 
versal before  an  existing  common  interest  in 
a  narrower  field  can  be  utilized  as  a  basis  for  a 
peace  of  victory,  in  which  aggression  against 
public  right  has  been  overborne  and  the  ag- 
gressor is  rendered  powerless.  For  unless 
actual  aggression  is  defeated,  is  made  con- 
scious of  its  defeat,  and  is  caused  to  suffer 
the  consequences  of  it,  peace  becomes  a  mock- 
229 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ery.  A  distinction  must  be  made  between  a 
compromise  peace,  in  which  the  aggressor  is 
treated  as  an  equal,  and  a  peace  of  victory, 
in  which  he  must  pay  the  penalty  of  his  of- 
fense ;  or  war  would  become  a  recognized  in- 
nocent diversion  and  peace  the  mere  play- 
thing of  participants  in  a  rude  and  danger- 
ous game  of  chance.  To  state  the  matter 
concretely,  unless  the  Central  Powers  and 
their  allies  are  so  weakened  and  punished  for 
their  crimes  against  the  peace  of  the  world 
that  they  will  not  repeat  the  performance  at 
a  more  favorable  time,  the  war  has  been  lost 
to  the  Entente,  and  the  treaty  of  peace,  no 
matter  what  it  contains,  will  prove  inef- 
fectual. 

The  community  of  interest  on  which  the 
present  peace  should  be  made  is  the  defeat  of 
a  common  enemy.  When  that  peace  is  made 
there  will  be  a  long  period  of  comparative 
repose  during  which  the  larger  problem  of 
universal  and  permanent  peace  might  be  con- 
sidered. If,  however,  the  Entente  Allies 
cannot  impose  a  just  peace  in  the  concrete, 
230 


THE  DEBACLE  OF  DOGMATISM 

what  hope  is  there  that  they  can  forever 
maintain  it  in  the  abstract? 

The  truth  is  that  proposing  peace  in  gen- 
eral has  taken  the  place  of  imposing  peace 
in  the  actual  particular  situation  because  it 
was  easier  to  imagine  the  theoretical  potency 
of  a  League  of  Nations  than  it  was  to  deal 
with  realities.  As  a  result,  the  common  in- 
terest which  the  Entente  had  when  the 
armistice  was  signed  in  rendering  Germany 
powerless  for  harm  in  the  future,  has  been 
held  in  the  background  by  the  discussion  of 
a  theory,  while  the  separate  interests  of  the 
victors  in  the  war  have  seemed  to  most  of 
them  the  only  realities  with  which  the  Con- 
ference would  deal  or  which  its  conclusions 
would  affect.  Thus  Great  Britain  has 
thought  of  her  maritime  supremacy  and  her 
colonial  conquests,  France  of  her  future  ter- 
ritorial security,  Italy  of  the  control  of  the 
Adriatic,  Japan  of  her  Eastern  interests, 
Belgium  of  her  rehabilitation,  and  the  new 
nationalities  of  their  racial  integration  and 
safety  from  their  neighbors  old  and  new. 
The  representatives  of  the  United  States, 
231 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

on  the  other  hand,  having  nothing  to  ask  for 
except  the  adoption  of  their  theory  of  uni- 
versal peace,  have  held  a  position  of  influence 
which  enabled  them  to  say,  "The  League  of 
Nations  first,  and  peace  with  Germany 
afterward." 

The  inevitable  consequence  of  such  a  mise 
en  scene  of  the  Conference  was  delay,  the 
exaggeration  of  separate  interests,  and  an 
effort  to  make  the  League  serve,  as  far  as 
possible,  these  particular  national  aims, 
while  the  original  community  of  interest  in 
the  suppression  of  German  aggressiveness 
was  gradually  dissipated.  In  brief,  atten- 
tion to  Germany,  the  new  nationalities,  the 
rise  and  spread  of  Bolshevism,  the  growing 
menace  of  Russia  even  in  a  military  sense, 
was  withdrawn,  to  be  fixed  on  getting  into 
the  theory  of  the  League  something  besides 
abstractions.  This  has  been  in  part  accom- 
plished. Dogma  has  answered  to  dogma,  in- 
terest to  interest,  and  instead  of  a  pacifically 
disposed  general  society  of  nations  agreeing 
to  accept,  respect,  and  maintain  Inter- 
national Law  as  its  rule  of  conduct,  we  have 


THE  DEBACLE  OF  DOGMATISM 

an  organized  balance  of  power  only,  domi- 
nated by  five  Great  Powers,  whose  interests 
have  been  in  some  manner  incorporated  in 
a  Constitution  for  a  League  of  Nations; — 
all  except  those  of  the  United  States,  which 
seeks  nothing  but  the  realization  of  ideals! 
If  we  adopt  the  theory  that  a  League  is  a 
necessary  preliminary  to  a  peace  with  Ger- 
many, say  the  Entente  Allies,  America  must 
agree  to  defend  us  always  and  everywhere. 
That  is  Europe's  answer  to  the  President's 
insistence  on  a  League  as  a  preliminary  con- 
dition of  peace. 

The  President  went  to  Europe  with  an 
ideal.  Europe  welcomed  him  and  confronted 
him  with  the  result  of  its  experience.  To  this 
experience  his  ideal  has  had  to  adjust  itself. 
The  result  is  not  the  realization  of  his  expec- 
tations. He  sought  to  reconstruct  the  world. 
He  has  been  obliged  to  engage  his  country  in 
a  permanent  defensive  alliance  of  a  kind  that 
a  very  short  time  ago  he  expressly  repudi- 
ated, not  merely  because  it  is  contrary  to  the 
traditions  of  the  United  States,  but  as  he 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

emphatically  declared  because  it  is  incom- 
patible with  our  national  purpose. 

Only  four  years  ago  he  voiced  his  convic- 
tion by  saying:  "Every  man  who  stands  in 
this  presence  should  examine  himself  and 
see  whether  he  has  the  full  conception  of 
what  it  means  that  America  should  live  her 
own  life."  And,  referring  to  our  relations 
to  the  rest  of  the  world,  he  added: 

"It  was  not  merely  because  of  passing  and 
transient  circumstances  that  Washington 
said  we  must  keep  free  from  entangling  al- 
liances. It  was  because  he  saw  that  no 
country  had  yet  set  its  face  in  the  same  direc- 
tion in  which  America  had  set  her  face.  We 
cannot  form  alliances  with  those  who  are  not 
going  our  way;  and  in  our  might  and 
majesty  and  in  the  confidence  and  definite- 
ness  of  our  own  purpose  we  need  not  and  we 
should  not  form  alliances  with  any  nation 
in  the  world." 

At  that  time  the  President  spoke  in  words 

which  his  countrymen  understood.    During 

the  Great  War  he  gradually  saw  that  the 

United  States  could  not  remain  isolated  in 

234 


THE  DEBACLE  OF  DOGMATISM 

a  world  of  which  it  forms  a  part.  We  entered 
the  war,  as  our  honor  compelled  us  to  do. 
We  became  associated  with  Great  Powers  in 
Europe.  We  had  a  common  cause,  and  we 
fought  valiantly  with  them  against  a  com- 
mon enemy.  We  won  a  victory,  and  what 
was  demanded  was  a  peace  of  victory.  But 
the  President  had  set  his  mind  on  a  peace  of 
reconstruction.  America's  life  was  no 
longer  to  him  the  highest  purpose.  He 
wanted  to  be  the  creator  of  a  new  world. 

From  that  moment  the  President  no 
longer  represented  America.  He  was  the 
victim  of  his  obsession,  the  reconstructed 
world.  He  did  not  even  care  for  America's 
consent.  He  did  not  seek  it.  He  did  not 
desire  it.  His  mind  was  closed  to  it.  He 
had  a  doctrine  which  he  apparently  felt  he 
could  not  teach.  He  made  no  attempt  to 
teach  it.  He  was  resolved  to  enforce  it. 
Then  it  would  be  believed,  because  it  would 
be  no  longer  merely  an  idea,  it  would  be  a 
fact. 

Such  a  determination,  with  all  America 
apparently  behind  it — although  America  had 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

not  been  asked  to  speak — could  not  fail  to 
produce  some  result;  but  it  was  not  the  re- 
sult intended.  In  the  contest  between  the 
dogma  that  only  a  reconstructed  world 
could  make  peace  at  all  and  the  pressing 
necessity  that  peace  should  be  promptly 
made,  diplomacy  wrung  from  idealism  three 
concessions : 

(1)  Peace  is  to  be  guaranteed  to  the 
peacemakers  by  stereotyping  the  map  of  the 
world  as  they  will  make  it; 

(2)  Imperialism  may  pass  for  democracy 
by  becoming  international;  and 

(3)  Democratic  leadership  does  not  re- 
quire democratic  methods  of  procedure. 

The  President  accepted  these  results  and 
they  were  embodied  in  the  "Constitution" 
sent  from  Paris  and  pronounced  unalterable. 
But  American  public  opinion  was  yet  to  be 
learned;  and  American  public  opinion,  even 
that  most  favorable  to  a  League,  was  not  sat- 
isfied with  the  form  or  the  substance  of  this 
document. 

A  new  map  of  Europe  is  undoubtedly 
necessary  in  order  to  secure  the  safety  of  the 


THE  DEBACLE  OF  DOGMATISM 

countries  inclined  toward  peace  from  a  new 
outbreak  of  aggression;  but  the  Constitution 
of  a  League  of  Nations  is  not  satisfied  with 
this,  it  demands  that  the  boundaries  of  the 
States  which  are  members  of  the  League,  to- 
gether with  all  their  widely  scattered  colo- 
nial possessions,  shall  for  all  time  be  pro- 
tected by  all  the  associated  Powers.  This  is 
the  first  and  most  conspicuous  victory  of 
diplomacy  over  idealism. 

To  the  uninitiated  this  Constitution  is  the 
outgrowth  of  new  and  original  conceptions, 
arising  out  of  the  peculiar  circumstances  of 
recent  international  experience.  It  has  been 
heralded  as  the  application  of  the  Christian 
religion  to  the  problems  of  international  re- 
lationship, and  glorified  as  its  consummate 
flower  and  perfect  fruit. 

How  far  this  proposed  League  is  from  be- 
ing either  new  or  original  will  be  apparent 
to  those  who  will  compare  its  provisions  with 
those  contained  in  "The  Project  of  Perpet- 
ual Peace,"  written  by  the  Abbe  de  St. 
Pierre,  more  than  two  hundred  years  ago, 
during  the  Congress  of  Utrecht,  in  1713. 
237 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

The  good  Abbe's  purpose,  like  the  alleged 
object  of  the  League  of  Nations,  was  to 
make  a  permanent  end  of  war,  and  his 
method  wras  substantially  that  which  is  now 
proposed.  His  plan  was  as  follows : 

1.  A  contract  of  perpetual  and  irrevocable 
alliance  between  the  principal  sovereigns, 
with  a  diet  composed  of  plenipotentiaries,  in 
which  all  differences  between  the  High  Con- 
tracting Parties  are  to  be  settled  by  arbitra- 
tion or  judicial  decision. 

2.  The  number  of  Powers  sending  pleni- 
potentiaries to  the  Congress  to  be  specified, 
together  with  others  to  be  invited  to  sign  the 
treaty. 

3.  The    Confederation   thus    formed    to 
guarantee  to  each  of  its  members  the  sover- 
eignty of  the  territories  it  actually  possesses. 

4.  The  Congress  to  define  the  cases  which 
would  place  offending  States  under  the  ban 
of  Europe. 

5.  The  Powers  to  agree  to  arm  and  take 
the  offensive,  in  common  and  at  the  com- 
mon expense,  against  any  State  thus  banned, 

238 


THE  DEBACLE  OF  DOGMATISM 

until  it  shall  have  submitted  to  the  common 
will. 

6.  The  plenipotentiaries  in  the  Congress 
shall  have  power  to  make  such  rules  as  they 
shall  judge  important,  with  a  view  to  secur- 
ing for  the  European  Republic  and  each  of 
its  members  all  possible  advantages. 

The  learned  Abbe's  plan  sought  to  estab- 
lish perpetual  peace  by  mutual  guarantees 
of  possession.  It  was  rejected  as  impracti- 
cable because  it  ignored  two  persistent  ten- 
dencies of  human  nature, — the  ambition  of 
rulers  on  the  one  hand,  and  national  aspira- 
tions for  freedom  and  equality  on  the  other. 
During  the  two  hundred  years  that  have 
elapsed  since  his  project  was  published,  it 
has  encountered  these  two  obstacles,  and  not 
being  able  to  overcome  them,  could  not  be 
realized.  There  has  never  been  a  time  dur- 
ing those  centuries  when  the  process  of  politi- 
cal evolution  seemed  complete.  There  were 
always  nations  that  were  not  yet  satisfied. 
There  was  always  a  longing  among  sup- 
pressed peoples  for  liberation,  and  among 
all  nations,  except  the  greatest,  for  an  un- 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

attained  equality.  Is  it  possible  to  believe 
that  these  conditions  have  changed,  or  will 
change  when  the  peace  treaty  is  signed  at 
Versailles?  Alongside  the  "satisfied  nations" 
there  will  remain  the  unsatisfied,  and  the  dis- 
satisfied, even  among  those  who  are  benefi- 
ciaries of  the  peace. 

It  has  been  well  said  that,  if  the  map  of 
Europe  could  have  been  thus  perpetuated  in 
the  time  of  the  benevolent  Marcus  Aurelius, 
when  it  might  have  seemed  desirable,  Europe 
would  still  be  living  under  the  Roman  Em- 
pire. There  would  be  to-day,  if  this  had  hap- 
pened in  the  time  of  St.  Pierre,  no  French 
Republic,  and  no  free  governments  in 
America.  The  project  would  have  arrested 
the  entire  historic  development  of  Europe. 
There  have  been  moments  when  to  many  that 
would  have  seemed  to  be  a  happy  event. 
What  a  perfect  world  this  would  be  to  in- 
habit, if  the  professions  of  the  Holy  Alli- 
ance could  have  been  permanently  carried 
into  effect,  when  Their  Majesties,  the  Em- 
peror of  Austria,  the  King  of  Prussia,  and 
the  Emperor  of  Russia,  "having  acquired  the 
240 


THE  DEBACLE  OF  DOGMATISM 

intimate  conviction  of  the  necessity  of  set- 
tling the  steps  to  be  observed  by  the  Powers, 
in  their  reciprocal  relations,  upon  the  sub- 
lime truths  which  the  Holy  Religion  of  our 
Saviour  teaches,"  solemnly  declared  "their 
fixed  resolution,  both  in  the  administration 
of  their  respective  States,  and  in  their  politi- 
cal relations  with  every  other  government, 
to  take  for  their  sole  guide  the  precepts  of 
that  Holy  Religion,  namely,  the  precepts  of 
Justice,  Christian  Charity,  and  Peace,  which, 
far  from  being  applicable  only  to  private 
concerns  must  have  an  immediate  influence 
upon  the  counsels  of  Princes,  and  guide  all 
their  steps,  as  being  the  only  means  of  con- 
solidating human  institutions  and  remedying 
their  imperfections." 

Could  any  form  of  words  be  more  inspir- 
ing to  the  believer,  or  more  appealing  to  his 
confidence?  The  "only  means  of  consolidat- 
ing human  institutions !"  and  it  really  seemed 
to  be  true.  How  rude  it  must  have  appeared 
to  Their  Majesties — and  we  always  have 
those  who  assume  that  they  alone  know  what 
is  good  for  the  world — when  Castlereagh,  the 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

clear-headed  realist,  the  soul  of  loyalty  to 
the  Grand  Alliance  against  Napoleon,  the 
apostle  of  national  freedom,  voiced  the 
danger  of  placing  all  Europe  under  the  con- 
trol of  this  vague  idealism  which,  it  was  soon 
discovered,  served  as  a  mask  of  the  most  per- 
nicious despotism,  and  imperiled  the  national 
liberties  of  all  the  remainder  of  the  world. 

Thanks  to  the  courage  of  Castlereagh  and 
his  determined  opposition  to  the  Holy  Al- 
liance, that  imperial  syndicate  was  broken 
up.  Had  it  not  been  thwarted,  and  had  not 
the  influence  inspired  by  Washington  and 
sustained  by  Monroe  and  his  advisers  warned 
the  King  of  Spain,  supported  by  this  con- 
spiracy, not  to  attempt  to  reclaim  his  colo- 
nies in  America,  they  would  still,  no  doubt, 
be  dependencies  of  the  Spanish  crown,  and 
more  than  half  of  the  Western  Hemisphere 
would  still  be  monarchical.  But  if  the  pro- 
ject of  St.  Pierre  had  gone  into  effect  before 
the  American  Revolution,  there  would  have 
been  in  1823  no  American  Republic  to  hold 
aloft  the  standard  of  liberty  and  self-gov- 
ernment. There  would  perhaps  be  even  now 


THE  DEBACLE  OF  DOGMATISM 

no  democratic  Britain;  for  the  American 
Revolution  was  not  merely  a  war  for  inde- 
pendence, it  was  a  struggle  in  behalf  of  in- 
herent human  rights  and  representative  gov- 
ernment against  reactionary  absolutism  im- 
ported into  England,  which  had  nearly  un- 
done through  parliamentary  corruption  the 
whole  work  of  the  earlier  English  Revolu- 
tion. 

It  is  now  proposed  to  base  the  League  of 
Nations  on  the  permanence  of  the  map  of 
the  world  as  redrawn  at  Paris,  at  least  so 
far  as  the  members  of  the  League  are  con- 
cerned. Its  motto  is,  Beati  possidentes.  This 
is  the  meaning  of  Article  X,  which  is  the  one 
substantial  element  in  the  proposed  Consti- 
tution. This  article  binds  the  High  Con- 
tracting Parties  "to  respect  and  preserve  as 
against  external  aggression  the  territorial 
integrity  and  the  political  independence  of 
all  States  members  of  the  League,"  present 
and  future.  It  is  a  solemn  and  absolutely 
binding  engagement.  Had  it  been  in  force 
before  the  Spanish- American  War,  Cuba 
would  probably  still  be  a  subject  colony  of 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Spain,  a  scene  of  continuous  revolution, 
badly  governed,  the  subject  of  extortion  and 
oppression,  and  a  nuisance  to  its  neighbors ; 
and  there  is  no  provision  in  the  Constitution 
of  the  League  of  Nations  that  would  have 
furnished  a  remedy.  The  sinking  of  the 
Maine  would  not  have  been  held  to  justify  a 
war  against  Spain;  for  it  would  have  been 
disavowed,  and  the  sovereignty  of  Spain 
protected.  There  are  countries  that  do  not 
govern  well;  there  are  countries  that  will  not 
govern  well;  and  there  are  countries  that 
cannot  govern  well;  and  the  only  remedy  is 
revolution.  Article  X  does  not,  it  is  true, 
require  aid  to  a  sovereign  State  in  suppress- 
ing an  unsuccessful  revolution;  but  if  any 
portion  of  it  should  attain  its  independence 
and  the  mother  country  continued  at  war 
with  it,  "external  aggression"  would  be  al- 
leged; and  the  aid  of  all  the  High  Contract- 
ing Parties,  economic  and  even  military, 
could  then  be  invoked  against  the  new  claim- 
ant of  independence. 

The  perpetual  guarantee  of  territorial  in- 
tegrity, especially  when  applied  to  conquered 


THE  DEBACLE  OF  DOGMATISM 

colonies  and  dependencies,  occupied  by  alien 
peoples  desiring  independence,  was  not  one 
of  the  objects  for  which  the  Entente  Allies 
became  associated  in  the  war.  It  was  first 
suggested  in  the  fourteenth  rubric  of  the 
compromise  peace  plan  proposed  by  the 
President  of  the  United  States,  who  fore- 
shadowed such  a  "mutual  guarantee"  as  one 
of  the  bases  of  the  "general  association"  in 
which  the  Central  Powers  were  intended  also 
to  have  a  place.  The  League  now  to  be  con- 
stituted is  far  from  being  such  a  general  as- 
sociation. It  is,  in  effect,  a  new  preponder- 
ance of  power.  The  reason  why  it  is  accept- 
able to  several  of  the  Powers  entering  into 
it  is  that  it  affords  them  this  guarantee  as 
against  all  possible  enemies  in  the  future. 
Their  interest  is  in  the  acquisition  of  the 
wealth,  the  natural  resources,  and  the  poten- 
tial military  efficiency  of  the  United  States 
in  a  defensive  alliance.  That  was  not  the 
original  purpose  of  the  President ;  but  that  is 
the  price  he  has  had  to  pay  for  the  realiza- 
tion of  his  idea  of  a  League  of  Nations,  as 
distinguished  from  a  permanent  Entente 
245 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

with  regard  to  the  specific  purpose  of  the 
war.  The  European  nations  would  not  for 
a  moment  have  considered  the  suggestion 
until  the  military  value  of  this  country  had 
been  demonstrated  by  the  part  it  has  taken 
in  the  Great  War. 

Irrespective  of  any  League,  the  co-bellig- 
erents on  the  side  of  the  Entente  Allies  are 
in  honor  bound  to  enforce  upon  the  common 
enemy  just  terms  of  peace  that  will  prevent 
further  aggression ;  but  this  does  not  involve 
the  necessity  of  a  permanent  engagement  to 
prevent  the  future  dismemberment  of  sur- 
viving empires.  It  is  assumed  in  this  Con- 
stitution, and  it  may  be  true,  that  the  exten- 
sive populations  ruled  by  the  countries  that 
now  hold  them  in  a  relation  of  dependence 
are  better  governed  than  they  would  be  if 
they  enjoyed  self-determination.  I  have  no 
disposition  to  raise  an  issue  on  this  point; 
but  it  is  not  certain  that  this  condition,  if  it 
exists,  will  always  remain  the  same,  or  that 
the  preservation  of  territorial  integrity, 
which  now  covers  many  conquered  peoples, 
will  prove  to  be  the  method  of  justice  or 
246 


THE  DEBACLE  OF  DOGMATISM 

conducive  to  peace.  There  is,  however,  in 
this  Constitution  no  provision  for  the  "con- 
sent of  the  governed" ;  and  it  is  not  apparent 
that  there  could  be  without  a  frank  aban- 
donment of  imperial  claims  which  the  High 
Contracting  Parties  have  no  intention  to  sur- 
render. 

Undeniably,  by  accepting  Article  X  the 
United  States  would  become  an  underwriter 
of  imperial  insurance  in  which  it  would  not 
be,  and  ought  not  to  ask  to  be,  an  equal  part- 
ner. What  the  United  States  would  gain 
by  this  engagement  has  never  been  even  con- 
sidered. On  the  contrary,  all  questions  of 
"expediency"  have  been  contemptuously 
waved  aside  as  unworthy  of  consideration. 
But  it  is  more  than  a  question  of  expediency, 
— it  is  a  question  of  principle.  The  ideal  of 
peace  is  noble,  but  it  is  not  the  only  ideal. 
We  are  urged  as  a  duty  to  sacrifice  to  it  not 
only  our  interest  but  our  ideal  of  freedom, 
the  foundation  of  our  conception  of  self- 
government.  That  we  should  cherish  the 
ideal  of  peace,  and  endeavor  in  the  right  way 
to  serve  it,  is  a  proposition  which  no  true 
247 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

American  will  deny;  but  that  we  should  in 
any  way  barter  our  freedom  for  it,  or  aban- 
don our  principle  of  the  "consent  of  the  gov- 
erned," is  a  quite  different  proposal.  One 
would  be  rendering  a  better  service  to  his 
country,  and  in  the  end  to  humanity  in  gen- 
eral, if  he  should  seek  to  establish  peace  in 
some  other  way.  It  is  not  doubtful  that  the 
present  generation  of  Americans,  and  those 
that  are  to  follow,  can  be  more  serviceable 
to  the  highest  human  interests  as  a  strong, 
free,  and  independent  people  than  by  being 
bound  to  do  that  against  which,  when  called 
upon  to  observe  the  bond,  their  consciences 
as  lovers  of  liberty  would  revolt. 

One  of  the  alleged  purposes  of  the  war 
has  been  "to  make  the  world  safe  for  democ- 
racy." This  Constitution  does  not  carry  out 
that  purpose.  It  does  not  in  any  way 
refer  to  it.  It  is  a  union  and  an  intend- 
ed domination  of  Great  Powers,  and  the 
small  States  are  treated  as  of  secondary  im- 
portance. They  have  had  thus  far  no  col- 
lective voice.  They  have  been  permanently 
relegated  to  the  rear.  Far  from  being  recog- 
248 


THE  DEBACLE  OF  DOGMATISM 

nized  as  truly  "self -determining,"  the  new 
nationalities  are  treated  as  creations,  the 
handiwork  of  the  potters  at  Paris,  who  are 
moulding  them  out  of  the  debris  of  the  ex- 
tinct autocracies,  Russia,  Prussia,  Austria, 
and  Turkey,  whose  populations  have  been 
left  in  turmoil  and  turbulence  by  the  fall  of 
the  only  governments  they  ever  knew. 

During  the  protracted  negotiations  at 
Paris  regarding  the  League  of  Nations,  a 
new  enemy  has  arisen, — a  form  of  interna- 
tionalism more  dangerous  than  any  single 
coalition.  It  aims  at  the  life  of  nations  and 
would  destroy  all  national  existence.  It  is,, 
therefore,  a  time  to  think  first  of  the  national 
life,  to  maintain  it  in  its  strength,  its  purity, 
its  freedom,  and  its  established  foundations. 
Nothing  but  a  vigorous  nationalism  can  over- 
come this  insidious  enemy,  which  would  di- 
vide every  house  against  itself.  It  is  a  time, 
therefore,  for  every  free,  self-governing  na- 
tion to  be  a  master  in  its  own  house.  Its 
association  with  other  nations  should  look 
toward  a  peace  based  on  justice  with  all  of 
them,  a  willingness  to  help,  but  not  to  be 
249 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

bound.  It  is  timely  to  face  this  new  and  all 
pervading  menace  of  Bolshevism,  to  isolate 
it,  to  circumscribe  it,  and  to  exterminate  it. 
The  Constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations 
ignores  this  problem.  Some  of  its  advocates 
even  seem  to  dally  with  it,  and  would  be 
willing  to  make  terms  with  it. 

Two  obvious  duties  lie  before  the  Entente 
Allies:  first,  to  destroy,  not  Germany,  but 
German  militarism,  by  imposing  a  peace  of 
victory  over  militarism  through  geographic 
limitation  under  conditions  of  disarmament ; 
and,  second,  to  reinforce  that  limitation 
through  geographic  circumscription,  by  the 
formation  of  new  independent  States,  so  as 
to  create  a  barrier  on  the  East  and  South- 
east against  the  German  appropriation  of 
Russia.  The  order  of  the  day  should  be, 
first  peace,  and  then  an  affirmation  of  the 
restored  existence  of  a  Society  of  States 
based  on  their  inherent  rights  under  Inter- 
national Law,  with  a  pledge  to  respect,  im- 
prove, and  apply  it  judicially. 

If  the  conflict  with  Germany  were  ended, 
an  understanding  between  the  Powers  now 
250 


THE  DEBACLE  OF  DOGMATISM 

deliberating  at  Paris  and  a  united  effort  tc 
respect  and  defend  International  Law  if 
again  violated,  would  go  far  toward  securing 
the  peace  of  the  entire  world  for  some  years 
to  come.  Instead  of  allowing  Bolshevism 
to  spread,  and  permitting  Germany  to  en- 
ter into  alliance  with  it  until  she  can  appro- 
priate its  spoils,  a  new  order  of  normal  State 
existence  should  be  aimed  at,  in  which  an 
assenting  Germany  can  participate  before 
she  is  destroyed. 

When  peace  is  once  established,  it  is  the 
Society  of  States,  not  a  defensive  League 
within  it,  likely  to  be  counterpoised  by  an- 
other political  combination  of  the  same  kind, 
that  should  be  instituted.  But  this  is  not  the 
work  of  war.  It  is  essentially  a  work  of 
peace,  to  be  elaborated  in  a  time  of  peace. 
The  first  condition  of  it  is  not  a  self -pro- 
tective and  dominant  League;  but  an  open 
forum,  where  the  small  States,  unintimi- 
dated,  may  freely  voice  their  necessities,  not 
to  a  junta  of  Great  Powers,  but  to  the  world 
at  large;  which  will  then  quickly  discover 
which  nation  is  deserving  of  aid  and  sympa- 
251 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

thy.  For  this  the  Constitution  of  a  League 
of  Nations  makes  no  provision.  It  demands 
that  we  shall  walk  by  faith  and  not  by  sight; 
and  that  we  shall  place  our  faith  not  in  open 
discussion,  not  in  the  disinterested  judgment 
of  mankind,  but  in  the  wisdom,  the  virtue, 
and  the  unselfishness  of  an  international  im- 
perium,  constructed  and  designed  primarily 
to  secure  its  own  immunity  by  maintaining 
a  predominant  collective  force,  and  secon- 
darily to  convert  the  small  States  into  vir- 
tual protectorates  under  its  own  laws. 

Instead  of  a  directory  in  Paris,  working 
in  camera,  hedged  about  with  secrecy,  form- 
ing new  nations  out  of  the  debris  of  these 
disintegrated  empires,  and  setting  up  a  sep- 
arate and  exclusive  control  by  Great  Powers, 
the  appeal  should  be  to  the  smaller  States 
and  to  the  newly  liberated  nationalities  to 
express  their  desires  and  preferences,  and 
together  to  unite  in  determining  their  own 
future  destinies.  They  should  be  told:  We 
shall  now  treat  and  help  you  as  free  peoples. 
We  ask  you  to  cease  fighting  and  choose 
your  own  representatives.  We  shall  aid  you 


THE  DEBACLE  OF  DOGMATISM 

as  far  as  we  can  in  securing  an  adjustment 
of  your  differences  and  shall  respect  your 
self-determination,  but  we  must  do  this  im- 
partially in  response  to  your  wishes.  We 
shall  open  the  ways  of  communication  and 
commerce,  but  if  you  fight  it  will  be  at  your 
own  peril  and  the  effect  of  your  quarrels 
will  be  to  close  the  avenues  of  trade. 

This  is  not  the  manner  in  which  the  Con- 
ference at  Paris  is  proceeding.  It  is  a  secret 
conclave,  conducted  by  a  Supreme  Council 
composed  of  Great  Powers,  with  a  growing 
tendency  to  leave  all  decisions  to  the  "Big 
Four."  It  is  reconstructing  Europe  in  its 
own  way,  and  presumably  in  its  own  inter- 
est. It  proposes  a  close  corporation  for  the  fu- 
ture, acting  in  secret,  to  secure  its  own  peace 
and  dictate  the  peace  of  the  world  upon  the 
basis  of  a  map  of  its  own  making.  The  Great 
Powers  claim  to  be  just,  virtuous,  and  even 
benevolent,  and  perhaps  they  are,  but  the 
Holy  Alliance  a  hundred  years  ago  also 
claimed  the  noblest  intentions. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  how  democracy, 
in  the  end,  has  usually  inadvertently  played 
253 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

into  the  hands  of  autocracy,  and  confided  its 
destinies  to  a  single  dominant  will.  When 
the  Directory  was  formed  at  Paris,  in  the 
French  Revolution,  and  the  directors  met  to 
fortify  their  control,  their  first  thought  was 
of  organization;  but  at  their  first  meeting  it 
was  observed  that  it  was  unnecessary; — 
Bonaparte  had  already  taken  his  seat  at  the 
head  of  the  table !  No  one  disputed  his  right 
to  remain  there.  Was  he  not  necessary  to 
the  cause?  Had  he  not  fought  successfully 
the  battles  of  democracy  ?  Democracy,  it  ap- 
peared, could  not  be  imperilled  by  its  most 
valiant  apostle. 

The  small  States — the  truly  democratic 
States — wait  in  the  anteroom  while  the  "Big 
Four"  decide  the  fate  of  Europe.  The  Coun- 
cil, when  the  League  is  adopted,  is  to  take 
their  place.  Democracy  will,  of  course,  be 
safe;  for  our  President  is  named  in  Article 
V  of  the  Covenant  as  the  person  to  summon 
the  first  meeting  of  the  Assembly,  and  of  the 
Council.  He,  of  course,  represents  democ- 
racy,— at  least  the  type  of  democracy  which 
254* 


THE  DEBACLE  OF  DOGMATISM 

he  represents.    We  shall  in  time,  perhaps, 
learn  more  fully  what  it  is. 

There  might,  however,  in  the  interest  of 
democracy,  be  some  additional  assurance  in 
the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations 
itself;  but,  when  we  examine  it,  we  find  that 
it  contains  no  declaration  of  principles  which 
the  members  are  pledged  to  respect  and  sup- 
port. There  is  no  Bill  of  Rights,  defining 
the  essential  and  immutable  prerogatives  of 
sovereign  States, — not  a  word  in  the  entire 
document  to  indicate  that  States  possess  any 
inherent  and  sovereign  rights  whatever. 
Nothing  is  said  of  the  right  of  "self-determi- 
nation," nothing  of  any  rights  as  belonging 
to  the  "people"  anywhere.  The  whole  docu- 
ment is  devoted  to  the  interests  of  Govern- 
ments. There  is  no  indication  even  of  any 
right  in  any  people  to  be  directly  represented 
in  this  corporation  of  State  interests.  The 
only  reference  to  the  people  in  this  Cov- 
enant, aside  from  the  power  and  preroga- 
tives of  States  and  Governments,  is  in  Ar- 
ticle XXIII,  which  promises  to  establish  a 
permanent  Bureau  of  Labor,  with  implicit 
255 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

power  to  regulate  the  conditions  of  industry, 
•'both  in  their  own  countries  and  in  all  coun- 
tries to  which  their  commercial  and  indus- 
trial relations  extend";  that  is,  it  would  ap- 
pear, to  prescribe  the  conditions  of  labor  in 
all  the  countries  of  the  world,  whether  mem- 
bers of  the  League  or  not. 

The  most  pernicious  vice  in  the  system  of 
ideas  upon  which  this  League  is  founded  is 
that  peace  can  be  secured,  without  the  ex- 
istence of  immense  armed  forces,  by  artifi- 
cial lines  drawn  on  a  map. 

A  great  force  of  cartographers  has  been 
employed  at  Paris  in  dissecting  out  of  the 
conglomeration  of  races  the  various  nation- 
alities, and  circumscribing  them  by  lines  of 
geographic  demarcation.  The  secret  of  peace 
does  not  lie  in  geography,  but  in  institutions, 
political  and  economic.  The  one  great  les- 
son that  constitutional  self-government  has 
taught  is  that  peace  and  contentment  are  not 
created  by  geographic  boundaries,  but  by 
just  laws  and  the  economic  opportunities 
afforded  under  a  good  government.  The 
precise  delimitation  of  races  in  the  Near 
256 


THE  DEBACLE  OF  DOGMATISM 

East, — the  debris  of  the  Turkish  Empire, 
for  example, — is  a  physical  impossibility. 
There  cannot  be  created  a  Czecho-Slovakia, 
a  Jugo-Slavia,  an  Armenia,  a  Poland,  or  a 
Syria,  where  the  population  will  be  entirely 
homogeneous,  without  impracticable  migra- 
tions. There  will  always  be  left  enclaves  or 
transfusions  of  distinct  races.  We  should 
never  dream  of  such  an  operation  in  the 
United  States.  We  merge  our  population 
by  our  institutions.  Given  constitutional 
guarantees,  representative  government,  and 
the  abolition  of  hyphenism — that  is,  the  total 
obliteration  of  race  distinctions — and  the 
problem  of  government  is  solved.  If  we  un- 
dertook to  set  up  in  America  the  conception 
of  race-nationality  as  a  basis  of  government, 
we  should  plunge  this  nation  into  civil  war. 
And  the  attempt  to  do  this  in  Europe  will 
have  no  other  result. 

The  whole  conception  of  race-nationality 
is  fallacious  and  involves  a  new  danger.  Its 
logical  outcome  is  a  struggle  for  race  domi- 
nation, as  Pan-Germanism  well  illustrated. 
Wider  territorial  expansion  was  demanded, 
257 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

in  order  that  a  prolific  race  might  always  re- 
main under  the  same  political  regime.  This 
is  the  basis  of  the  present  efforts  at  scientific 
race  cartography.  It  will  prove  illusory.  It 
is  for  the  peoples  by  choice  and  agreement 
to  make  the  map,  and  not  the  ethnographers. 

In  the  United  States,  and  in  America  gen- 
erally, no  map  has  ever  been  made  by  a  Su- 
preme Council.  The  existing  map  has  been 
made  by  the  peoples  who  inhabit  this  conti- 
nent, or  by  negotiation  with  other  peoples; 
not  always  without  conflict,  but  always  fol- 
lowed with  consent.  It  may  not  be  a  per- 
fect map,  but  it  is  more  generally  assented 
to  than  one  which  a  Supreme  Council  could 
have  imposed.  We,  in  America,  have  pro- 
tected our  sister  republics  from  foreign  in- 
tervention, but  we  have  never  pretended  to 
portion  out  the  continent  among  them. 

The  principle  followed  in  constituting  the 
new  nationalities  and  fixing  their  frontiers 
is  of  importance  chiefly  in  its  relation  to  fu- 
ture peace.  Unless  they  are  satisfied  there 
will  be  continued  rivalries  and  possible  con- 
flict. If  Article  X  is  retained  in  the  Consti- 
253 


THE  DEBACLE  OF  DOGMATISM 

tution  of  the  League  of  Nations,  there  can 
be  no  change  in  the  map  when  once  the  Con- 
stitution is  adopted.  Self-determination,  so 
far  as  national  allegiance  is  concerned,  will 
then  be  finally  repressed.  If  it  is  to  have 
any  recognition,  it  must  be  respected  now; 
if  not,  all  the  members  of  the  League  will  be 
arrayed  against  freedom  and  compelled  to 
defend  by  force  mistakes  that  might  have 
been  avoided. 

By  whatever  standard  we  judge  it,  it  is 
evident  that  the  League  of  Nations,  in  pro- 
portion as  it  is  to  be  real,  is  not  the  ultimate 
international  ideal.  It  is,  and  by  its  essen- 
tial nature  must  be,  a  combination  of  Powers 
within  the  wider  Society  of  States.  So  far 
as  the  President  of  the  United  States  is  con- 
cerned with  it,  it  was  appealed  to  as  a  com- 
promise expedient  in  the  midst  of  war,  in  or- 
der to  provide  a  means  of  reconciliation  be- 
tween the  Entente  Allies  and  the  Central 
Powers.  That  was  the  purpose  of  the  four- 
teen rubrics,  and  the  League  of  Nations  is 
merely  the  vehicle  for  enforcing  them. 

But  the  problem  now  is  not  reconciliation, 
259 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

and  it  never  was.  The  real  problem  was  ami 
is  to  show  the  Central  Powers,  and  particu- 
larly Germany,  that  ruthless  aggression  and 
violation  of  the  Law  of  Nations  cannot  be 
tolerated,  and  cannot  escape  a  just  punish- 
ment. The  whole  future  of  the  Society  of 
States  depends  absolutely  on  that.  There 
must  be  a  peace  of  victory  and  not  a  peace 
of  compromise,  or  there  will  never  be  any 
sure  peace  in  the  world. 

The  President  has  never  entertained  this 
idea.  He  still  holds  to  his  fourteen  points 
of  compromise  as  the  only  ground  of  recon- 
ciliation with  criminal  nations.  If  there  is 
to  be  any  safety  in  the  future,  they  must 
cease  to  be  criminal  and  pay  the  penalty  of 
their  crimes.  After  that  they  can  take  their 
places,  if  they  confess  and  abandon  their 
faults,  in  the  free  and  responsible  Society  of 
States. 

The  idea  of  the  League  has  been  to  bring 
them  into  it  upon  a  basis  of  equality  in  the 
treaty  of  peace  itself.  That  is  why  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  League  and  the  treaty  of 
peace  were  to  be  so  interwoven  and  compact- 
260 


THE  DEBACLE  OF  DOGMATISM 

*d  that  they  could  not  be  separated,  and  that 
no  nation  could  make  peace  without  accept- 
ing the  League.  If  Germany  signed  that 
treaty,  she  also  would  accept  the  League; 
and,  having  accepted  it,  with  all  its  obliga- 
tions, why  should  she  then  not  become  a 
member  of  it? 

That,  in  brief,  is  the  whole  content  of  the 
dogma  of  the  League.  If  Germany  and 
other  nations  were  really  penitent,  really  vir- 
tuous, really  minded  to  submit  to  Interna- 
tional Law,  to  respect  it,  and  to  maintain  it, 
the  League  would  be  a  superfluity.  But  if 
Germany  and  other  nations  are  not  so  mind- 
ed, then  they  have  no  proper  place  in  it ;  and 
such  a  place  should  not  be  prepared  for 
them. 

Finally,  the  President's  dogma  breaks  on 
the  determination  of  the  Entente  to  remain 
an  entente,  no  matter  by  what  name  it  is 
called.  The  basis  of  that  Entente  was  and 
remains  that  the  aggressor  must  be  defeated 
and  punished  for  crime,  not  welcomed  into 
a  fraternity  of  equals.  Unless  the  President 
accepts  that  conclusion,  he  and  the  Confer- 
261 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ence  at  Paris  have  nothing  in  common.  If 
he  does  accept  it,  the  League,  as  it  must  be 
amended  before  it  can  be  adopted,  is  in  its 
essence  nothing  but  a  written  form  of  an  un- 
derstanding for  mutual  defense  against  an 
enemy  not  wholly  overcome.  If  the  enemy 
had  been  made  to  acknowledge  defeat  at  the 
moment  when  he  really  was  defeated,  all  this 
circumlocution  would  have  been  avoided. 
The  Entente  would  have  obtained  la  victoire 
integrate  and  a  chastened  Germany  would 
now  be  rehabilitating  her  national  life,  as  it 
is  her  right  and  duty  to  do,  in  order  to  sup- 
press Bolshevism  instead  of  allying  herself 
with  it,  and  preparing  to  take  a  normal  and 
useful  part  in  the  Society  of  States. 


VIII 

THE  PRESIDENTS  CHALLENGE  TO  THE 
SENATE 

AT  Paris  the  President  of  the  United 
States  has  had  considerable  apparent  success 
in  securing  the  embodiment  of  his  own  per- 
sonal terms  and  at  least  a  part  of  his  plan  for 
a  League  of  Nations  in  the  treaty  of  peace 
prepared  by  the  Entente  Allies.  The  reason 
for  this  is  obvious.  The  United  States  was 
necessary  to  a  victorious  conclusion  of  the 
Great  War,  and  it  is  equally  necessary  to  the 
future  maintenance  of  peace.  Representing 
in  his  own  person,  as  it  appeared,  the  future 
policy  of  America,  it  was  possible  for  the 
President  at  any  time  to  order  his  ship,  to 
abandon  the  Conference,  and  to  leave  the 
Entente  Allies  to  face  Germany  alone. 
That  decision  would  have  created  a  great 
embarrassment  for  the  exposed  countries 
like  Belgium  and  France.  Such  a  desertion, 
263 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

it  is  true,  would  not  have  met  the  approval 
of  the  American  people,  but  they  would  have 
been  powerless  to  avert  its  consequences. 

When  the  President,  after  his  brief  visit 
to  the  United  States,  returned  to  Paris  to 
resume  negotiations  in  the  Conference,  he 
found  that  in  his  absence  great  progress  had 
been  made  toward  the  completion  of  a  treaty 
that  would  end  the  long  suspense  and  bring 
the  war  to  a  formal  conclusion;  but  this 
treaty  did  not  contemplate  the  inclusion  of 
the  Constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations. 
The  President  had,  however,  thrown  down 
to  the  Senators  who  had  declared  their  un- 
willingness to  ratify  the  Constitution  of  the 
League  as  it  had  been  presented  to  them  a 
challenge  which  he  intended  to  carry  out.1 
"When  that  treaty  comes  back,"  he  had  said 
in  his  address  in  New  York,  on  March  4th, 
"gentlemen  on  this  side  will  find  the  cove- 
nant not  only  in  it,  but  so  many  threads  of 
the  treaty  tied  to  the  covenant  that  you  can- 
not dissect  the  covenant  from  the  treaty  with- 

1For   the   declaration   of  the   Senators,   see  the   "Round 
Robin"    at    the    end    of    this    volume. 

264 


PRESIDENT'S  CHALLENGE  TO  SENATE 

out  destroying  the  whole  vital  structure." 
Thirty-nine  Senators,  elected  by  the  peo- 
ple, representing  more  than  two-thirds  of  the 
entire  population  of  the  United  States,  were 
thus  virtually  informed  that  the  "advice  and 
consent"  of  the  Senate  would  receive  no  con- 
sideration. They  might,  if  they  chose,  pri- 
vately regard  the  Constitution  of  the  League 
of  Nations  as  a  defiance  of  their  judgment 
and  even  a  violation  of  the  fundamental  law 
of  the  Republic,  which  they  had  solemnly 
sworn  to  defend,  but  they  would  find  them- 
selves placed  in  a  position  in  which  they 
would  have  to  accept  this  document  as  it  had 
been  formulated,  without  alterations,  or  they 
would  be  compelled  to  bear  the  odium  of  pre- 
venting the  conclusion  of  peace,  because  the 
League  of  Nations  would  be  an  essential 
part  of  the  peace  treaty. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  dwell  upon  this  de- 
fiance of  the  constitutional  division  of  the 
treaty-making  power  and  of  the  purpose 
with  which  that  division  was  originally  made 
and  should  always  be  maintained.  This  de- 
fiance assumed  what  every  autocratic  usur- 
265 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

pation  of  authority  assumes,  namely,  that 
power  could  be  invoked  to  sustain  it.  In 
this  case  it  would  no  doubt  be  an  attempt, 
in  the  nominal  interest  of  peace,  to  bring 
political  pressure  to  bear  upon  refractory 
Senators,  in  order  to  compel  them  to  yield 
to  a  superior  will.  It  requires  no  reflection 
to  perceive  that  if  this  were  done  and  were 
successful,  it  would  mark  the  extinction  of 
representative  and  even  of  constitutional 
government  in  the  United  States.  That  it 
was  ever  even  contemplated  indicates  a  de- 
parture from  the  principles  on  which  our 
government  is  based  which  should  awaken 
a  deep  concern  for  the  future  and  call  at- 
tention to  the  perils  of  autocratic  as  distin- 
guished from  representative  democracy. 

How  serious  the  incident  is  from  this 
point  of  view  becomes  clear  when  we  com- 
pare the  status  of  the  American  representa- 
tion in  the  Peace  Conference  with  that  of 
any  other  of  the  Great  Powers.  In  that  con- 
clave, the  United  States  is  the  only  country 
not  represented  by  a  single  person  confirmed 
by  the  legislative  branch  of  Government; 
266 


PRESIDENT'S  CHALLENGE  TO  SENATE 

and  yet  that  body,  negotiating  in  secret,  has 
formulated  a  compact  which,  if  adopted,  is 
to  become  under  our  Constitution  "the  su- 
preme law  of  the  land."  The  treaty  which 
is  to  contain  this  supreme  law,  it  has  been 
declared  by  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  is  to  comprise  matters  foreign  to 
its  main  purpose  which  cannot  be  separated 
from  it,  and  upon  which  the  legislative  half 
of  the  treaty-making  power  is  not  to  be  per- 
mitted to  exercise  its  untrammeled  judg- 
ment. 

It  is  in  this  connection  important  to  note 
that  while  the  "plenipotentiaries"  of  the 
United  States  in  the  Peace  Conference  have 
no  legislative  authority  and  derive  their 
powers  solely  from  the  Executive,  none  of 
them  having  been  confirmed  by  the  Senate, 
all  the  representatives  of  the  European 
Powers  in  the  Conference  are  subject  to  re- 
call by  the  legislative  branch  of  their  gov- 
ernments if  their  actions  in  the  course  of  the 
negotiations  are  not  approved.  In  order 
that  approval  or  disapproval  may  be  intel- 
ligently expressed  and  in  a  timely  manner, 
267 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

the  legislatures  insist  that  they  be  kept  in- 
formed of  the  course  taken;  and,  as  an  ex- 
ample of  this  surveillance,  it  may  be  noted 
that  the  British  Premier  found  it  necessary 
to  return  in  person  to  London,  in  order  to 
explain  to  the  House  of  Commons  the  atti- 
tude he  had  taken  on  behalf  of  his  govern- 
ment in  a  matter  of  interest  to  them.  And 
the  Italian  Premier  did  the  same. 

No  European  Premier,  the  head  of  a  re- 
sponsible government,  would  for  a  moment 
venture  to  ignore  the  advice  of  the  legisla- 
tive body  upon  which  his  official  existence 
is  dependent,  much  less  to  attempt  to  force 
its  hand  by  embodying  in  a  treaty  anything 
which  he  had  occasion  to  believe  would  not 
meet  with  its  approval.  If  he  should  be  so 
rash  as  to  do  so,  he  would  be  immediately 
withdrawn  from  the  negotiations  and  an- 
other would  be  substituted  in  his  place. 

It  was  certainly  never  intended  by  the 
founders  of  the  American  Republic  that  the 
vital  questions  of  foreign  policy  and  inter- 
national engagements  should  be  subject  to 
decision  by  a  single  person.  If  the  precau- 


1  PRESIDENT'S  CHALLENGE  TO  SENATE 

i  ^ 

tions  taken  to  avoid  that  result  are  lightly 

to  be  set  aside  and  ignored,  and  especially 
if  the  voice  of  the  people  should  proclaim  a 
preference  for  that  method  of  procedure, 
the  United  States  would  at  once  take  rank 
as  the  least  democratic  nation  in  the  world, 
and  there  would  be  new  evidence  that  a  de- 
mocracy unrestrained  by  law  is  the  inevi- 
table victim  of  autocracy. 

Whatever  the  attitude  of  the  majority  of 
the  people  may  be  in  this  matter — and  it 
would  be  a  serious  reproach  to  them  to  sug- 
gest that  they  would  approve  the  suppres- 
sion of  freedom  in  their  representatives — 
the  real  issue  created  by  the  purpose  to  force 
acquiescence  is  not  the  ratification  or  non- 
ratification  of  a  particular  treaty  but  the 
attempt  of  the  Executive  to  dominate  the 
legislative  branch  of  the  Government. 

The  strongest  argument  for  a  League  of 
Nations  thus  far  advanced  is  that  it  would 
offer  an  opportunity  for  conference  and  dis- 
cussion, the  idea  being  that  by  this  means 
good  understanding  would  be  promoted.  The 
effort  to  force  the  action  of  the  Senate  by; 
269 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

combining  the  League  of  Nations  with  a 
treaty  of  peace  for  the  purpose  of  prevent- 
ing the  separate  examination  of  the  project 
of  a  League  on  its  merits,  is  a  sad  commen- 
tary on  the  prospect  of  free  conference  and 
discussion  when  the  project  is  adopted. 

The  Senate  has  the  constitutional  right  to 
withhold  its  consent  from  a  treaty  of  which 
it  does  not  approve.  It  may  withhold  it 
completely  or  in  part.  Possessing  the  right 
of  amendment — which  is  in  effect  a  condi- 
tional ratification — it  has  a  ready  defense 
against  any  attempt  to  force  its  decisions. 
There  can  be  no  intertwining  of  engage- 
ments which  it  cannot  unravel.  It  can  ratify 
a  treaty  of  peace  and  at  the  same  time  re- 
ject a  compact  for  a  League  of  Nations. 
It  would  then  remain  for  those  responsible 
for  the  negotiation  of  a  treaty  designed  to 
frustrate  the  judgment  of  the  Senate  to  ob- 
tain the  acceptance  of  the  changes  which  the 
amendments  might  require. 

Two  courses,  in  such  a  situation,  would 
be  open.  The  President  might  refuse  to  act 
any  further,  or  he  might  consent  to  reopen 
270 


PRESIDENT'S  CHALLENGE  TO  SENATE 

the  negotiations  for  the  purpose  of  securing 
agreement  on  the  changes.  In  the  first  case, 
the  responsibility  for  the  delay  of  a  formal 
conclusion  of  peace  would  evidently  rest 
upon  those  who  had  concluded  a  treaty 
which  they  knew  beforehand  would  not  be 
acceptable  to  a  body  necessary  to  ratifica- 
tion. 

In  the  second  case,  the  signatory  Powers 
could  not  consistently  refuse  to  separate 
what  they  had  themselves  intended  not  to 
join  together,  until  the  President  forced 
them  to  do  so;  for  they  were  prepared  to 
postpone  the  League  of  Nations  and  sign  a 
preliminary  treaty  of  peace  when  the  Presi- 
dent returned  to  Paris  from  his  visit  to 
America  and  changed  their  plans.  The  em- 
barrassment of  asking  for  a  reversal  of  a 
course  upon  which  the  President  had  himself 
insisted  would  no  doubt  be  for  him  very 
great,  but  the  alternative  to  resorting  to  it 
would  be  a  clear  responsibility  for  the  fail- 
ure of  the  peace  negotiations.  Whatever 
course  might  be  followed  as  a  consequence 
of  the  Senate's  insistence  upon  its  constitu- 
271 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

tional  right,  it  is  inconceivable  that  four,  or 
ten  or  any  other  number  of  delegates  sit- 
ting in  council  at  Paris  could  frame  any 
document  on  any  subject  which  the  Senate 
of  the  United  States  could  be  forced  by  the 
Executive  to  adopt  against  the  better  judg- 
ment of  its  members.  If  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  for  any  reason  whatever,  ar- 
bitrarily insisted  upon  that,  it  would  mark 
the  end  of  the  Republic. 

From  the  beginning  it  was  made  clear  that 
the  Senate  of  the  United  States  would  not 
ratify  any  treaty  which  created  a  super- 
government  ;  that  is,  a  government  that  ren- 
dered the  Government  of  the  United  States 
in  any  way  subordinate  to  it. 

Immediately  there  began  a  series  of  exten- 
uations regarding  the  purport  of  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  League.  The  representa- 
tions of  Senators  regarding  it  were  repudi- 
ated as  "bogies."  Far  from  the  Constitu- 
tion creating  a  supernational  government,  it 
was  declared  by  its  advocates,  it  was  only  an 
agreement  to  listen  to  "recommendations," 
not  necessarily  to  follow  them.  In  the  cases 


PRESIDENT'S  CHALLENGE  TO  SENATE 

where  the  Constitution  seemed  to  call  for 
war,  in  order  to  impose  peace,  it  remained 
for  the  separate  governments  to  declare  war, 
or  not,  as  they  might  deem  best.  Thus,  it 
turned  out  that,  if  this  interpretation  was 
correct,  it  was  the  League  itself  that  was 
the  real  bogie; — a  device  not  to  enforce 
peace  by  an  international  army  but  by  sheer 
intimidation,  pretending  to  show  a  mailed 
fist  but  in  fact  merely  shaking  a  finger  at  a 
possible  aggressor. 

It  was  a  difficult  task  to  mediate  between 
these  extreme  interpretations,  that  of  a 
super-government  and  that  of  an  unaffect- 
ed sovereignty.  Some  middle  ground  was 
even  more  necessary  to  the  theory  of  the 
League  to  Enforce  Peace  than  it  was  to  the 
President's  conception  of  a  leagr^  which 
should  aim  to  "insure"  peace;  a  result  which, 
he  thought,  might  be  accomplished  "vithout 
force  if  the  intimidation  imposed  were  sui- 
ficiently  impressive. 

It  was  upon  the  President  of  the  League 
to  Enforce  Peace,  Ex-President  William 
Howard  Taft,  therefore,  that  the  task  chief - 
273 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

ly  fell,  by  the  use  of  his  great  prestige  and 
his  dialectical  skill,  to  reconcile  the  Consti- 
tution of  the  League  to  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States.  Coming  from  him,  al- 
most any  assurance  seemed  to  many  citizens 
a  sufficient  guarantee  that  the  conflict  be- 
tween the  two  "constitutions"  was  purely 
imaginary,  which  makes  it  of  importance  to 
know  what  the  former  President's  position 
was  regarding  the  obligations  of  the  League. 

Answering  the  argument  of  Senator 
Knox,  the  Ex-President,  in  his  speech  be- 
fore the  Economic  Club  of  New  York,  par- 
ried the  accusation  regarding  super-govern- 
ment in  the  following  adroit  manner: 

"When  Senator  Knox's  attack  upon  the 
covenant  is  analyzed,  it  will  be  seen  to  rest 
on  an  assumption  that  the  Executive  Coun- 
cil is  given  executive  powers  which  are  un- 
warranted by  the  text  of  the  covenant. 
'  arJtie  whole  function  of  the  Executive  Coun- 
cil is  to  be  the  medium  through  which  the 
League  members  are  to  exchange  views,  the 
advisory  board  to  consider  all  matters  aris- 
ing in  the  field  of  the  League's  possible 
274 


PRESIDENT'S  CHALLENGE  TO  SENATE 

action  and  to  advise  the  members  as  to  what 
they  ought  by  joint  action  to  do.' 

"The  Council  makes  few,  if  any,  orders 
binding  on  the  members  of  the  League. 
Where  the  Executive  Council  acts  as  a  medi- 
ating and  inquiring  body  to  settle  differ- 
ences not  arbitrated,  its  unanimous  recom- 
mendations of  a  settlement  must  satisfy  the 
nation  seeking  relief,  if  the  defendant 
nation  complies  with  the  recommendation. 
All  other  obligations  of  the  United  States 
under  the  League  are  to  be  found  in  the 
covenants  of  the  League,  and  not  in  any 
action  of  the  Executive  Council.  When 
this  is  understood  clearly  the  whole  structure 
of  Senator  Knox's  indictment  falls." 

The  argument  here  is  that  the  Executive 
Council  is  a  purely  "advisory"  body,  with- 
out any  power  to  command.  The  obliga- 
tions of  the  United  States  therefore,  are  not 
to  be  found  in  the  action  of  the  Council,  but 
solely  in  "the  covenants  of  the  League." 
These  covenants,  being  freely  made,  it  is 
held,  are  in  no  sense  infractions  of  sover- 
eignty. On  the  contrary,  they  are  affirma- 
275 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

tions  of  it.    They  are  voluntary  agreements. 

The  answer  to  Senator  Knox  then  reduces 
itself  to  this:  that  there  is  in  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  League  as  originally  presented  no 
element  of  a  super-government.  That  the 
League,  as  such,  can  enforce  nothing;  and 
that  the  "recommendations"  of  the  Execu- 
tive Council  are  in  no  sense  binding. 

To  verify  this  interpretation,  the  Ex- 
President  quotes  Lord  Robert  Cecil  as  lay- 
ing down  the  principle  "that  all  action  must 
be  unanimously  agreed  to  in  accordance  with 
the  general  rule  that  governs  international 
relations;"  adding,  that  "this  interpretation 
by  one  of  the  most  distinguished  draftsmen 
of  the  League  shows  that  all  its  language, 
reasonably  construed,  delegates  no  power  to 
these  bodies  to  act  for  the  League  and  its 
members  without  their  unanimous  concur- 
rence unless  the  words  used  make  such  dele- 
gation clear."  It  is  interesting,  however,  to 
observe  that  Ex-President  Taft  has  pro- 
posed four  amendments  to  the  original  draft 
of  the  Constitution  of  the  League,  the  third 
one  "definitely  stating  the  rule  of  unanimity 
276 


PRESIDENT'S  CHALLENGE  TO  SENATE 

and  making  it  perfectly  plain  that  any  action 
taken  by  the  Executive  Council  of  the 
League  must  be  unanimous,  thereby  neces- 
sitating the  concurrence  of  the  American 
Government's  member  of  the  Executive 
Council  before  its  action  could  be  binding 
upon  the  United  States."  2  This  amend- 
ment has  been  accepted,  and  to  that  extent 
the  League  becomes  an  Entente. 

It  is  not  possible,  however,  thus  easily  to 
destroy  the  argument  of  Senator  Knox.  The 
fact  that  Mr.  Taf t  finds  it  desirable  to  make 
sure  of  the  unanimity  of  the  Executive 
Council  before  it  can  even  be  allowed  to 
"recommend,"  shows  that  there  is  lodged 
within  it  some  potency  against  which  it  is 
necessary  to  guard.  It  cannot  be  over- 
looked that  Article  I,  creating  the  Ex- 
ecutive Council,  makes  it  the  "instrumen- 
tality" through  which  "action  shall  be 
effected."  That  is  why  it  was  called  and 
still  is  an  "Executive"  Council,  although  the 
word  "Council"  is  now  unqualified.  It  has 
important  functions  to  perform.  When  the 

2  For  the  amendments,  see,  at  the  end  of  this  volume,  a 
list  of  the  amendments  proposed 

277 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

allotment  of  armament  has  once  been  made, 
the  scale  of  forces  cannot  be  exceeded 
"without  the  concurrence  of  the  Council" 
(Article  VIII),  and  under  the  rule  of  una- 
nimity one  single  member  could  prevent  a 
State  from  increasing  its  means  of  defense. 
The  Council  is  to  "advise"  upon  the  means 
by  which  the  obligation  to  protect  territorial 
integrity  and  political  independence,  under 
Article  X,  shall  be  fulfilled.  If  this  advice 
involves  a  declaration  of  war,  the  govern- 
ments advised  to  make  a  declaration  may  in- 
deed refuse ;  but  they  would  in  that  case  be 
regarded  as  delinquent.  Under  Article 
XVI  such  a  member  may  be  expelled  from 
the  League;  and  a  member  may  not  volun- 
tarily withdraw  on  two  years'  notice  unless 
"all  its  obligations  under  this  Covenant  have 
been  fulfilled  at  the  time  of  withdrawal" 
(Article  I).  A  worse  situation  would  arise 
if  the  opposition  of  a  member  of  the  Council 
should  nullify  any  action  whatever,  and  thus 
completely  paralyze  the  League.  When  the 
Council,  acting  as  a  judge,  makes  a  recom- 
mendation, under  Article  XII,  compliance 
218 


PRESIDENT'S  CHALLENGE  TO  SENATE 

with  the  award  by  one  party  binds  the  other 
to  accept  it;  and,  under  Article  XV,  if  any 
party  shall  refuse  so  to  comply,  "the  Coun- 
cil shall  propose  the  measures  necessary  to 
give  effect  to  the  recommendation."  Under 
Article  XVI,  the  Council  is  to  recommend 
"what  effective  military  or  naval  force  the 
members  of  the  League  shall  severally  con- 
tribute to  the  armed  forces  to  be  used  to 
protect  the  covenants  of  the  League."  Under 
Article  XVII  the  Council  may  coerce 
States  not  members  of  the  League,  and 
under  Article  XXII  it  exercises  sovereign 
rights  through  its  mandates  to  members  of 
the  League.  It  is  true  that  all  these  powers 
are  expressed  in  terms  of  invitation  rather 
than  terms  of  command,  but  unless  the 
Council  is  regarded  as  acting  with  authority 
it  is  difficult  to  see  that  there  is  any  provi- 
sion for  the  effective  enforcement  of  peace 
or  of  any  covenants  whatever. 

There  remain,  however,  the  "obligations 

of  the  Covenant";  and  it  is  upon  these  that 

the  Ex-President  lays  the  whole  burden. 

The  treaty-making  power,  he  holds, — that 

219 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

is,  the  President  and  Senate, — is  empow- 
ered by  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  to  make  treaties,  which  "enables  them 
to  bind  the  United  States  to  a  contract  with 
another  nation  on  any  subject  usually  the 
subject  matter  of  treaties  between  nations, 
subject  to  the  limitation  that  the  treaty  may 
not  change  the  form  of  the  government  of  the 
United  States.  ...  It  therefore  follows  that 
whenever  the  treaty-making  power  binds  the 
United  States  to  do  anything  it  must  be 
done  by  the  branch  of  that  government 
vested  by  the  Constitution  with  that  func- 
tion." This  is  to  say  that  when  the  treaty- 
making  power  engages  to  make  war,  to  raise 
armies  and  maintain  navies,  or  not  to  raise 
armies  and  maintain  navies,  or  to  do  any- 
thing which  the  Constitution  empowers 
Congress  to  do,  Congress  must  do  it,  and  has 
no  choice,  except  to  take  notice  that  the  ob- 
ligation has  fallen  due  and  action  must  be 
taken. 

Thus  Mr.   Taft  very  ingeniously  takes 
away  from  the  Council  of  the  League  all  the 
attributes  of  a  super-government  only  to 
280 


PRESIDENT'S  CHALLENGE  TO  SENATE 

include  them  in  the  "obligations  of  the  Cove- 
nant" created  by  the  President  and  Senate 
of  the  United  States. 

That  the  Constitution  of  the  League  thus 
creates  a  super-government,  that  is,  a  form 
of  authority  under  which  the  Congress  of 
the  United  States  is  compelled  to  act  when 
the  casus  fcederis  calls  for  its  action,  must 
be  candidly  admitted.  Senator  Knox  finds 
this  compulsion  in  the  Council,  the  "instru- 
mentality through  which  the  League's 
action  is  effected."  Mr.  Taft  finds  it  in 
"the  obligations  of  the  Covenant."  In  either 
case,  the  result  is  the  same.  The  League 
binds  Congress  to  declare  war,  raise  and  ex- 
pend money,  and  do  many  other  acts,  not 
when  Congress  in  its  own  judgment  con- 
siders them  timely  and  necessary,  but  when 
the  "obligations  of  the  Covenant"  require  it. 

These  obligations,  the  Ex-President  not 
only  admits  but  asserts,  are  commands  to 
Congress  to  act  in  the  way  they  prescribe. 
Who  then  creates  these  obligations?  The 
President  of  the  United  States  thinks  they 
can  be  created  by  himself  alone  through  his 
281 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

influence  at  Paris,  and  that  the  Senate  can 
then  be  forced  to  accept  them  whether  the 
senators  wish  to  do  so  or  not.  The  Ex- 
President  of  the  United  States  does  not  go  so 
far  as  this.  He  considers  it  necessary  for  the 
whole  treaty-making  power  to  create  these 
obligations,  but  he  believes  that  the  Presi- 
dent and  Senate  together  can  create  them; 
and  that,  having  done  so,  the  Congress  of 
the  United  States  must  act  when  the  obli- 
gations fall  due,  and  will  have  no  freedom 
beyond  the  recognition  of  the  fact  that  the 
time  has  arrived  for  the  fulfilment  of  the  ob- 
ligations thus  created.  The  Council  will 
"advise"  the  Congress  of  this  and  "recom- 
mend" its  action.  The  only  escape  from 
action  would  be  either  an  attempt  on  the 
part  of  Congress  to  prove  that  the  Council 
was  misinterpreting  the  treaty  or  the  failure 
of  our  Government  to  respect  it. 

In  such  circumstances  is  it  reprehensible 
that  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  should 
wish  to  consider  with  great  care  the  nature 
of  the  obligations  to  be  undertaken,  and 
should  refuse  to  be  forced  into  acquies- 
282 


PRESIDENT'S  CHALLENGE  TO  SENATE 

cence  by  an  executive  demand  that  all  "ex- 
pediency" is  to  be  disregarded? 

Objections  to  the  original  proposal  ac- 
cepted at  Paris  were  raised  by  members  of 
all  political  parties  in  the  United  States.  It 
is  futile,  therefore,  to  regard  criticism  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  League  as  a  partisan  op- 
position. Its  most  ardent  advocate,  for 
reasons  which  are  obvious,  has  been  Ex- 
President  Taft.  Although  committed  a 
priori  to  the  formation  of  a  "League,"  there 
were,  nevertheless,  modifications  which  he 
as  well  as  others  considered  it  desirable  to 
make  respecting  the  engagements  of  the 
United  States.  The  first  relates  to  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  consisting  of  an  amendment 
making  reservations  to  safeguard  it ;  the  sec- 
ond to  secure  any  country  in  the  League  the 
right  to  control  matters  solely  within  its  do- 
mestic jurisdiction,  such  as  the  question  of 
immigration;  and  one  to  provide  for  a  with- 
drawal from  the  League  of  Nations,  and 
possibly  for  a  definite  term  of  the  existence 
of  the  League  itself.  It  is  noteworthy  that 
all  these  changes  are  in  the  direction  of  re- 
283 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

stricting  the  power  and  limiting  the  dura- 
tion of  the  League. 

Other  eminent  American  statesmen  also 
have  suggested  improvements  in  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  League  as  originally  pro- 
posed.3 All  of  them  unite  in  demanding  the 
retention  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Upon 
this  point  Mr.  Charles  Evans  Hughes  and 
Mr.  Elihu  Root  have  been  particularly  ex- 
plicit in  counselling  that  it  be  made  clear 
that  no  obligation  assumed  by  the  United 
States  shall  imply  the  renunciation  of  its 
time-honored  policy  with  regard  to  strictly 
American  questions. 

This  earnest  expression  of  solicitude  has 
produced  an  effect  at  Paris,  but  the  result 
has  occasioned  bewilderment.  It  has  never 
been  considered  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
is  to  be  classed  with  international  engage- 
ments, treaties  of  arbitration,  or  regional 
understandings  for  securing  the  maintenance 
of  peace ;  and  the  amazement  was  therefore 
great  when  the  public  was  informed  that 

8  See  at  the  end  of  this  volume  the  amendments  referred 
to. 

284 


PRESIDENT'S  CHALLENGE  TO  SENATE 

Article  X,  which  pledges  the  members  of 
the  League  "to  respect  and  preserve  as 
against  external  aggression"  one  another's 
"territorial  integrity  and  existing  political 
independence,"  was  to  be  amended  by  the 
addition  of  the  words: 

"Nothing  in  this  covenant  shall  be  deemed 
to  affect  the  validity  of  international  en- 
gagements, such  as  treaties  of  arbitration  or 
regional  understandings  like  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  for  securing  the  maintenance  of 
peace,"  which  now  appear  as  Article  XXI 
in  the  revised  covenant. 

It  is  proudly  announced  that  at  last,  in 
the  midst  of  much  opposition  and  by  great 
efforts,  the  President  succeeded  in  securing 
the  recognition  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  a 
part  of  International  Law !  It  seems  rather 
disingenuous,  after  heralding  the  League  as 
itself  an  extension  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
to  all  the  world,  as  the  President  has  done, 
that  he  should  make  a  struggle  for  its  inclu- 
sion in  this  treaty,  and  in  such  a  form !  That 
the  President  should  ever  have  accepted  the 
language  of  this  amendment,  which  it  is  al- 
285 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

most  inconceivable  that  any  American  could 
have  written,  as  a  characterization  of  a 
policy  of  the  United  States,  which  is  neither 
a  law,  nor  an  international  engagement,  nor 
a  regional  understanding,  but  simply  and 
solely  a  political  policy,  is  certainly  surpris- 
ing. 

It  is  doubtful  if  the  presence  of  these 
strange  words  in  the  Covenant  of  the  League 
can  ever  transform  a  purely  national  policy 
into  International  Law,  which  would  only 
denature  it.  It  requires  no  sanction  by  a 
lawmaking  body,  and  if  it  did  the  Confer- 
ence at  Paris  could  not  give  it.  It  is  a  life 
principle  of  the  American  Republic,  and 
means  two  things:  first,  that  no  foreign 
Power  shall  ever  acquire  a  foothold  on  this 
continent  that  would  menace  the  security  of 
this  nation ;  and,  second,  that  this  nation  will 
never  imperil  its  own  existence  by  interven- 
tion in  non- American  affairs. 

Never  before  the  Great  War  had  it  been 

necessary  for  the  United  States  to  fight  in 

Europe  for  its  own  rights,  but  the  ambitions 

and  methods  of  the  Imperial  German  Gov- 

286 


PRESIDENT'S  CHALLENGE  TO  SENATE 

ernment  created  that  necessity.  We  have 
in  this  war  fought  for  Belgium,  for  France, 
for  Great  Britain,  and  other  nations  because 
they  were  fighting  for  us,  and  we  shall  do  so 
again  if  our  common  enemy  renews  the  at- 
tack ;  but  we  have  never  yet  been  committed 
to  a  pledge  to  fight  for  everybody  every- 
where. The  Monroe  Doctrine  has  remained 
until  now  an  uncompromised  national  policy, 
and  it  should  be  permanently  maintained  in 
its  twofold  meaning  as  a  prohibition  of  for- 
eign intrusion  on  the  American  continent 
and  as  a  limitation  of  responsibility  in  other 
parts  of  the  world. 

The  amendment  as  it  stands  in  the  revised 
Covenant  does  not  express  this  intention. 
Article  XXI  has  more  appropriate  appli- 
cation to  the  secret  treaty  of  London,  which 
the  President  repudiates,  than  it  has  to  the 
Monroe  Doctrine;  for  the  secret  treaty  of 
London  was  a  "regional  understanding," 
while  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  not.  The 
form  of  reservation  attached  to  the  Hague 
Conventions  was  explicit  and  accurate,4  and 

4  See  the  text  of  this  reservation  at  the  end  of  this  volume. 
287 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

might  well,  with  slight  modification,  be  at- 
tached to  the  present  treaty,  which  would  be 
in  the  spirit  of  Mr.  Root's  third  and  Mr. 
Hughes'  third  and  fourth  proposed  amend- 
ments. 

Mr.  Root  further  suggests,  in  his  sixth 
amendment,  the  calling  of  a  general  confer- 
ence of  the  members  after  five  or  ten  years 
to  revise  the  Covenant,  after  which  any  mem- 
ber, on  a  year's  notice,  may  withdraw  from 
the  League;  and  Mr.  Hughes  would  make 
provision  that  any  member  may  withdraw 
"at  its  pleasure  on  specified  notice,"  instead 
of  after  two  years'  notice  of  its  intention  to 
do  so,  as  provided  in  the  revised  draft  of 
Article  I.  He  also  proposed  that  no  mem- 
ber shall  be  constituted  a  mandatary  with- 
out its  consent,  which  has  been  accepted,  and 
that  no  European  or  Asiatic  Power  shall  be 
constituted  a  mandatary  of  any  American 
people. 

Even  as  thus  modified,  the  League  would 
be  far  from  the  realization  of  the  highest  in- 
ternational ideals.  It  has  been  pointed  out 
that  the  Covenant  neither  recognizes  as  bind- 
288 


PRESIDENT'S  CHALLENGE  TO  SENATE 

ing  the  rules  of  International  Law  nor 
makes  provision  for  the  improvement  of 
them.  As  a  limited  corporation  in  the  gen- 
eral Society  of  States,  it  cannot  claim  uni- 
versality or  justly  exercise  lawmaking 
powers  that  all  sovereign  States  would  be 
bound  to  respect.  It  would  be  merely  a 
single  political  organism  in  a  community  of 
jurally  equal  States.  Other  leagues  might 
be  formed  which,  even  if  they  did  not  equal 
it  in  power,  could  claim  an  equal  justifica- 
tion for  their  existence.  They  also  would 
aim  to  be  self -protective.  In  brief,  even 
though  the  League  were  preponderant,  it 
would  not  constitute  the  Society  of  States. 

To  prevent  the  continuance  of  what  would 
thus  remain  at  most  a  mere  preponderance 
of  power,  Mr.  Root  has  proposed  in  his  sec- 
ond amendment  a  method  of  making  the 
League  the  means  of  a  transition  to  a  real 
Society  of  Nations.  His  proposal,  which 
was  endorsed  by  the  Executive  Committee 
of  the  American  Society  of  International 
Law  and  cabled  to  Paris,  is  as  follows: 

"The  Executive  Council  shall  call  a  gen- 
289 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

eral  conference  of  the  Powers  to  meet  not 
less  than  two  years  or  more  than  five  years 
after  the  signing  of  this  convention  for  the 
purpose  of  reviewing  the  condition  of  Inter- 
national Law,  and  of  agreeing  upon  and 
stating  in  its  authoritative  form  the  prin- 
ciples and  rules  thereof. 

"Thereafter  regular  conferences  for  that 
purpose  shall  be  called  and  held  at  stated 
times." 

This  wise  suggestion  was  not  adopted  at 
Paris;  a  fact  which  justifies  the  inference 
that  the  League  intends  to  decide  questions 
of  International  Law  in  its  own  way,  and  in 
accordance  with  its  own  corporate  policies. 
In  short,  it  intends  to  act  imperially. 

As  an  example  of  this,  take  the  provision 
for  determining  whether  or  not  a  given  ques- 
tion is  one  of  domestic  jurisdiction,  like  the 
tariff  or  the  immigration  question.  Article 
XV  reads :  "If  the  dispute  ...  is  found  by 
the  Council  to  arise  out  of  a  matter  which 
by  International  Law  is  solely  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  that  party,  the  Council  shall 
so  report,  and  shall  make  no  recommenda- 
290 


PRESIDENT'S  CHALLENGE  TO  SENATE 

tion  as  to  its  settlement."  But,  it  is  imme- 
diately added,  "The  Council  may  in  any  case 
under  this  Article  refer  the  dispute  to  the 
Assembly" ;  that  is,  even  though  the  question 
at  issue  is  under  International  Law  a  do- 
mestic one,  upon  which  the  Council  made 
no  recommendation,  it  could  be  referred  to 
the  Assembly  for  decision!  The  nature  of 
the  decision  would  then  depend  upon  the 
policy  which  the  Assembly  chose  to  adopt. 
If  the  United  States  were  a  disputant,  it 
would  have  no  voice  in  the  decision,  which 
would  be  made  by  others,  without  reference 
to  International  Law,  in  accordance  with 
their  prevailing  policies,  whatever  they 
might  be. 

Before  entering  into  such  bonds  with  for- 
eign Powers,  it  is  timely  to  consider  the 
consequences  of  making  engagements,  nomi- 
nally in  the  interest  of  peace,  regarding  mat- 
ters which  have  no  logical  connection  with 
a  treaty  of  peace  and  are  arbitrarily  forced 
into  it.  It  is  inevitable  that  matters  which 
we  have  always  considered  purely  national 
will  be  treated  by  the  League  as  inter- 
291 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

national.  This  is  true  of  our  foreign  policy 
as  a  whole,  which  under  the  League  would 
be  equally  the  affair  of  all  the  members.  Not 
even  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  which  we  have 
always  considered  peculiarly  our  own  affair, 
would  be  exempted  from  this  total  surrender 
of  national  policy.  In  the  British  Memo- 
randum, giving  the  views  of  London  regard- 
ing the  Monroe  Doctrine,  for  example,  that 
purely  American  policy  is  already  treated 
as  an  "international  understanding/'  to  be 
interpreted  and  applied  by  the  Council  and 
the  Assembly,  and  not  any  longer  by  the 
United  States  alone.  "Should  any  dispute 
arise  between  American  and  European 
Powers,"  concludes  this  commentary,  ffthe 
League  is  there  to  settle  It!' 

After  such  an  assumption  as  this  what 
will  remain,  under  this  Covenant,  of  an  in- 
dependent American  foreign  policy?  The 
powers  which  in  the  first  draft  of  the  Cove- 
nant were  attributed  to  the  Executive  Coun- 
cil are  in  the  revised  document  largely  trans- 
ferred to  the  Assembly.  In  that  larger  body 
the  United  States  would  have  three  repre- 


PRESIDENT'S  CHALLENGE  TO  SENATE 

sentatives,  but  only  one  vote.  Among  the 
"original  members"  of  the  League  and  sep- 
arate "signatories  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace," 
are  specified,  "the  British  Empire,  Canada, 
Australia,  South  Africa,  New  Zealand  and 
India."  5  These  six  members,  with  a  close 
community  of  primary  interests,  would  be 
entitled  to  eighteen  representatives  and  six 
votes  in  the  Assembly,  while  the  United 
States,  which  has  a  greater  self-governing 
population  than  all  of  these  imperial  domin- 
ions combined,  would  have  only  three  repre- 
sentatives and  only  one  vote. 

It  is  an  unwelcome  task,  in  view  of  the 
close  friendship  that  should  exist  between  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain,  to  call  at- 
tention to  this  disparity;  for  real  friendship 
never  anywhere  long  continues  in  the  pres- 
ence of  doubt  as  to  perfect  freedom  and  per- 
fect equality.  For  common  interests  and 
common  purposes  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain — which  have  so  much  in  com- 
mon— should  act  together;  but  it  must  not 

6  See  the  Annex  to  the  Revised  Covenant  at  the  end  of 
the  volume. 

293 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

be  overlooked  that  the  British  Empire  has 
interests  and  policies  which  the  United 
States  has  never  shared  and  has  not  always 
approved.  As  a  people  we  have  never  re- 
gretted our  separate  and  independent  exist- 
ence, and  there  are  many  millions  of  Ameri- 
can citizens  who  will  not  submit  to  abandon- 
ing it  now.  Nothing  could  more  fatally  de- 
stroy the  friendship  of  these  two  countries 
than  a  conviction  that  what  was  fought  for 
and  won  in  1776  is  to  be  lightly  surrendered 
in  the  floodtide  of  our  national  greatness  at 
the  end  of  a  victorious  war. 

There  are  those  who  believe  that  at  Paris 
American  interests  have  been  subordinated 
to  foreign  interests,  in  order  to  secure  the 
success  of  the  President's  personal  theories. 
They  believe  that  he  went  to  Europe  to  say 
in  private  what  he  did  not  wish  to  discuss  in 
public;  that  he  intended  to  establish  a 
League  that  would  make  possible  a  com- 
promise peace;  that  this  League  was  origi- 
nally intended  to  limit  the  supremacy  of 
Great  Britain  on  the  sea,  and  thus  placate 
the  hostility  of  Germany;  that  France,  as  a 
294 


PRESIDENT'S  CHALLENGE  TO  SENATE 

means  of  obtaining  future  security,  could  be 
made  to  enter  such  a  League  along  with 
Germany ;  that,  upon  these  conditions,  a  gen- 
eral reciprocal  guarantee  of  territory  could 
be  obtained,  and  that  the  rivalries  of  trade 
could  in  future  be  avoided  by  "the  removal 
of  all  economic  barriers  and  the  establish- 
ment of  an  equality  of  trade  conditions 
among  all  the  nations  consenting  to  the 
peace  and  associating  themselves  for  its 
maintenance."  6 

To  carry  this  theory  into  effect,  it  was 
necessary  to  interweave  the  treaty  of  peace 
with  the  formation  of  a  League  in  such  a 
manner  that  all  who  desired  peace, — for  it 
was  certain  that  all  the  belligerents  wished 
for  peace  as  soon  as  possible, — would  be 
forced  to  accept  the  League,  whether  they 
desired  it  or  not ;  for  the  League  thus  organ- 
ized was  to  create  a  new  international  order, 
which  the  President  believed  would  put  an 
end  to  war,  and  be  the  greatest  achievement 
in  history. 

8  See  number  3  of  the  Fourteen  Points  at  the  end  of  this 
volume. 

295 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Without  discussing  in  a  critical  spirit  the 
character  of  the  motives  of  this  great  enter- 
prise, it  is  clear  that  the  execution  of  this 
purpose  involved  secrecy,  opposition  to  a 
prompt  peace  of  victory,  negotiation  with 
adverse  national  interests,  and  some  conces- 
sions for  the  purpose  of  winning  adherents. 

It  will  probably  be  many  years  before  the 
conversations  of  the  Supreme  Council  of 
Ten,  the  "Big  Four"  and  the  "Big  Three" 
will  become  known  to  the  public,  and  some  of 
them  will  perhaps  never  be  known  or  be  vari- 
ously reported  in  memoirs  and  autobiogra- 
phies. The  participants  will  no  doubt  have 
for  a  long  time  a  certain  control  over  one 
another. 

It  was  pointed  out  in  a  friendly  spirit  be- 
fore the  President  went  to  Europe,  that  by 
appointing  himself  as  first  delegate  and  re- 
pudiating written  instructions  to  intermedi- 
aries, he  was  risking  the  charge  of  secret 
diplomacy  and  the  deliberate  abandonment 
of  the  idea  of  covenants  "openly  arrived  at." 

The  Senate  of  the  United  States,  if  the 
ordinary  course  had  been  adopted,  would  be 
296 


PRESIDENT'S  CHALLENGE  TO  SENATE 

in  a  position  to  know  from  records  what  was 
the  actual  course  of  negotiation.  In  the 
absence  of  this,  unless  the  President  wishes 
personally  to  submit  to  interrogation,  there 
is  room  for  a  wide  scope  of  inference  regard- 
ing the  bargains  made  to  secure  the  League. 

There  are  those  who  will  wonder  why  the 
alleged  American  plan  of  a  League  has 
never  been  published;  who  will  infer  that  it 
was  rejected  or  withdrawn  because  it  was 
needful  to  adopt  a  more  flexible  trading  pro- 
gramme ;  and  who  will  think  that  the  Smuts 
plan  was  adopted  because  without  conces- 
sions to  Great  Britain  there  could  have  been 
no  League,  and  without  a  league  of  some 
kind  the  Great  Mission  would  have  been  a 
failure. 

One  might  imagine  the  British  Premier  as 
saying:  "There  is  already  a  League  of 
Nations.  The  British  Empire  is  such  a 
league.  If  you  will  model  the  League  on 
that,  as  General  Smuts  suggests,  we  might 
regard  it  favorably.  Of  course  we  must  re- 
tain our  sea-power.  Unless  you  will  pledge 
the  large  navy  you  are  developing  in  the 
297 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

United  States  to  the  defense  of  the  Empire, 
we  must  defend  ourselves.  Of  course  under 
the  League,  the  rights  of  neutrality,  to  which 
you  have  held  so  closely  in  the  past,  would 
no  longer  exist.  If  you  will  help  us  out  with 
mandataries  and  defend  our  imperial  pos- 
sessions from  future  attack,  perhaps  we  can 
arrange  for  a  League." 

"But  by  this  plan,  what  advantage  does 
the  United  States  get?" 

"Why,  Mr.  President,  you  get  the 
League!" 

With  France  negotiations  were,  perhaps, 
less  complicated,  for  without  some  special 
provision,  even  after  peace  was  signed, 
France  would  be  unprotected.  One  can  im- 
agine a  question  to  Monsieur  Clemenceau: 
"Where  will  France  look  for  protection,  if 
not  to  the  League?" — "To  the  honor  of  her 
co-belligerents." — "But  would  not  the  mu- 
tual guarantees  of  the  League  be  sufficient?" 
"With  Germany  a  League  is  impossible." — 
"What  then  do  you  expect?"  —  "We  expect 
a  separate  defensive  alliance ;  for  the  League 
does  not  aif ord  security  for  France.  If  you 
298 


PRESIDENT'S  CHALLENGE  TO  SENATE 

have  the  League,  we  must  have  the  separate 
alliance." 

And  so,  even  without  documents,  the  logic 
of  the  situation  renders  it  not  difficult  to 
understand  what  has  happened  at  Paris; 
why  the  League  was  always,  except  in 
America,  regarded  and  spoken  of  as  fTidee 
Americcdne"  and  also  why  the  League  had 
to  be  intertwined  inextricably  with  the  long 
deferred  and  much  desired  treaty  of  peace, 
in  order  to  force  the  hand  of  the  Senate. 

Acting  by  itself,  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States  would  probably  regard  the  prestige 
of  reorganizing  the  world  on  paper  as  bought 
at  too  high  a  price  by  the  acceptance  of  the 
responsibilities  of  Article  X  and  American 
participation  in  the  international  political 
trust  that  is  to  issue  "Acts  and  Charters"  for 
the  sovereign  rule  of  countries  and  colonies 
in  Europe,  Asia,  and  Africa  with  which  the 
United  States,  as  a  constitutional  self- 
governing  nation,  has  no  right  of  interfer- 
ence. 

However  the  Senate  may  regard  the 
President's  challenge,  it  cannot  escape  re- 
299 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

sponsibility  for  its  decision.  There  is  one 
aspect  of  the  subject  of  the  highest  impor- 
tance to  the  future  of  the  American  Repub- 
lic that  has  been  left  in  obscurity  by  nearly 
all  who  have  commented  on  the  proposed 
League,  namely,  the  joint  imperialism  which 
it  establishes.  This,  though  overlooked  in 
America,  is  well  understood  in  Great  Brit- 
ain, and  preparations  are  making  to  render 
it  effective.  General  Smuts,  who  is  a  prac- 
tical officer,  recognizes  that  it  is  necessary 
for  the  League  "to  train  big  staffs  to  look  at 
things  from  a  large  human,  instead  of 
national  point  of  view."  The  Grand  Sec- 
retariat now  being  organized  in  London, 
under  the  direction  of  Sir  James  Eric  Drum- 
mond,  of  the  British  Foreign  Office,  will  be 
the  school  in  which  the  international  bureau- 
cracy will  be  formed  and  tempered  to  its 
task.  Viscount  Grey  sees  a  great  future  for 
this  super-national  rule  of  the  world  under 
benevolent  experts.  "I  don't  see/'  he  said, 
"why  the  League  of  Nations,  once  formed, 
should  be  necessarily  idle."  Nor  would  he 
leave  it  without  means  of  action.  "I  don't 
300 


PRESIDENT'S  CHALLENGE  TO  SENATE 

see  why,"  he  continued,  "it  should  not  be 
arranged  for  an  authoritative  and  an  inter- 
national force  to  be  at  its  disposal,  which 
should  act  as  police  in  individual  countries." 
It  is  this  that  makes  the  acceptance  of  a 
place  in  the  League  by  the  United  States  so 
imperative  for  its  success.  This  policing  of 
the  world  requires  men  and  money.  America 
has  both.  Europe's  answer  to  America's 
great  idea  of  a  League  is :  "We  accept  it  with 
pleasure.  Now  stop  the  fighting  that  has  not 
ceased  from  Finland  to  the  Crimea,  while 
the  Peace  Conference  has  been  in  session. 
We  have  our  own  idea  of  these  things  based 
on  a  long  experience.  We  will  try  your 
plan,  but  in  the  meantime  you  must  make 
the  Turk  spare  the  Armenian,  a  mutilated 
Poland  be  satisfied  with  its  lot,  keep  the 
Hungarians  and  the  Roumanians  quiet  on 
the  Theiss,  settle  the  disputes  of  the  Italians 
and  the  Jugo- Slavs  in  the  Adriatic,  make 
Persia  a  safe  place  to  live  in,  and  keep  Ger- 
many within  bounds.  Unless  your  League 
can  do  these  things,  ft  has  not  helped  us 
much,  but  if  it  does  them  it  will  be  chiefly  at 
301 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

your  expense ;  for  we  must  put  our  house  in 
order  and  pay  our  debts  while  we  guard  our 
frontiers.  We  have  not  asked  you  for  a 
League.  We  are  interested  in  our  own 
national  life.  We  have  consented  to  the 
League,  but  we  have  never  much  believed  in 
it.  Now  let  America  show  us  that  it  will 
work." 

And  the  Senate  will  have  to  answer  to  the 
country  for  the  engagements  it  ratifies. 


DOCUMENTS 

I.    PRESIDENT  WILSON'S 
"POINTS" 

THE  "FOURTEEN  POINTS"  OF  JANUARY  8, 
1918. 

1.  Open  covenants   of  peace,  openly  arrived  at, 
after  which  there  shall  be  no  private  international 
understandings    of    any    kind,    but    diplomacy    shall 
proceed  always  frankly  and  in  the  public  view. 

2.  Absolute  freedom  of  navigation  upon  the  seas, 
outside  territorial  waters,  alike  in  peace  and  in  war, 
except   as   the   seas   may   be   closed   in  whole   or  in 
part  by  international  action  for  the  enforcement  of 
international  covenants. 

[The  allied  Governments  reserved  to  themselves 
complete  freedom  on  this  point,  November  5,  and 
stated  their  understanding  that  the  word  "restored" 
in  the  paragraph  below  dealing  with  invaded  countries 
means  compensation  by  Germany  for  damage  to 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

civilian  population  of  the  Allies  and  their  property. 
To  the  latter  point  President  Wilson  formally  as- 
sented.] 

3.  The  removal,   so  far  as  possible,  of  all  eco- 
nomic barriers  and  the  establishment  of  an  equality 
of  trade  conditions  among  all  the  nations  consenting 
to  the  peace  and  associating  themselves  for  its  main- 
tenance. 

4.  Adequate  guarantees  given  and  taken  that  na- 
tional armaments  will  be  reduced  to  the  lowest  point 
consistent  with  domestic  safety. 

5.  A  free,  open-minded,  and  absolutely  impartial 
adjustment  of  all  colonial  claims,  based  upon  a  strict 
observance  of  the  principle  that  in  determining  all 
such   questions   of   sovereignty   the   interests   of  the 
populations  concerned  must  have  equal  weight  with 
the  equitable  claims   of  the  government  whose  title 
is  to  be  determined. 

6.  The   evacuation   of   all   Russian   territory  and 
such  a  settlement  of  all  questions  affecting  Russia  as 
will  secure  the  best  and   freest  cooperation   of  the 
other  nations  of  the  world  in  obtaining  for  her  an 
unhampered  and  unembarrassed  opportunity  for  the 
independent  determination  of  her  own  political  devel- 
opment and  national  policy,  and  assure  her  of  a  sin- 
cere welcome  into  the  society  of  free  nations  under 
institutions  of  her  own  choosing,  and,  more  than  a 
welcome,  assistance  also  of  every  kind  that  she  may 
need  and  may  herself  desire.     The  treatment  accorded 

304 


PRESIDENT  WILSON'S  "POINTS" 

Russia  by  her  sister  nations  in  the  months  to  come 
will  be  the  acid  test  of  their  good  will,  of  their 
comprehension  of  her  needs  as  distinguished  from 
their  own  interests,  and  of  their  intelligent  and  un- 
selfish sympathy. 

1  7-  Belgium,  the  whole  world  will  agree,  must  be 
evacuated  and  restored,  without  any  attempt  to  limit 
the  sovereignty  which  she  enjoys  in  common  with 
all  other  free  nations.  No  other  single  act  will  serve 
as  this  will  serve  to  restore  confidence  among  the 
nations  in  the  laws  which  they  have  themselves  set 
and  determined  for  the  government  of  their  relations 
with  one  another.  Without  this  healing  act  the 
whole  structure  and  validity  of  international  law 
is  forever  impaired. 

8.  All  French  territory  should  be  freed  and  the 
invaded   portions   restored,   and   the   wrong   done   to 
France  by  Prussia  in  1871  in  the  matter  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  which  has  unsettled  the  peace  of  the  world 
for  nearly  fifty  years,  should  be  righted,  in  order 
that  peace  may  once  more  be  made  secure  in  the 
interest  of  all. 

9.  A  readjustment  of  the  frontiers  of  Italy  should 
be  effected  along  clearly  recognizable  lines  of  na- 
tionality. 

10.  The  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary,  whose  place 
among  the  nations  we  wish  to  see  safeguarded  and 
assured,  should  be  accorded  the  freest  opportunity  of 
autonomous  development. 

305 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

[On  October  19^  the  President  notified  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  which  had  requested  an  arm- 
istice that  certain  conditions  had  changed  since  Jan- 
uary 8.  Quoting  point  10,  Secretary  Lansing's  note 
said:  "Since  that  sentence  was  written  and  uttered 
to  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  has  recognized  that  a  state  of 
belligerency  exists  between  the  Czecho-Slovaks  and 
the  German  and  Austro-Hungarian  Empires  and  that 
the  Czecho-Slovak  National  Council  is  a  de  facto 
belligerent  Government  clothed  with  proper  author- 
ity to  direct  the  military  and  political  affairs  of  the 
Czecho-Slovaks.  It  has  also  recognized  in  the  fullest 
manner  the  justice  of  the  nationalistic  aspirations  of 
the  Jugo-Slavs  for  freedom.  The  President  is,  there- 
fore, no  longer  at  liberty  to  accept  the  mere 
'autonomy*  of  these  peoples  as  a  basis  of  peace,  but 
is  obliged  to  insist  that  they,  and  not  he,  shall  be 
the  judges  of  what  action  on  the  part  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  will  satisfy  their  aspirations 
and  their  conception  of  their  rights  and  destiny  as 
members  of  the  family  of  nations."] 

11.  Rumania,  Serbia,  and  Montenegro  should  be 
evacuated,  occupied  territories  restored,  Serbia  ac- 
corded free  and  secure  access  to  the  sea,  and  the  re- 
lations of  the  several  Balkan  states  to  one  another 
determined  by  friendly  counsel  along  historical  estab- 
lished lines  of  allegiance  and  nationality,  and  inter- 
national guarantees  of  the  political  Aid  economic 
306 


PRESIDENT  WILSON'S  "POINTS" 

independence  and  territorial  integrity  of  the  several 
Balkan  states  should  be  entered  into. 

12.  The  Turkish  portions  of  the  present  Ottoman 
Empire  should  be  assured  a  secure  sovereignty,  but 
the  other  nationalities  which  are  now  under  Turkish 
rule  should  be  assured  an  undoubted  security  of  life 
and  an  absolutely  unmolested  opportunity  of  autono- 
mous  development,   and   the   Dardanelles   should  be 
permanently  opened  as  a  free  passage  to  the  ships 
and  commerce  of  all  nations  under  international  guar- 
antees. 

1 3.  An  independent  Polish  state  should  be  erected, 
which  should  include  the  territories  inhabited  by  in- 
disputably  Polish  populations,  which  should  be  as- 
sured a  free  and  secure  access  to  the  sea,  and  whose 
political  and  economic   independence  and  territorial 
integrity     should    be    guaranteed    by    international 
covenant. 

14.  A    general    association    of    nations    must    be 
formed  under  specific  covenants  for  the  purpose  of 
affording  mutual  guarantees  of  political  independence 
and   territorial   integrity   to    great   and   small   states 
alike. 

THE  FIVE  POINTS  OF  SEPTEMBER  27,  1918. 

(Address  at  Metropolitan  Opera  House,  New  York) 

As  I  see  it,  the  constitution  of  that  league  of  na- 
tions and  the  clear  definition  of  its  objects  must  be 
307 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

a  part,  is  in  a  sense  the  most  essential  part,  of  the 
peace  settlement  itself.  ...  It  is  necessary  to 
guarantee  the  peace,  and  the  peace  cannot  be  guar- 
anteed as  an  afterthought. 

First,  the  impartial  justice  meted  out  must  involve 
no  discrimination  between  those  to  whom  we  wish 
to  be  just  and  those  to  whom  we  do  not  wish  to  be 
just.  It  must  be  a  justice  that  plays  no  favorites 
and  knows  no  standard  but  equal  rights  of  the  several 
peoples  concerned; 

Second,  no  special  or  separate  interest  of  any  single 
nation  or  any  group  of  nations  can  be  made  the  basis 
of  any  part  of  the  settlement  which  is  not  consistent 
with  the  common  interest  of  all; 

Third,  there  can  be  no  leagues  or  alliances  or 
special  covenants  and  understandings  within  the  gen- 
eral and  common  family  of  the  league  of  nations; 

Fourth,  and  more  specifically,  there  can  be  no 
special,  selfish  economic  combinations  within  the 
league  and  no  employment  of  any  form  of  economic 
boycott  or  exclusion  except  as  the  power  of  economic 
penalty  by  exclusion  from  the  markets  of  the  world 
may  be  vested  in  the  league  of  nations  itself  as  a 
means  of  discipline  and  control. 

Fifth,  all  international  agreements  and  treaties  of 
every  kind  must  be  made  known  in  their  entirety  to 
the  rest  of  the  world. 


II.  THE  COVENANT  AS  ORIGI- 
NALLY AGREED  UPON  AT 
PARIS,  FEBRUARY  14, 1919 


PREAMBLE 

In  order  to  promote  international  co-operation  and 
to  secure  international  peace  and  security  by  the  ac- 
ceptance of  obligations  not  to  resort  to  war,  by  the 
prescription  of  open,  just  and  honorable  relations 
between  nations,  by  the  firm  establishment  of  the 
understandings  of  international  law  as  the  actual  rule 
of  conduct  among  governments,  and  by  the  main- 
tenance of  justice  and  a  scrupulous  respect  for  all 
treaty  obligations  in  the  dealings  of  organized  peoples 
with  one  another,  the  Powers  signatory  to  this  Cov- 
enant adopt  this  constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

Article  I 

The  action  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  under 
the  terms  of  this  Covenant  shall  be  effected  through 
the  instrumentality  of  meetings  of  a  Body  of  Dele- 
gates representing  the  High  Contracting  Parties,  of 
meetings  at  more  frequent  intervals  of  an  Executive 
Council,  and  of  a  permanent  international  Secretariat 
to  be  established  at  the  Seat  of  the  League. 
309 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Article  II 

Meetings  of  the  Body  of  Delegates  shall  be  held  at 
stated  intervals  and  from  time  to  time  as  occasion  may 
require  for  the  purpose  of  dealing  with  matters  with- 
in the  sphere  of  action  of  the  League.  Meetings  of 
the  Body  of  Delegates  shall  be  held  at  the  Seat  of 
the  League  or  at  such  other  place  as  may  be  found 
convenient  and  shall  consist  of  representatives  of  the 
High  Contracting  Parties.  Each  of  the  High  Con- 
tracting Parties  shall  have  one  vote  but  may  have  not 
more  than  three  representatives. 

Article  III 

The  Executive  Council  shall  consist  of  representa- 
tives of  the  United  States  of  America,  the  British 
Empire,  France,  Italy  and  Japan,  together  with  rep- 
resentatives of  four  other  States,  members  of  the 
League.  The  selection  of  these  four  States  shall  be 
made  by  the  Body  of  Delegates  on  such  principles 
and  in  such  manner  as  they  think  fit.  Pending  the 
appointment  of  these  representatives  of  the  other 
States,  representatives  of  shall  be  mem- 

bers of  the  Executive  Council. 

Meetings  of  the  Council  shall  be  held  from  time 
to  time  as  occasion  may  require  and  at  least  once  a 
year  at  whatever  place  may  be  decided  on,  or  failing 
any  such  decision,  at  the  Seat  of  the  League,  and  any 
matter  within  the  sphere  of  action  of  the  League  or 
affecting  the  peace  of  the  world  may  be  dealt  with 
at  such  meetings. 

310 


ORIGINAL  COVENANT 

Invitations  shall  be  sent  to  any  Power  to  attend 
a  meeting  of  the  Council  at  which  matters  directly 
affecting  its  interests  are  to  be  discussed  and  no 
decision  taken  at  any  meeting  will  be  binding  on  such 
Power  unless  so  invited. 

Article  IV 

All  matters  of  procedure  at  meetings  of  the  Body  of 
Delegates  or  the  Executive  Council  including  the 
appointment  of  Committees  to  investigate  particular 
matters  shall  be  regulated  by  the  Body  of  Delegates 
or  the  Executive  Council  and  may  be  decided  by  a 
majority  of  the  States  represented  at  the  meeting. 

The  first  meeting  of  the  Body  of  Delegates  and  of 
the  Executive  Council  shall  be  summoned  by  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  of  America. 

Article  V 

The  permanent  Secretariat  of  the  League  shall  be 
established  at  which  shall 

constitute  the  Seat  of  the  League.  The  Secretariat 
shall  comprise  such  secretaries  and  staff  as  may  be 
required,  under  the  general  direction  and  control  of 
a  Secretary-General  of  the  League,  who  shall  be 
chosen  by  the  Executive  Council;  the  Secretariat 
shall  be  appointed  by  the  Secretary-General  subject 
to  confirmation  by  the  Executive  Council. 

The  Secretary-General  shall  act  in  that  capacity  at 
all  meetings  of  the  Body  of  Delegates  or  of  the  Ex- 
ecutive Council. 

311 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

The  expenses  of  the  Secretariat  shall  be  borne  by 
the  States  members  of  the  League  in  accordance  with 
the  apportionment  of  the  expenses  of  the  International 
Bureau  of  the  Universal  Postal  Union. 

Article  VI 

Representatives  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties 
and  officials  of  the  League  when  engaged  on  the  busi- 
ness of  the  League  shall  enjoy  diplomatic  privileges  and 
immunities,  and  the  buildings  occupied  by  the  League 
or  its  officials  or  by  representatives  attending  its  meet- 
ings shall  enjoy  the  benefits  of  extraterritoriality. 

Aiticle  VII 

Admission  to  the  League  of  States  not  signatories 
to  the  Covenant  and  not  named  in  the  Protocol  hereto 
as  States  to  be  invited  to  adhere  to  the  Covenant  re- 
quires the  assent  of  not  less  than  two-thirds  of  the 
States  represented  in  the  Body  of  Delegates,  and 
shall  be  limited  to  fully  self-governing  countries  in- 
cluding Dominions  and  Colonies. 

No  State  shall  be  admitted  to  the  League  unless  it 
is  able  to  give  effective  guarantees  of  its  sincere  inten- 
tion to  observe  its  international  obligations,  and  unless 
it  shall  conform  to  such  principles  as  may  be  pre- 
scribed by  the  League  in  regard  to  its  naval  and 
military  forces  and  armaments. 

Article  VTH 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  recognize  the  princi- 
ple that  the  maintenance  of  peace  will  require  the 


ORIGINAL  COVENANT 

reduction  of  national  armaments  to  the  lowest  point 
consistent  with  national  safety  and  the  enforcement  by 
common  action  of  international  obligations,  having 
special  regard  to  the  geographical  situation  and  cir- 
cumstances of  each  State;  and  the  Executive  Council 
shall  formulate  plans  for  effecting  such  reduction. 
The  Executive  Council  shall  also  determine  for  the 
consideration  and  action  of  the  several  governments 
what  military  equipment  and  armament  is  fair  and 
reasonable  in  proportion  to  the  scale  of  forces  laid 
down  in  the  programme  of  disarmament;  and  these 
limits,  when  adopted,  shall  not  be  exceeded  without 
the  permission  of  the  Executive  Council. 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  the  manu- 
facture by  private  enterprise  of  munitions  and  imple- 
ments of  war  lends  itself  to  grave  objections,  and 
direct  the  Executive  Council  to  advise  how  the  evil 
effects  attendant  upon  such  manufacture  can  be  pre- 
vented, due  regard  being  had  to  the  necessities  of  those 
countries  which  are  not  able  to  manufacture  for  them- 
selves the  munitions  and  implements  of  war  necessary 
for  their  safety. 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  undertake  in  no  way 
to  conceal  from  each  other  the  condition  of  such  of 
their  industries  as  are  capable  of  being  adapted  to 
war-like  purposes  or  the  scale  of  their  armaments, 
and  agree  that  there  shall  be  full  and  frank  inter- 
change of  information  as  to  their  military  and  naval 
programmes. 

313 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 
Article  IX 

A  permanent  Commission  shall  be  constituted  to  ad- 
vise the  League  on  the  execution  of  the  provisions  of 
Article  VIII  and  on  military  and  naval  questions 
generally. 

Article  X 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  undertake  to  respect 
and  preserve  as  against  external  aggression  the  ter- 
ritorial integrity  and  existing  political  independence 
of  all  States  members  of  the  League.  In  case  of 
any  such  aggression  or  in  case  of  any  threat  or  danger 
of  such  aggression  the  Executive  Council  shall  advise 
upon  the  means  by  which  this  obligation  shall  be  ful- 
filled. 

Article  XI 

Any  war  or  threat  of  war,  whether  immediately 
affecting  any  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  or  not, 
is  hereby  declared  a  matter  of  concern  to  the  League, 
and  the  High  Contracting  Parties  reserve  the  right 
to  take  any  action  that  may  be  deemed  wise  and 
effectual  to  safeguard  the  peace  of  nations. 

It  is  hereby  also  declared  and  agreed  to  be  the 
friendly  right  of  each  of  the  High  Contracting  Par- 
ties to  draw  the  attention  of  the  Body  of  Delegates 
or  of  the  Executive  Council  to  any  circumstances 
affecting  international  intercourse  which  threaten  to 
disturb  international  peace  or  the  good  understand- 
ing between  nations  upon  which  peace  depends. 
314 


ORIGINAL  COVENANT 

Article  Xn 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  should 
disputes  arise  between  them  which  cannot  be  adjusted 
by  the  ordinary  processes  of  diplomacy,  they  will  in 
no  case  resort  to  war  without  previously  submitting 
the  questions  and  matters  involved  either  to  arbitra- 
tion or  to  inquiry  by  the  Executive  Council  and  until 
three  months  after  the  award  by  the  arbitrators  or  a 
recommendation  by  the  Executive  Council;  and  that 
they  will  not  even  then  resort  to  war  as  against  a 
member  of  the  League  which  complies  with  the  award 
of  the  arbitrators  or  the  'recommendation  of  the  Ex- 
ecutive Council. 

In  any  case  under  this  Article,  the  award  of  the 
arbitrators  shall  be  made  within  a  reasonable  time, 
and  the  recommendation  of  the  Executive  Council 
shall  be  made  within  six  months  after  the  submission 
of  the  dispute. 

Article  XIII 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  whenever 
any  dispute  or  difficulty  shall  arise  between  them 
which  they  recognize  to  be  suitable  for  submission 
to  arbitration  and  which  cannot  be  satisfactorily 
settled  by  diplomacy,  they  will  submit  the  whole  sub- 
ject matter  to  arbitration.  For  this  purpose  the 
Court  of  arbitration  to  which  the  case  is  referred  shall 
be  the  court  agreed  on  by  the  parties  or  stipulated  in 
any  Convention  existing  between  them.  The  High 
Contracting  Parties  agree  that  they  will  carry  out 
315 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

in  full  good  faith  any  award  that  may  be  rendered. 
In  the  event  of  any  failure  to  carry  out  the  award, 
the  Executive  Council  shall  propose  what  steps  can 
best  be  taken  to  give  effect  thereto. 

Article  XIV 

The  Executive  Council  shall  formulate  plans  for  the 
establishment  of  a  Permanent  Court  of  International 
Justice  and  this  Court  shall,  when  established,  be  com- 
petent to  hear  and  determine  any  matter  which  the 
parties  recognize  as  suitable  for  submission  to  it  for 
arbitration  under  the  foregoing  Article. 

Article  XV 

If  there  should  arise  between  States  members  of 
the  League  any  dispute  likely  to  lead  to  a  rupture, 
which  is  not  submitted  to  arbitration  as  above,  the 
High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  they  will  refer 
the  matter  to  the  Executive  Council;  either  party  to 
the  dispute  may  give  notice  of  the  existence  of  the 
dispute  to  the  Secretary-General,  who  will  make  all 
necessary  arrangements  for  a  full  investigation  and 
consideration  thereof.  For  this  purpose  the  parties 
agree  to  communicate  to  the  Secretary-General,  as 
promptly  as  possible,  statements  of  their  case  with  all 
the  relevant  facts  and  papers,  and  the  Executive 
Council  may  forthwith  direct  the  publication  thereof. 

Where  the  efforts  of  the  Council  lead  to  the  settle- 
ment of  the  dispute,  a  statement  shall  be  published 
indicating  the  nature  of  the  dispute  and  the  terms  of 
316 


ORIGINAL  COVENANT 

settlement,  together  with  such  explanations  as  may  be 
appropriate.  If  the  dispute  has  not  been  settled,  a 
report  by  the  Council  shall  be  published,  setting  forth 
with  all  necessary  facts  and  explanations  the  recom- 
mendation which  the  Council  think  just  and  proper 
for  the  settlement  of  the  dispute.  If  the  report  is 
unanimously  agreed  to  by  the  members  of  the  Council 
other  than  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  the  High  Con- 
tracting Parties  agree  that  they  will  not  go  to  war 
with  any  party  which  complies  with  the  recommenda- 
tion and  that,  if  any  party  shall  refuse  so  to  comply, 
the  Council  shall  propose  the  measures  necessary  to 
give  effect  to  the  recommendation.  If  no  such 
unanimous  report  can  be  made,  it  shall  be  the  duty 
of  the  majority  and  the  privilege  of  the  minority  to 
issue  statements  indicating  what  they  believe  to  be 
the  facts  and  containing  the  recommendations  which 
they  consider  to  be  just  and  proper. 

The  Executive  Council  may  in  any  case  under  this 
Article  refer  the  dispute  to  the  Body  of  Delegates. 
The  dispute  shall  be  so  referred  at  the  request  of 
either  party  to  the  dispute,  provided  that  such  request 
must  be  made  within  fourteen  days  after  the  submis- 
sion of  the  dispute.  In  any  case  referred  to  the  Body 
of  Delegates  all  the  provisions  of  this  Article  and 
of  Article  XII  relating  to  the  action  and  powers  of 
the  Executive  Council  shall  apply  to  the  action  and 
powers  of  the  Body  of  Delegates. 
317 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Article  XVI 

Should  any  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  break 
or  disregard  its  covenants  under  Article  XII,  it  shall 
thereby  ipso  facto  be  deemed  to  have  committed  an 
act  of  war  against  all  the  other  members  of  the 
League,  which  hereby  undertake  immediately  to  sub- 
ject it  to  the  severance  of  all  trade  or  financial  re- 
lations, the  prohibition  of  all  intercourse  between 
their  nationals  and  the  nationals  of  the  covenant- 
breaking  State,  and  the  prevention  of  all  financial, 
commercial,  or  personal  intercouse  between  the  na- 
tionals of  the  covenant-breaking  State  and  the  na- 
tionals of  any  other  State,  whether  a  member  of 
the  League  or  not. 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Executive  Council  in 
such  case  to  recommend  what  effective  military  or 
naval  force  the  members  of  the  League  shall  sever- 
ally contribute  to  the  armed  forces  to  be  used  to 
protect  the  covenants  of  the  League. 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree,  further,  that 
they  will  mutually  support  one  another  in  the  financial 
and  economic  measures  which  are  taken  under  this 
Article,  in  order  to  minimize  the  loss  and  inconveni- 
ence resulting  from  the  above  measures,  and  that  they 
will  mutually  support  one  another  in  resisting  any 
special  measures  aimed  at  one  of  their  number  by  the 
covenant-breaking  State,  and  that  they  will  afford 
passage  through  their  territory  to  the  forces  of  any 
318 


ORIGINAL  COVENANT 

of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  who  are  co-operating 
to  protect  the  covenants  of  the  League. 

Article  XVII 

In  the  event  of  disputes  between  one  State  member 
of  the  League  and  another  State  which  is  not  a  mem- 
ber of  the  League,  or  between  States  not  members  of 
the  League,  the  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that 
the  State  or  States  not  members  of  the  League  shall 
be  invited  to  accept  the  obligations  of  membership  in 
the  League  for  the  purposes  of  such  dispute,  upon 
such  conditions  as  the  Executive  Council  may  deem 
just,  and  upon  acceptance  of  any  such  invitation,  the 
above  provisions  shall  be  applied  with  such  modifica- 
tions as  may  be  deemed  necessary  by  the  League. 

Upon  such  invitation  being  given  the  Executive 
Council  shall  immediately  institute  an  inquiry  into 
the  circumstances  and  merits  of  the  dispute  and 
recommend  such  action  as  may  seem  best  and  most 
effectual  in  the  circumstances. 

In  the  event  of  a  Power  so  invited  refusing  to 
accept  the  obligations  of  membership  in  the  League 
for  the  purposes  of  such  dispute,  and  taking  any 
action  against  a  State  member  of  the  League  which  in 
the  case  of  a  State  member  of  the  League  would  con- 
stitute a  breach  of  Article  XII,  the  provisions  of 
Article  XVI  shall  be  applicable  as  against  the  State 
taking  such  action. 

If  both  parties  to  the  dispute  when  so  invited  refuse 
to  accept  the  obligations  of  membership  in  the  League 
319 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

for  the  purposes  of  such  dispute,  the  Executive  Coun- 
cil may  take  such  action  and  make  such  recommenda- 
tions as  will  prevent  hostilities  and  will  result  in  the 
settlement  of  the  dispute. 

Article  XVIII 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  the 
League  shall  be  entrusted  with  the  general  super- 
vision of  the  trade  in  arms  and  ammunition  with  the 
countries  in  which  the  control  of  this  traffic  is  neces- 
sary in  the  common  interest. 

Article  XIX 

To  those  colonies  and  territories  which  as  a  con- 
sequence of  the  late  war  have  ceased  to  be  under  the 
sovereignty  of  the  States  which  formerly  governed 
them  and  which  are  inhabited  by  peoples  not  yet 
able  to  stand  by  themselves  under  the  strenuous  con- 
ditions of  the  modern  world,  there  should  be  applied 
the  principle  that  the  well-being  and  development  of 
such  peoples  form  a  sacred  trust  of  civilization  and 
that  securities  for  the  performance  of  this  trust  should 
be  embodied  in  the  constitution  of  the  League. 

The  best  method  of  giving  practical  effect  to  this 
principle  is  that  the  tutelage  of  such  peoples  should 
be  entrusted  to  advanced  nations  who  by  reason  of 
their  resources,  their  experience  or  their  geographical 
position,  can  best  undertake  this  responsibility,  and 
that  this  tutelage  should  be  exercised  by  them  as 
mandataries  on  behalf  of  the  League. 


ORIGINAL  COVENANT 

The  character  of  the  mandate  must  differ  according 
to  the  stage  of  the  development  of  the  people,  the  geo- 
graphical situation  of  the  territory,  its  economic  con- 
ditions and  other  similar  circumstances. 

Certain  communities  formerly  belonging  to  the 
Turkish  Empire  have  reached  a  stage  of  development 
where  their  existence  as  independent  nations  can  be 
provisionally  recognized  subject  to  the  rendering  of 
administrative  advice  and  assistance  by  a  mandatory 
power  until  such  time  as  they  are  able  to  stand  alone. 
The  wishes  of  these  communities  must  be  a  principal 
consideration  in  the  selection  of  the  mandatory  power. 

Other  peoples,  especially  those  of  Central  Africa, 
are  at  such  a  stage  that  the  mandatary  must  be  re- 
sponsible for  the  administration  of  the  territory  sub- 
ject to  conditions  which  will  guarantee  freedom  of 
conscience  or  religion,  subject  only  to  the  maintenance 
of  public  order  and  morals,  the  prohibition  of  abuses 
such  as  the  slave  trade,  the  arms  traffic  and  the  liquor 
traffic,  and  the  prevention  of  the  establishment  of 
fortifications  or  military  and  naval  bases  and  of  mili- 
tary training  of  the  natives  for  other  than  police  pur- 
poses and  the  defense  of  territory,  and  will  also  secure 
equal  opportunities  for  the  trade  and  commerce  of 
other  members  of  the  League. 

There  are  territories,  such  as  South-west  Africa 
and  certain  of  the  South  Pacific  Islands,  which,  owing 
to  the  sparseness  of  their  population,  or  their  small 
size,  or  their  remoteness  from  the  centers  of  civiliza- 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

tion,  or  their  geographical  contiguity  to  the  mandatory 
state,  and  other  circumstances,  can  be  best  adminis- 
tered under  the  laws  of  the  mandatory  state  as  in- 
tegral portions  thereof,  subject  to  the  safeguards 
above-mentioned  in  the  interests  of  the  indigenous 
population. 

In  every  case  of  mandate,  the  mandatory  state  shall 
render  to  the  League  an  annual  report  in  reference  to 
the  territory  committed  to  its  charge. 

The  degree  of  authority,  control,  or  administration 
to  be  exercised  by  the  mandatory  state  shall  if  not 
previously  agreed  upon  by  the  High  Contracting  Par- 
ties in  each  case  be  explicitly  defined  by  the  Executive 
Council  in  a  special  Act  or  Charter. 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  further  agree  to  es- 
tablish at  the  seat  of  the  League  a  Mandatory  Com- 
mission to  receive  and  examine  the  annual  reports  of 
the  Mandatory  Powers,  and  to  assist  the  League  in 
ensuring  the  observance  of  the  terms  of  all  Mandates. 

Article  XX 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  will  endeavor  to  se- 
cure and  maintain  fair  and  humane  conditions  of  labor 
for  men,  women  and  children  both  in  their  own  coun- 
tries and  in  all  countries  to  which  their  commercial 
and  industrial  relations  extend ;  and  to  that  end  agree 
to  establish  as  part  of  the  organization  of  the  League 
a  permanent  Bureau  of  Labor. 


ORIGINAL  COVENANT 

Article  XXI 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  provi- 
sion shall  be  made  through  the  instrumentality  of  the 
League  to  secure  and  maintain  freedom  of  transit  and 
equitable  treatment  for  the  commerce  of  all  States 
members  of  the  League,  having  in  mind,  among  other 
things,  special  arrangements  with  regard  to  the  neces- 
sities of  the  regions  devastated  during  the  war  of 
1914-1918. 

Article  XXn 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  to  place  under 
the  control  of  the  League  all  international  bureaux 
already  established  by  general  treaties  if  the  parties 
to  such  treaties  consent.  Furthermore,  they  agree 
that  all  such  international  bureaux  to  be  constituted 
in  future  shall  be  placed  under  the  control  of  the 
League. 

Article  XXIII 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  every 
treaty  or  international  engagement  entered  into  here- 
after by  any  State  member  of  the  League,  shall  be 
forthwith  registered  with  the  Secretary-General  and 
as  soon  as  possible  published  by  him,  and  that  no 
such  treaty  or  international  engagement  shall  be  bind- 
ing until  so  registered. 

Article  XXIV 

It  shall  be  the  right  of  the  Body  of  Delegates  from 
time  to  time  to  advise  the  reconsideration  by  States 
323 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

members  of  the  League,  of  treaties  which  have  be- 
come inapplicable,  and  of  international  conditions,  of 
which  the  continuance  may  endanger  the  peace  of  the 
world. 

Article  XXV 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  severally  agree  that 
the  present  Covenant  is  accepted  as  abrogating  all 
obligations  inter  se  which  are  inconsistent  with  the 
terms  thereof,  and  solemnly  engage  that  they  will  not 
hereafter  enter  into  any  engagements  inconsistent 
with  the  terms  thereof. 

In  case  any  of  the  Powers  signatory  hereto  or  sub- 
sequently admitted  to  the  League  shall,  before  becom- 
ing a  party  to  this  Covenant,  have  undertaken  any 
obligations  which  are  inconsistent  with  the  terms  of 
this  Covenant,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  such  Power 
to  take  immediate  steps  to  procure  its  release  from 
such  obligations. 

Article  XXVI 

Amendments  to  this  Covenant  will  take  effect  when 
ratified  by  the  States  whose  representatives  compose 
the  Executive  Council  and  by  three-fourths  of  the 
States  whose  representatives  compose  the  Body  of 
Delegates. 


III.  THE  SENATE  "ROUND  ROB- 
IN" AGAINST  THE  LEAGUE 
OF  NATIONS 

Whereas,  under  the  Constitution,  it  is  a  function 
of  the  Senate  to  advise  and  consent  to,  or  dissent  from 
the  ratification  of  any  treaty  of  the  United  States,  and 
no  such  treaty  can  become  operative  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  Senate  expressed  by  the  affirmative  vote 
of  two-thirds  of  the  Senators  present,  and 

Whereas,  owing  to  the  victory  of  the  arms  of  the 
United  States  and  of  the  nations  with  whom  it  is  as- 
sociated, a  Peace  Conference  was  convened,  and  is 
now  in  session  at  Paris  for  the  purpose  of  settling  the 
terms  of  peace;  and, 

Whereas,  a  Committee  of  the  conference  has  pro- 
posed a  constitution  for  a  League  of  Nations,  and 
the  proposal  is  now  before  the  Peace  Conference  for 
its  consideration; 

Now,  therefore,  be  it  resolved,  by  the  Senate  of  the 
United  States  in  the  discharge  of  its  constitutional 
duty  of  advice  in  regard  to  treaties,  that  it  is  the 
sense  of  the  Senate  that,  while  it  is  the  sincere  desire 
that  the  nations  of  the  world  should  unite  to  promote 
peace  and  general  disarmament  the  Constitution  of 
the  League  of  Nations  in  the  form  now  proposed  to 
325 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

the  Peace  Conference  should  not  be  accepted  by  the 
United  States. 

And  be  it  resolved  further,  that  it  is  the  sense  of 
the  Senate  that  the  negotiations  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States  should  immediately  be  directed  to  the 
utmost  expedition  of  the  urgent  business  of  negotiat- 
ing peace  terms  with  Germany  satisfactory  to  the 
United  States  and  the  nations  with  whom  the  United 
States  is  associated  in  the  war  against  the  German 
Government,  and  the  proposal  for  a  League  of  Na- 
tions to  insure  the  permanent  peace  of  the  world 
should  be  then  taken  up  for  careful  and  serious  con- 
sideration. 

(Signed)  HENRY  CABOT  LODGE,  of  Massachusetts, 
and  thirty-eight  other  Senators  and  Senators- 
elect,  as  follows: 

California,  JOHNSON  New  Jersey,  FRELINGHUYSEN 

Colorado,   PHIPPS  and  EDGE 

Connecticut,  BRANDEGEE  and  New  Mexico,  FALL 

McL-BAN  New  York,  WADSWORTH  and 

Delaware,  BALL  CALDER 

Idaho,  BORAH  North  Dakota,  GRONNA 

Illinois,   SHERMAN   and  Me-  Ohio,  HARDING 

CORMICK  Pennsylvania,      KNOX      and 

Indiana,  NEW  and  WATSON  PENROSE 

Iowa,  CUMMINS  South  Dakota,  STERLING 

Kansas,  CURTIS  Utah,  SMOOT 

Maine,  HALE  and  FERNALD  Vermont,    DILLINGHAM    and 

Maryland,  FRANCE  PAGE 

Michigan,     TOWNSEND     and  Washington,   POINDEXTER 

NEWBERRY  West  Virginia,  SUTHERLAND 

Missouri,  SPENCER  and  ELKINS 

New  Hampshire,  MOSES  and  Wisconsin,  LENROOT 

KEYES  Wyoming,  WARREN 


IV.  AMENDMENTS  PROPOSED  TO 
THE  ORIGINAL  DRAFT  OF 
THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE 
LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

By  the  Honorable  William  Howard  Taft 

First — An  amendment  making  reservations  de- 
signed to  safeguard  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  to  sat- 
isfy those  Senators  and  others  who  fear  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  might  be  jeopardized  by  the  League  of  Na- 
tions, this  amendment  being  drafted  so  that  agree- 
ments under  the  League  covenant  shall  not  be  con- 
strued as  an  infringement  upon  the  principles  of 
international  policies  heretofore  generally  recognized. 

Second. — An  amendment  definitely  affirming  the 
right  of  any  country  in  the  League  to  control  matters 
solely  within  its  domestic  jurisdiction,  this  reservation 
being  broad  enough  to  protect  the  United  States  in 
dealing  with  immigration  and  preventing  the  influx  of 
foreign  labor. 

Third. — An  amendment  definitely  stating  the  rule 
of  unanimity  and  making  it  perfectly  plain  that  any 
action  taken  by  the  Executive  Council  of  the  League 
must  be  unanimous,  thereby  necessitating  the  con- 
currence of  the  American  Government's  member  of 
327 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

the  Executive  Council  before  its  action  could  be  bind- 
ing on  the  United  States. 

Fourth. — An  amendment  by  way  of  definite  state- 
ment on  the  right  of  nations  to  withdraw  from  the 
League  of  Nations  and  possibly  providing  for  a  def- 
inite term,  perhaps  ten  years,  for  the  League  as  a 
whole,  and  a  definite  term  for  the  obligation  to  re- 
strict armament  within  such  limit  as  may  be  agreed 
upon. 

By  the  Honorable  Charles  Evans  Hughes 

Having  explained  at  the  outset  that  he  would  not 
attempt  to  review  matters  of  mere  form,  as  it  seemed 
to  be  conceded  that  the  covenant  was  poorly  drafted, 
and  its  most  earnest  supporters  had  severely  criticized 
it,  Mr.  Hughes  said  he  thought  the  Covenant  should 
be  amended  as  follows: 

"(1)  By  explicit  provision  as  to  the  requirement  of 
unanimity  in  decision. 

"(2)  By  suitable  limitation  as  to  the  field  of  the 
league's  inquiries  and  action,  so  as  to  leave  no  doubt 
that  the  internal  concerns  of  States,  such  as  immigra- 
tion and  tariff  laws,  are  not  embraced. 

"(3)  By  providing  that  no  foreign  Power  shall 
hereafter  acquire,  by  consent,  purchase  or  in  any 
other  way  any  possession  on  the  American  Continent 
or  the  islands  adjacent  thereto. 

"(4)  By  providing  that  the  settlement  of  purely 
American  questions  shall  be  remitted  primarily  to  the 
328 


PROPOSED  AMENDMENTS 

American  nations,  and  that  European  nations  shall 
not  intervene  unless  requested  to  do  so  by  the  Amer- 
ican nations. 

"(5)  By  omitting  the  guaranty  of  Article  X  [which 
pledges  the  nations  in  the  compact  to  undertake  to 
preserve  against  external  aggression  the  territorial 
integrity  and  existing  political  independence  of  every 
State  in  the  league.] 

"(6)  By  providing  that  no  member  of  the  league 
shall  be  constituted  a  mandatary  without  its  consent, 
and  no  European  or  Asiatic  Power  shall  be  constituted 
a  mandatary  of  any  American  people. 

"(7)  By  providing  that  any  member  of  the  league 
may  withdraw  at  its  pleasure  on  specified  notice." 

Mr.  Hughes  criticized  severely  the  tenth  article  of 
the  covenant,  under  which  the  "High  Contracting  Par- 
ties" undertake  to  "respect  and  preserve  as  against 
external  aggression  the  territorial  integrity  and  exist- 
ing political  independence  of  all  states  members  of 
the  league."  Conceding  the  argument  that  this  clause 
had  been  included  to  protect  the  nations  born  of  the 
war,  the  speaker  regarded  it  "as  a  trouble-breeder  and 
not  a  peace  maker/' 

It  makes  no  allowance,  he  said,  for  changes  in 
the  make-up  of  member  nations  which  may  be  found 
advisable  and  "ascribes  a  soundness  of  judgment  to 
the  peace  conference  in  erecting  States  and  defining 
boundaries  which  nobody  in  the  history  of  the  world 
has  ever  possessed." 

829 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Mr.  Hughes  said  definite  recognition  should  be 
made  in  the  league  covenant  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
and,  while  urging  a  clause  prohibiting  European  ag- 
gression on  the  American  continent  in  any  form,  he 
advocated  also  reserving  the  right  of  any  nation 
to  decline  a  mandatary  for  the  administration  of  for- 
eign territory. 

By  the  Honorable  Elihu  Root 

First  Amendment 

Strike  out  Article  XIII,  and  insert  the  follow- 
ing:— 

The  High  Contracting  Powers  agree  to  refer  to  the 
existing  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  at  The 
Hague,  or  to  the  Court  of  Arbitral  Justice  proposed 
at  the  Second  Hague  Conference  when  established,  or 
to  some  other  Arbitral  Tribunal,  all  disputes  between 
them  (including  those  affecting  honor  and  vital  inter- 
ests) which  are  of  a  justiciable  character,  and  which 
the  powers  concerned  have  failed  to  settle  by  diplo- 
matic methods.  The  powers  so  referring  to  arbitra- 
tion agree  to  accept  and  give  effect  to  the  award  of 
the  Tribunal. 

Disputes  of  a  justiciable  character  are  defined  as 
disputes  as  to  the  interpretation  of  a  treaty,  as  to 
any  question  of  international  law,  as  to  the  exist- 
ence of  any  fact  which  if  established  would  con- 
stitute a  breach  of  any  international  obligation,  or 
330 


PROPOSED  AMENDMENTS 

as  to  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  reparation  to  be 
made  for  any  such  breach. 

Any  question  which  may  arise  as  to  whether  a  dis- 
pute is  of  a  justiciable  character  is  to  be  referred  for 
decision  to  the  Court  of  Arbitral  Justice  when  con- 
stituted, or,  until  it  is  constituted,  to  the  existing  Per- 
manent Court  of  Arbitration  at  The  Hague. 

Second  Amendment 

Add  to  Article  XIV  the  following  paragraph: — 
"The  Executive  Council  shall  call  a  general  confer- 
ence of  the  Powers  to  meet  not  less  than  two  years  or 
more  than  five  years  after  the  signing  of  this  conven- 
tion for  the  purpose  of  reviewing  the  condition  of  In- 
ternational Law,  and  of  agreeing  upon  and  stating  in 
authoritative  form  the  principles  and  rules  thereof. 

"Thereafter  regular  conferences  for  that  purpose 
shall  be  called  and  held  at  stated  times." 

Third  Amendment 

Immediately  before  the  signature  of  the  American 
delegates,  insert  the  following  reservation: 

"Inasmuch  as  in  becoming  a  member  of  the  League 
the  United  States  of  America  is  moved  by  no  interest 
or  wish  to  intrude  upon  or  interfere  with  the  political 
policy  or  internal  administration  of  any  foreign  State, 
and  by  no  existing  or  anticipated  dangers  in  the  af- 
fairs of  the  American  continents,  but  accedes  to  the 
wish  of  the  European  States  that  it  shall  join  its 
power  to  theirs  for  the  preservation  of  general  peace, 
331 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

the  representatives  of  the  United  States  of  America 
sign  this  convention  with  the  understanding  that  noth- 
ing therein  contained  shall  be  construed  to  imply  a 
relinquishment  by  the  United  States  of  America  of  its 
traditional  attitude  towards  purely  American  ques- 
tions, or  to  require  the  submission  of  its  policy  re- 
garding such  questions,  (including  therein  the  admis- 
sion of  immigrants,)  to  the  decision  or  recommenda- 
tion of  other  powers." 

Fourth  Amendment 

Add  to  Article  X  the  following: 

"After  the  expiration  of  five  years  from  the  sign- 
ing of  this  convention  any  party  may  terminate  its 
obligation  under  this  Article  by  giving  one  year's  no- 
tice in  writing  to  the  Secretary  General  of  the 
League." 

Fifth  Amendment 

Add  to  Article  IX  the  following: 

"Such  Commission  shall  have  full  power  of  inspec- 
tion and  verification  personally  and  by  authorized 
agents  as  to  all  armament,  equipment,  munitions,  and 
industries  referred  to  in  Article 'VIII." 

Sixth  Amendment 

Add  to  Article  XXIV  the  following: 
"The  Executive  Council  shall  call  a  general  con- 
ference of  members  of  the  League  to  meet  not  less 
than  five  OP  more  than  ten  years  after  the  signing 
332 


PROPOSED  AMENDMENTS 

of  this  convention  for  the  revision  thereof,  and  at  that 
time,  or  at  any  time  thereafter  upon  one  year's  notice, 
any  member  may  withdraw  from  the  League." 

RESERVATION  MADE  TO  THE  HAGUE  CONVENTIONS  OP 

1899  AND  1907  REGARDING  THE  MONROE 

DOCTRINE 

"Nothing  contained  in  this  Convention  shall  be  so 
construed  as  to  require  the  United  States  of  America 
to  depart  from  its  traditional  policy  of  not  intruding 
upon,  interfering  with,  or  entangling  itself  in  the 
political  questions  or  policy  or  internal  administration 
of  any  foreign  State;  nor  shall  anything  contained  in 
the  said  Convention  be  construed  to  imply  a  relin- 
quishment  by  the  United  States  of  America  of  its 
traditional  attitude  toward  purely  American  ques- 
tions." 


V.    THE  COVENANT  AS  REVISED 

The  following  is  the  text  of  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations  as  adopted  by  the  plenary  session 
of  the  Peace  Conference  on  April  28,  1Q19: 

THE  COVENANT  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OP 
NATIONS  * 

In  order  to  promote  international  cooperation  and 
to  achieve  international  peace  and  security,  by  the 
acceptance  of  obligations  not  to  resort  to  war,  by  the 
prescription  of  open,  just  and  honorable  relations 
between  nations,  by  the  firm  establishment  of  the  un- 
derstandings of  international  law  as  to  actual  rule  of 
conduct  among  Governments,  and  by  the  maintenance 
of  justice  and  a  scrupulous  respect  for  all  treaty  ob- 
ligations in  the  dealings  of  organized  peoples  with 
one  another,  the  high  contracting  parties  agree  to  this 
covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

Article  I 

The  original  members  of  the  League  of  Nations 
shall  be  those  of  the  signatories  which  are  named  in 
the  annex  to  this  covenant  and  also  such  of  those 

lfThe  text  is  a  reproduction  of  that  issued  by  the  De- 
partment of  State  at  Washington. 

334 


COVENANT  AS  REVISED 

other  states  named  in  the  annex  as  shall  accede  with- 
out reservation  to  this  covenant.  Such  accessions 
shall  be  effected  by  a  declaration  deposited  with  the 
Secretariat  within  two  months  of  the  coming  into 
force  of  the  covenant.  Notice  thereof  shall  be  sent 
to  all  other  members  of  the  League. 

Any  fully  self-governing  state,  dominion  or  colony 
not  named  in  the  annex,  may  become  a  member  of  the 
League  if  its  admission  is  agreed  by  two-thirds  of 
the  assembly,  provided  that  it  shall  give  effective 
guarantees  of  its  sincere  intention  to  observe  its  inter- 
national obligations,  and  shall  accept  such  regulations 
as  may  be  prescribed  by  the  League  in  regard  to  its 
military  and  naval  forces  and  armaments. 

Any  member  of  the  League,  may,  after  two  years' 
notice  of  its  intention  so  to  do,  withdraw  from  the 
League,  provided  that  all  its  international  obligations 
and  all  its  obligations  under  this  covenant  shall  have 
been  fulfilled  at  the  time  of  its  withdrawal. 

Article  II 

The  action  of  the  League  under  this  covenant  shall 
be  effected  through  the  instrumentality  of  an  As- 
sembly and  of  a  Council,  with  a  permanent  Secre- 
tariat. 

Article  III 

The  Assembly  shall  consist  of  representatives  of 
the  members  of  the  League. 

The  Assembly  shall  meet  at  stated  intervals  and 
335 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

from  time  to  time  as  occasion  may  require,  at  the 
seat  of  the  League,  or  at  such  other  place  as  may 
be  decided  upon. 

,  The  Assembly  may  deal  at  its  meetings  with  any 
matter  within  the  sphere  of  action  of  the  League  or 
affecting  the  peace  of  the  world. 

At  meetings  of  the  Assembly,  each  member  of  the 
League  shall  have  one  vote,  and  may  have  not  more 
than  three  representatives. 

Article  IV 

The  Council  shall  consist  of  representatives  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  of  the  British  Empire, 
of  France,  of  Italy,  and  of  Japan,  together  with  rep- 
resentatives of  four  other  members  of  the  League. 
These  four  members  of  the  League  shall  be  selected 
by  the  Assembly  from  time  to  time  in  its  discretion. 
Until  the  appointment  of  the  representatives  of  the 
four  members  of  the  League  first  selected  by  the 
Assembly,  representatives  of  (blank)  shall  be  mem- 
bers of  the  Council. 

With  the  approval  of  the  majority  of  the  Assem- 
bly, the  Council  may  name  additional  members  of 
the  League  whose  representatives  shall  always  be 
members  of  the  Council;  the  Council  with  like  ap- 
proval may  increase  the  number  of  members  of  the 
League  to  be  selected  by  the  Assembly  for  represen- 
tation on  the  Council. 

The  Council  shall  meet  from  time  to  time  as  occa- 
sion may  require,  and  at  least  once  a  year,  at  the 
836 


COVENANT  AS  REVISED 

seat  of  the  League,  or  at  such  other  place  as  may  be 
decided  upon. 

The  Council  may  deal  at  its  meetings  with  any  mat- 
ter within  the  sphere  of  action  of  the  League  or  af- 
fecting the  peace  of  the  world. 

Any  member  of  the  League  not  represented  on  the 
Council  shall  be  invited  to  send  a  representative  to  sit 
as  a  member  at  any  meeting  of  the  Council  during 
the  consideration  of  matters  specially  affecting  the 
interests  of  that  member  of  the  League. 

At  meetings  of  the  Council,,  each  member  of  the 
League  represented  on  the  Council  shall  have  one 
vote,  and  may  have  not  more  than  one  representa- 
tive. 

Article  V 

Except  where  otherwise  expressly  provided  in  this 
covenant,  or  by  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  decisions 
at  any  meeting  of  the  Assembly  or  of  the  Council 
shall  require  the  agreement  of  all  the  members  of 
the  League  represented  at  the  meeting. 

All  matters  of  procedure  at  meetings  of  the  As- 
sembly or  of  the  Council,  the  appointment  of  com- 
mittees to  investigate  particular  matters,  shall  be 
regulated  by  the  Assembly  or  by  the  Council  and  may 
be  decided  by  a  majority  of  the  members  of  the 
League  represented  at  the  meeting. 

The  first  meeting  of  the  Assembly  and  the  first 
meeting  at  the  Council  shall  be  summoned  by  the 
President  of  the  United  States  of  America. 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

Article  VI 

The  permanent  Secretariat  shall  be  established  at 
the  seat  of  the  League.  The  Secretariat  shall  com- 
prise a  Secretariat  General  and  such  secretaries  and 
staff  as  may  be  required. 

The  first  Secretary  General  shall  be  the  person 
named  in  the  annex;  thereafter  the  Secretary  Gen- 
eral shall  be  appointed  by  the  Council  with  the  ap- 
proval of  the  majority  of  the  Assembly. 

The  Secretaries  and  the  staff  of  the  Secretariat 
shall  be  appointed  by  the  Secretary  General  with 
the  approval  of  the  Council. 

The  Secretary  General  shall  act  in  that  capacity  at 
all  meetings  of  the  Assembly  and  of  the  Council. 

The  expenses  of  the  Secretariat  shall  be  T?orne  by 
the  members  of  the  League  in  accordance  with  the 
apportionment  of  the  expenses  of  the  International 
Bureau  of  the  Universal  Postal  Union. 

Article  VII 

The  seat  of  the  League  is  established  at  Geneva. 

The  Council  may  at  any  time  decide  that  the  seat 
of  the  League  shall  be  established  elsewhere. 

All  positions  under  or  in  connection  with  the 
League,  including  the  Secretariat,  shall  be  open 
equally  to  men  and  women. 

Representatives  of  the  members  of  the  League  and 
officials  of  the  League  when  engaged  on  the  business 
of  the  League  shall  enjoy  diplomatic  privileges  and 
immunities. 


COVENANT  AS  REVISED 

The  buildings  and  other  property  occupied  by  the 
League  or  its  officials  or  by  representatives  attend- 
ing its  meetings  shall  be  inviolable. 

Article  VIH 

The  members  of  the  League  recognize  that  the 
maintenance  of  a  peace  requires  the  reduction  of  na- 
tional armaments  to  the  lowest  point  consistent  with 
national  safety  and  the  enforcement  by  common  action 
of  international  obligations. 

The  Council,  taking  account  of  the  geographical 
situation  and  circumstances  of  each  state,  shall  for- 
mulate plans  for  such  reduction  for  the  consideration 
and  action  of  the  several  governments. 

Such  plans  shall  be  subject  to  reconsideration  and 
revision  at  least  every  ten  years. 

After  these  plans  shall  have  been  adopted  by  the 
several  governments,  limits  of  armaments  therein  fixed 
shall  not  be  exceeded  without  the  concurrence  of  the 
Council. 

The  members  of  the  League  agree  that  the  manu- 
facture by  private  enterprise  of  munitions  and  imple- 
ments of  war  is  open  to  grave  objections.  The 
Council  shall  advise  how  the  evil  effects  attendant 
upon  such  manufacture  can  be  prevented,  due  regard 
being  had  to  the  necessities  of  those  members  of 
the  League  which  are  not  able  to  manufacture  the 
munitions  and  implements  of  war  necessary  for  their 
safety. 

The  members  of  the  League  undertake  to  inter- 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

change  full  and  frank  information  as  to  the  scale  of 
their  armaments,  their  military  and  naval  programmes 
and  the  condition  of  such  of  their  industries  as  are 
adaptable  to  warlike  purposes. 

Article  IX 

A  permanent  commission  shall  be  constituted  to 
advise  the  Council  on  the  execution  of  the  provisions 
of  Articles  I  and  VIII  and  on  military  and  naval 
questions  generally. 

Article  X 

The  members  of  the  League  undertake  to  respect 
and  preserve  as  against  external  aggression  the  terri- 
torial integrity  and  existing  political  independence  of 
all  members  of  the  League.  In  case  of  any  such  ag- 
gression or  in  case  of  any  threat  or  danger  of  such 
aggression,  the  Council  shall  advise  upon  the  means 
by  which  this  obligation  shall  be  fulfilled. 

Article  XI 

Any  war  or  threat  of  war  whether  immediately  af- 
fecting any  of  the  members  of  the  League  or  not,  is 
hereby  declared  a  matter  of  concern  to  the  whole 
League,  and  the  League  shall  take  any  action  that 
may  be  deemed  wise  and  effectual  to  safeguard  the 
peace  of  nations.  In  case  any  such  emergency  should 
arise,  the  Secretary-General  shall,  on  the  request 
of  any  member  of  the  League,  forthwith  summon  a 
meeting  of  the  Council. 

It  is  also  declared  to  be  the  fundamental  right  of 
340 


COVENANT  AS  REVISED 

each  member  of  the  League  to  bring  to  the  attention 
of  the  Assembly  or  of  the  Council  any  circumstance 
whatever  affecting  international  relations  which 
threatens  to  disturb  either  the  peace  or  the  good  un- 
derstanding between  nations  upon  which  peace  de- 
pends. 

Article  XH 

The  members  of  the  League  agree  that  if  there 
should  arise  between  them  any  dispute  likely  to  lead 
to  a  rupture,  they  will  submit  the  matter  either  to 
arbitration  or  to  inquiry  by  the  Council,  and  they 
agree  in  no  case  to  resort  to  war  until  three  months 
after  the  award  by  the  arbitrators  or  the  report  by 
the  Council. 

In  any  case  under  this  Article  the  award  of  the 
arbitrators  shall  be  made  within  a  reasonable  time, 
and  the  report  of  the  Council  shall  be  made  within 
six  months  after  the  submission  of  the  dispute. 

Article  XIII 

The  members  of  the  League  agree  that  whenever 
any  dispute  shall  arise  between  them  which  they  rec- 
ognize to  be  suitable  for  submission  to  arbitration 
and  which  cannot  be  satisfactorily  settled  by  diplo- 
macy, they  will  submit  the  whole  subject  matter  to 
arbitration.  Disputes  as  to  the  interpretation  of  a 
treaty,  as  to  any  question  of  international  law,  as  to 
the  existence  of  any  fact  which  if  established  would 
constitute  a  breach  of  any  international  obligation,  or 
as  to  the  extent  and  nature  of  the  reparation  to  be 
341 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

made  for  any  such  breach,  are  declared  to  be  among 
those  which  are  generally  suitable  for  submission  to 
arbitration.  For  the  consideration  of  any  such  dis- 
pute the  court  of  arbitration  to  which  the  case  is  re- 
ferred shall  be  the  court  agreed  on  by  the  parties  to 
the  dispute  or  stipulated  in  any  convention  existing 
between  them. 

The  members  of  the  League  agree  that  they  will 
carry  out  in  full  good  faith  any  award  that  may  be 
rendered  and  that  they  will  not  resort  to  war  against 
a  member  of  the  League  which  complies  therewith. 
In  the  event  of  any  failure  to  carry  out  such  an  award, 
the  Council  shall  propose  what  steps  should  be  taken 
to  give  effect  thereto. 

Article  XIV 

The  Council  shall  formulate  and  submit  to  the  mem- 
bers of  the  League  for  adoption  plans  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  permanent  court  of  international  jus- 
tice. The  court  shall  be  competent  to  hear  and  de- 
termine any  dispute  of  an  international  character 
which  the  parties  thereto  submit  to  it.  The  court  may 
also  give  an  advisory  opinion  upon  any  dispute  or 
question  referred  to  it  by  the  Council  or  by  the  As- 
sembly. 

Article  XV 

If   there    should    arise    between    members    of    the 

League  any  dispute  likely  to  lead  to  a  rupture,  which 

is  not  submitted  to  arbitration  as  above,  the  members 

of  the  League  agree  that  they  will  submit  the  matter 

342 


COVENANT  AS  REVISED 

to  the  Council.  Any  party  to  the  dispute  may  effect 
such  submission  by  giving  notice  of  the  existence  of 
the  dispute  to  the  Secretary-General,,  who  will  make 
all  necessary  arrangements  for  a  full  investigation 
and  consideration  thereof.  For  this  purpose  the 
parties  to  the  dispute  will  communicate  to  the  Secre- 
tary-General, as  promptly  as  possible,  statements  of 
their  case,  all  the  relevant  facts  and  papers;  the 
Council  may  forthwith  direct  the  publication  thereof. 

The  Council  shall  endeavor  to  effect  a  settlement  of 
any  dispute,  and  if  such  efforts  are  successful,  a  state- 
ment shall  be  made  public  giving  such  facts  and  ex- 
planations regarding  the  dispute,  terms  of  settlement 
thereof  as  the  Council  may  deem  appropriate. 

If  the  dispute  is  not  thus  settled,  the  Council  either 
unanimously  or  by  a  majority  vote  shall  make  and 
publish  a  report  containing  a  statement  of  the  facts 
of  the  dispute  and  the  recommendations  which  are 
deemed  just  and  proper  in  regard  thereto. 

Any  member  of  the  League  represented  on  the 
Council  may  make  public  a  statement  of  the  facts  of 
the  dispute  and  of  its  conclusions  regarding  the  same. 

If  a  report  by  the  Council  is  unanimously  agreed  to 
by  the  members  thereof  other  than  the  representa- 
tives of  one  or  more  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  the 
members  of  the  League  agree  that  they  will  not  go 
to  war  with  any  party  to  the  dispute  which  complies 
with  the  recommendations  of  the  report. 

If  ihe  Council  fails  to  reach  a  report  which  is 
343 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

unanimously  agreed  to  by  the  members  thereof,  other 
than  the  representatives  of  one  or  more  of  the  parties 
to  the  dispute,  the  members  of  the  League  reserve  to 
themselves  the  right  to  take  such  action  as  they  shall 
consider  necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  right  and 
justice. 

If  the  dispute  between  the  parties  is  claimed  by  one 
of  them,  and  is  found  by  the  Council,  to  arise  out  of  a 
matter  which  by  international  law  is  solely  within  the 
domestic  jurisdiction  of  that  party,  the  Council  shall 
so  report,  and  shall  make  no  recommendation  as  to 
its  settlement. 

The  Council  may  in  any  case  under  this  Article 
refer  the  dispute  to  the  Assembly.  The  dispute  shall 
be  so  referred  at  the  request  of  either  party  to  the 
dispute,  provided  that  such  request  be  made  within 
fourteen  days  after  the  submission  of  the  dispute  to 
the  Council. 

In  any  case  referred  to  the  Assembly  all  the  pro- 
visions of  this  Article  and  of  Article  XII  relating  to 
the  action  and  powers  of  the  Council  shall  apply  to 
the  action  and  powers  of  the  Assembly,  provided  that 
a  report  made  by  the  Assembly,  if  concurred  in  by 
the  representatives  of  those  members  of  the  League 
represented  on  the  Council  and  of  a  majority  of  the 
other  members  of  the  League,  exclusive  in  each  case 
of  the  representatives  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute, 
shall  have  the  same  force  as  a  report  by  the  Council 
concurred  in  by  all  the  members  thereof  other  than 
344 


COVENANT  AS  REVISED 

the  representatives  of  one  or  more  of  the  parties  to 
the  dispute. 

Article  XVI 

Should  any  member  of  the  League  resort  to  war  in 
disregard  of  its  covenants  under  Articles  XII,  XIII 
or  XV,  it  shall  ipso  facto  be  deemed  to  have  com- 
mitted an  act  of  war  against  all  other  members  of 
the  League,  which  hereby  undertake  immediately  to 
subject  it  to  the  severance  of  all  trade  or  financial 
relations,  the  prohibition  of  all  intercourse  between 
their  nationals  and  the  nationals  of  the  covenant- 
breaking  state  and  the  prevention  of  all  financial,  com- 
mercial, or  personal  intercourse  between  the  nationals 
of  the  covenant-breaking  state  and  the  nationals  of 
any  other  state,  whether  a  member  of  the  League  or 
not. 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Council  in  such  case  to 
recommend  to  the  several  governments  concerned 
what  effective  military  or  naval  forces  the  members 
of  the  League  shall  severally  contribute  to  the  arma- 
ments of  forces  to  be  used  to  protect  the  covenants 
of  the  League. 

The  members  of  the  League  agree,  further,  that 
they  will  mutually  support  one  another  in  the  finan- 
cial and  economic  measures  which  are  taken  under 
this  Article,  in  order  to  minimize  the  loss  and  incon- 
venience resulting  from  the  above  measures,  and  that 
they  will  mutually  support  one  another  in  resisting 
any  special  measures  aimed  at  one  of  their  number 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

by  the  covenant-breaking  state,  and  that  they  will 
take  the  necessary  steps  to  afford  passage  through 
their  territory  to  the  forces  of  any  of  the  members 
of  the  League  which  are  co-operating  to  protect  the 
covenants  of  the  League. 

Any  member  of  the  League  which  has  violated  any 
covenant  of  the  League  may  be  declared  to  be  no 
longer  a  member  of  the  League  by  a  vote  of  the 
Council  concurred  in  by  the  representatives  of  all 
the  other  members  of  the  League  represented  thereon. 

Article  XVII 

In  the  event*of  a  dispute  between  a  member  of  the 
League  and  a  state  which  is  not  a  member  of  the 
League,  or  between  states  not  members  of  the  League, 
the  state  or  states  not  members  of  the  League  shall 
be  invited  to  accept  the  obligations  of  membership  in 
the  League  for  the  purposes  of  such  dispute,  upon 
such  conditions  as  the  Council  may  deem  just.  If 
such  invitation  is  accepted,  the  provisions  of  Articles 
XII  to  XVI  inclusive  shall  be  applied  with  such  modi- 
fications as  may  be  deemed  necessary  by  the  Council. 

Upon  such  invitation  being  given,  the  Council  shall 
immediately  institute  an  inquiry  into  the  circum- 
stances of  the  dispute  and  recommend  such  action 
as  may  seem  best  and  most  effectual  in  the  circum- 
stances. 

If  a  state  so  invited  shall  refuse  to  accept  the  obli- 
gations of  membership  in  the  League  for  the  pur- 
poses of  such  dispute,  and  shall  resort  to  war  against 
346 


COVENANT  AS  REVISED 

a  member  of  the  League,  the  provisions  of  Article 
XVI  shall  be  applicable  as  against  the  state  taking 
such  action. 

If  both  parties  to  the  dispute,  when  so  invited 
refuse  to  accept  the  obligations  of  membership  in  the 
League  for  the  purposes  of  such  dispute,  the  Council 
may  take  such  measures  and  make  such  recommenda- 
tions as  will  prevent  hostilities  and  will  result  in  the 
settlement  of  the  dispute. 

Article  XVIII 

Every  convention  or  international  engagement  en- 
tered into  henceforward  by  any  member  of  the 
League,  shall  be  forthwith  registered  with  the  Sec- 
retariat and  shall  as  soon  as  possible  be  published  by 
it.  No  such  treaty  or  international  engagement  shall 
be  binding  until  so  registered. 

Article  XIX 

The  Assembly  may  from  time  to  time  advise  the 
reconsideration  by  members  of  the  League  of  treaties 
which  have  become  inapplicable,  and  the  considera- 
tion of  international  conditions  whose  continuance 
might  endanger  the  peace  of  the  world. 

Article  XX 

The  members  of  the  League  severally  agree  that 
this  covenant  is  accepted  as  abrogating  all  obliga- 
tions or  understandings  inter  se  which  are  inconsistent 
with  the  terms  thereof,  and  solemnly  undertake  that 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

they  will  not  hereafter  enter  into  any  engagements  in- 
consistent with  the  terms  thereof. 

In  case  members  of  the  League  shall,  before  becom- 
ing a  member  of  the  League,  have  undertaken  any 
obligations  inconsistent  with  the  terms  of  this  cove- 
nant, it  shall  be  the  duty  of  such  member  to  take 
immediate  steps  to  procure  its  release  from  such  obli- 
gations. 

Article  XXI 

Nothing  in  this  covenant  shall  be  deemed  to  affect 
the  validity  of  international  engagements  such  as 
treaties  of  arbitration  or  regional  understandings  like 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  for  securing  the  maintenance  of 
peace. 

Article  XXH 

To  those  colonies  and  territories  which  as  a  conse- 
quence of  the  late  war  have  ceased  to  be  under  the 
sovereignty  of  the  states  which  formerly  governed 
them  and  which  are  inhabited  by  peoples  not  yet  able 
to  stand  by  themselves  under  the  strenuous  conditions 
of  the  modern  world,  there  should  be  applied  the 
principle  that  the  well-being  and  development  of  such 
peoples  form  a  sacred  trust  of  civilization  and  that  se- 
curities for  the  performance  of  this  trust  should  be 
embodied  in  this  covenant. 

The  best  method  of  giving  practicable  effect  to  this 
principle  is  that  the  tutelage  of  such  peoples  be  en- 
trusted to  advanced  nations  who,  by  reasons  of  their 
resources,  their  experience  or  their  geographical  posi- 


COVENANT  AS  REVISED 

tion,  can  best  undertake  this  responsibility,  and  who 
are  willing  to  accept  it,  and  that  this  tutelage  should 
be  exercised  by  them  as  mandatories  on  behalf  of  the 
League. 

The  character  of  the  mandate  must  differ  accord- 
ing to  the  stage  of  the  development  of  the  people,  the 
geographical  situation  of  the  territory,  its  economic 
condition  and  other  similar  circumstances. 

Certain  communities  formerly  belonging  to  the 
Turkish  Empire  have  reached  a  stage  of  development 
where  their  existence  as  independent  nations  can  be 
provisionally  recognized  subject  to  the  rendering  of 
administrative  advice  and  assistance  by  a  mandatory 
until  such  time  as  they  are  able  to  stand  alone.  The 
wishes  of  these  communities  must  be  a  principal  con- 
sideration in  the  selection  of  the  mandatory. 

Other  peoples,  especially  those  of  Central  Africa, 
are  at  such  a  stage  that  the  mandatory  must  be  re- 
sponsible for  the  administration  of  the  territory  under 
conditions  which  will  guarantee  freedom  of  conscience 
or  religion  subject  only  to  the  maintenance  of  public 
order  and  morals,  the  prohibition  of  abuses  such  as 
the  slave  trade,  the  arms  traffic  and  the  liquor  traffic 
and  the  prevention  of  the  establishment  of  fortifica- 
tions or  military  and  naval  bases  and  of  military 
training  of  the  natives  for  other  than  police  purposes 
and  the  defense  of  territory  and  will  also  secure 
equal  opportunities  for  the  trade  and  commerce  of 
other  members  of  the  League. 
349 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

There  are  territories,  such  as  Southwest  Africa 
and  certain  of  the  South  Pacific  islands,  which,  ow- 
ing to  the  sparseness  of  their  population  or  their 
small  size  or  their  remoteness  from  the  centers  of 
civilization  or  their  geographical  contiguity  to  the 
territory  of  the  mandatory  and  other  circumstances, 
can  be  best  administered  under  the  laws  of  the  man- 
datory as  integral  portions  of  its  territory  subject  to 
the  safeguards  above  mentioned  in  the  interests  of  the 
indigenous  population.  In  every  case  of  mandate,  the 
mandatory  shall  render  to  the  Council  an  annual  re- 
port in  reference  to  the  territory  committed  to  its 
charge. 

The  degree  of  authority,  control  or  administration 
to  be  exercised  by  the  mandatory  shall^  if  not  previ- 
ously agreed  upon  by  the  members  of  the  League,  be 
explicitly  defined  in  each  case  by  the  Council. 

A  permanent  commission  shall  be  constituted  to 
receive  and  examine  the  annual  reports  of  the  manda- 
tories and  to  advise  the  Council  on  all  matters  relat- 
ing to  the  observance  of  the  mandates. 

Article  XXIII 

Subj  ect  to  and  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
international  conventions  existing  or  hereafter  to  be 
agreed  upon,  the  members  of  the  League  (a)  will 
endeavor  to  secure  and  maintain  fair  and  humane  con- 
ditions of  labor  for  men,  women  and  children  both 
in  their  own  countries  and  in  all  countries  to  which 
their  commercial  and  industrial  relations  extend,  and 
350 


COVENANT  AS  REVISED 

for  that  purpose  will  establish  and  maintain  the  neces- 
sary international  organizations;  (b)  undertake  to 
secure  just  treatment  of  the  native  inhabitants  of  ter- 
ritories under  their  control;  (c)  will  entrust  the 
League  with  the  general  supervision  over  the  execu- 
tion of  agreements  with  regard  to  the  traffic  in  women 
and  children,  and  the  traffic  in  opium  and  other  dan- 
gerous drugs;  (d)  will  entrust  the  League  with  the 
general  supervision  of  the  trade  in  arms  and  am- 
munition with  the  countries  in  which  the  control  of 
this  traffic  is  necessary  in  the  common  interest; 
(e)  will  make  provision  to  secure  and  maintain  free- 
dom of  communication  and  of  transit  and  equitable 
treatment  for  the  commerce  of  all  members  of  the 
League.  In  this  connection  the  special  necessities  of 
the  regions  devastated  during  the  war  of  1914-1918 
shall  be  in  mind;  (f)  will  endeavor  to  take  steps  in 
matters  of  international  concern  for  the  prevention 
and  control  of  disease. 

Article  XXIV 

There  shall  be  placed  under  the  direction  of  the 
League  all  international  bureaus  already  established 
by  general  treaties  if  the  parties  to  such  treaties  con- 
sent. All  such  international  bureaus  and  all  commis- 
sions for  the  regulation  of  matters  of  international 
interest  hereafter  constituted  shall  be  placed  under  the 
direction  of  the  League. 

In  all  matters  of  international  interest  which  are 


PROBLEMS  IN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

regulated  by  general  conventions  but  which  are  not 
placed  under  the  control  of  international  bureaus  or 
commissions,  the  Secretariat  of  the  League  shall,  sub- 
ject to  the  consent  of  the  Council  and  if  desired  by 
the  parties,  collect  and  distribute  all  relevant  infor- 
mation and  shall  render  any  other  assistance  which 
may  be  necessary  or  desirable. 

The  Council  may  include  as  part  of  the  expenses  of 
the  Secretariat  the  expenses  of  any  bureau  or  commis- 
sion which  is  placed  under  the  direction  of  the 
League. 

Article  XXV 

The  members  of  the  League  agree  to  encourage 
and  promote  the  establishment  and  co-operation  of 
duly  authorized  voluntary  national  Red  Cross  organi- 
zations having  as  purposes  improvement  of  health,  the 
prevention  of  disease  and  the  mitigation  of  suffering 
throughout  the  world. 

Article  XXVI 

Amendments  to  this  covenant  will  take  effect  when 
ratified  by  the  members  of  the  League  whose  repre- 
sentatives compose  the  Council  and  by  a  majority  of 
the  members  of  the  League  whose  representatives 
compose  the  Assembly. 

No  such  amendment  shall  bind  any  member  of  the 
League  which  signifies  its  dissent  therefrom,  but  in 
that  case  it  shall  cease  to  be  a  member  of  the  League. 


COVENANT  AS  REVISED 

Annex  to  the  Covenant 

One.  Original  members  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions. 

Signatories  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace. 

United  States  of  America,  Belgium,  Bolivia,  Brazil, 
British  Empire,  Canada,  Australia,  South  Africa,  New 
Zealand,  India,  China,  Cuba,  Czecho-Slovakia,  Ecua- 
dor, France,  Greece,  Guatemala,  Haiti,  Hedjaz,  Hon- 
duras, Italy,  Japan,  Liberia,  Nicaragua,  Panama, 
Peru,  Poland,  Portugal,  Roumania,  Servia,  Siam, 
Uruguay. 

States  invited  to  accede  to  the  covenant: 

Argentine  Republic,  Chile,  Colombia,  Denmark, 
Netherlands,  Norway,  Paraguay,  Persia,  Salvador, 
Spain,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  Venezuela. 

Two.  First  Secretary  General  of  the  League  of 
nations.2 

2  The  appointment  of  Sir  James  Eric  Drummond,  of 
the  British  Foreign  Office,  as  Secretary  General  is  an- 
nounced. 


INDEX 


ADAMS,  John,  77 
"Amalfi,  table  of,"  99 
Amendments,    276,    283, 

327-333 

American   republics,    146 
Arbitration,    as    provided 
for  in  the  Covenant, 
120-121 
Armenia,  137 
Asquith,  Mr.,  8 
Austin,  John,  82 
Authority    of    the    Cov- 
enant     under      the 
Constitution    of    the 
United    States,    149, 
155-157 


BALANCE  OP  POWER,  15, 

16,  212,  213,  245 
Balfour,  Mr.,  8,  10 
Bernstorff,  Count  von,  39 
Blackstone,  Sir  William, 


70 


Bolshevism,  49,  137,  201, 

223,  232,  249,  250, 

251,  262 
Bonaparte,    Napoleon    I, 

254 
Bourgeois,  Monsieur,  10, 

204,  205 
British  Prize  Cpurt,  71- 

72,  73-75 
Brockdorff  -  Rantzau, 

Count  von,  39 
Brotherhood  of  Men,  33 
Burlamaqui,  77 
Butler,    Charles    Henry. 

172 


CALHOUN,  John  C.,  167- 

168 

Cambon,  Paul,  101 
Cartography,    peace    by, 

256,  257 
Castlereagh,    Lord,    241, 


242 


355 


INDEX 


Cecil,  Lord  Robert,  276 
Challenge,     the     Presi- 
dent's, to  the  Senate, 
264,  265 
Clayton-Bulwer      treaty; 

the,  107-108 

Clemenceau,  Monsieur. 
204,  205,  211,  212, 
298 

Cleveland,  President,  134 
Conscription,   13,  14 
"Consolato,"  the,  99 
Constitution       of       the 
League    of   Nations. 
See  Covenant 
Cooper,  Sir  R.,  151 
Council.      See    Executive 
Council  and  Supreme 
Council 

Covenant,  the,  as  agreed 
upon  at  Paris,  on 
February  14,  1919, 
309 

as  revised,  334 
attitude  of,  toward  In- 
ternational     Law, 
122 

not   merely    an    agree- 
ment, 110,  111 


Covenant,  the,  work  of 
politicians,  not  of 
jurists,  120 

Crandall,  172 

Cruce,  Emeric,  1 

Cuba,  127,  243 

Curzon,  Lord,  10,  11 

DECLARATION  OF  RIGHTS, 

22 
Democracy,  character  of 

the  German,  52,  53 
tendency     of,     to     oli- 
garchy, 12,  13 
Denmark,  130,  131 
Devlin,  172,  173 
Direct  taxes,  156 
Distribution     of     power, 

158,  159,  160,  161 
Dumas,  78 

EBERT,  Premier  of  Ger- 
many, 52,  54 

Edward  VII,  188 

Efficiency,  American, 
cause  of,  32 

Entente  of  Free  Nations, 
character  of,  the,  34, 
35,  76,  117,  118, 


356 


INDEX 


119,  174,   195,  222, 
223,  225 

Entente  of  Free  Nations, 

formula  of,  101 
referred  to,  227,  261, 
262 

"Eternal  Peace,"  3 

Executive  Council,  pow- 
ers of  the,  114-119, 
123-125,  274-282, 
293 

Expediency,  not  consid- 
ered, 219,  283 

FARRAND,  Max,  86 

Federation,  24,  94,  144- 
145 

Firth,  J.  B.,  9,  11 

Fiscal  policy,  31 

Foreign  policy,  independ- 
ence in,  25 

"Fourteen  Points"  of 
President  Wilson, 
180,  181,  206,  259, 
260,  303 

Franklin,  Benjamin,  79 

Freedom  of  the  seas,  98, 
128,  209,  210 

"Free  Nations,"  26 


Full  powers,  British  for- 
mula of,  140 

GEORGE,   Lloyd,   8,   152 
Gray,  Mr.  Justice,  74 
"Great  Design,"  the,  2 
Grey,   Sir   Edward,   now 

Viscount,   100-101 
Grotius,  Hugo,  1,  4,  76, 

77 

HAGUE  CONFERENCES; 
the,  90 

Hague  Conventions,  the, 
121 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  71, 
77,  87,  88,  185 

Hapsburg,  House  of,  2 

Harden,  Maximilian,  65 

Harrison,  Austin,  14-21 

Henry  IV,  of  France,  1, 
208 

Hindenburg,  Field-Mar- 
shal von,  51,  54 

Hohenzollern  dynasty. 
42.  See  also  Wil- 
liam II 

Holy  Alliance,  240-242, 
253 


357 


INDEX 


Hughes,  Charles  Evans, 
284-288,  328-330 

IMPERIALISM,     138,    139j 

147,  176 

Imperium,    the,    of    the 
League   of    Nations, 
111,   112,   113,   126, 
131,    132,    134,   148, 
174,  175,  178,  252 
Indemnities,  61,  62,  65 
Industries,    Belgian,   59, 

61 

French,  59,  61 
German,  56,  57,  58,  60 
Inequality  of  nations,  27, 

31 

International  govern- 
ment,  23,  24,  25,  29, 
30 

International  Law,  as  af- 
fected by  treaties^ 
89,  90 

authority  of,  91,  92 
attitude    of    the    Cov- 
enant toward,  122, 
123,      127,      128, 
129 
born  of  the  sea,  99 


International  Law,  char- 
acter of,  75-76,  83- 
84 

conditions  of  establish- 
ing, 22 
part  of  Common  Law, 

70-71 
part  of  United  States 

law,  74-75,  91 
revision  of,  289,  290 
violations  of,  16 

JAY,  John,  84 
Jefferson,  President,  175 
Johnson,  Willis  Fletcher, 

135-136 

Jugemens  d'Oleron,  99 
Juristic    equality    of   na- 
tions, 27 

KANT,  Immanuel,  3,  24 
Knox,  Senator,  274-282 

LABOR,  Bureau  of,  255 
Lapradelle,  Professor  de. 

79 

Law,  Bonar,  151-153 
Law  of  Nations.    See  In- 
ternational Law 


INDEX 


Laws  of  Wisby,  99 
League  of  Nations,  the, 
as  an  American  idea, 
15,  16,  21,  299 
a  corporate  entity,  108- 

110 

criticism  of,  not  parti- 
san, 283 

not    spontaneously    as- 
sented to,  204 
not  ultimate  ideal,  259, 

288 
schemes    pf,     17,    23, 


sovereign  character  of, 

133 
League  to  Enforce  Peace, 

20,  25,  205,  273 
Liberum  veto,  116 
London,  secret  treaty  of, 

287 

Louisiana  Purchase,  175 
I 

MADISON,     James,     1 66- 

167 
"Manchester    Guardian," 


137 

Manchester,     President's 
speech  at,  211 

359 


Mandataries,  112,  135- 
138,  174-176,  214, 
288,  298 

NATIONAL  CONFERENCES, 

22 
National    interests,    231- 

232 
Nationalism,  necessity  of, 

249 
Neutrality,      14,     97-98, 

128-131,    174,    210, 

298 
Norway,  130-131 


OLIGARCHY    IN    DEMOC- 
RACY, 12-15 
Orders  in  Council,  71-73 

PAN-GERMANISM,  257 
Paquete  Habana,  case  of 

the,  74 

Parker,  Lord,  72,  97 
Peace,  terms  of,  63,  64 
Persia,  137 
President  of  the  United 


States.  See  Treaty- 
making  power,  also 
Wilson 


INDEX 


"Project     of     Perpetual 

Peace,"  8,  237-239 
Pufendorf,  77 

REPARATION,  61-62,  65 

Roman  Law,  77 

Root,      Elihu,      120-121, 

159-160,    284,    288- 

290,  330-3SS 

SAMOAN  ISLANDS,  96, 
134-136,  176 

Self-determination,  27, 
28,  248,  249,  255 

Senate,  the  constitutional 
relation  of  the,  to  the 
treaty-making  pow- 
er, 267-272.  See 
also  Treaty-making 
power 

Senate  "Round  Robin," 
the,  325 

Siberia,   12 

Sieyes,   9 

Simonds,  Frank  H.,  202 

Smith,  Sir  Frederick,  71 

Smuts,  General,  138, 
176-178,  213,  297, 
300 


Society  of  States,  nature 

of  the,  259-260,  289 
Sovereignty,     24,      138, 

275 
Standard    of    living,    31- 

32 
State,  the,  as  an  economic 

entity,  28-31 

Stafford,  Mr.  Justice,  109 
St.  Pierre,  the  Abbe  de,  3, 

237-239 

Sully,  Duke  of,  1,  208 
Super-government,        the 

League    of    Nations 

a,  112-118,  173-174, 

223-225,    226,    272- 

276,  280,  281 
Supreme     Council,     254, 

258,   296 
Sweden,  130-131 
Switzerland,  129-130 
Sydenham,  Lord,  9 

TAFT,  Henry  W.,   124 
Taft,    William    Howard, 

273-283,  327-328 
Thirty  Years'  War,  1 
Treaties,  as  contracts, 

106-108 


360 


INDEX 


Treaties,    not    abrogated 
by    unilateral    legis- 
lation,   106,    108 
the  supreme  law  of  the 

land,  80,  81 
under    the    Confedera- 
tion, 84 

when  self-executing,  86 
Treaty-making        power, 
under   the   Constitu- 
tion   of   the    United 
States,  149-150,  155, 
170-171 
limitations  of  the,  157- 

169 

under  the  British  Gov- 
ernment, 150-156 
Tucker,   John   Randolph, 

168-169 

Tucker,   St.   George,  the 
elder,  168 

UNANIMITY,    in    the    Ex- 
ecutive    Council     of 


the    League   of   Na- 
tions, 275-277 
Utrecht,  Congress  of,  3, 
237 

VATTEI,,  77-78 

WAR  DEBTS,  65-66 

Washington,  President, 
84,  242 

Westphalia,  Congress  of, 
1 

William  II,  German  Em- 
peror, 42-48,  183 

Wilson,  President,  6-7} 
18-19,  38-40,  61-64, 
137,  180-185,  202, 
211,  218-220,  233- 
235,  263-264,  282, 
294 

Workmen  and  Soldiers, 
Councils  of,  49 

ZAMORA,  case  of  the,  72 


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